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Foreword by DEval and the EBA 
The importance of bridging humanitarian aid and long-term 
development cooperation is a recurrent theme in the global debate 
on development aid. The gaps between the two are becoming more 
troubling as the complexity of conflicts intensifies. The many large-
scale humanitarian crises related to war and violence; their increased 
duration and the growing number of internal, regional and 
international actors with different agendas have made closer 
cooperation between humanitarian assistance and long-term 
development cooperation crucial.  
How could emergency and relief assistance to refugees, internally 
displaced and other populations and long-term development aid and 
post-war reconstruction be better coordinated? How to bring long-
term improvements for refugees and host populations in low or 
middle-income countries alike? How to improve conditions for 
coordination between crisis relief and long-term aid working in the 
same contexts and countries, but along divergent logics and with 
different aims? These are all burning questions. 
The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit reached a consensus on 
the need to better link humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation. But the agreement leaves open the question how this 
can best be done in practice. Moreover, there is not much robust 
evidence and knowledge about the extent to which effective linkages 
have already been established in practice. The present joint literature 
review of the German Institute for Development Evaluation 
(DEval) and the Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) 
presents an overview of knowledge on the humanitarian-
development gap and how it could be closed.  
Based on a review of previous work and literature, the report 
develops an analytical framework which divides the humanitarian-
development gap into seven dimensions, called sub-gaps, related to: 
(1) vision and strategy, (2) planning, (3) funding, (4) institutions, (5) 
ownership, (6) geographic/spatial, and lastly concerning (7) 
sequence. 
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This framework is utilized to analyse empirical studies on the 
international response to the horrendous Syria crisis. Syria may be 
an exceptional and unique case, but also reveals important 
information on the shortcomings that are the result of lack of 
coordination between humanitarian and development actors. The 
review, however, suggests some achievements in linking the two 
after the early years of the Syria emergency, when all focus was 
placed on response to crisis management. Yet, findings expose a 
lack of coordination, and there is an urgent need to develop 
strategies on how best to address remaining sub-gaps.  
The authors’ work has been conducted in dialogue with a 
reference group chaired jointly by Stefan Leiderer at DEval and Kim 
Forss, member of the EBA. However, the authors are solely 
responsible for the content of the report.  
 
Bonn and Stockholm, March 2018 
    
Jörg Faust   Helena Lindholm 
(Director of DEval)  (Chair of the EBA) 
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Summary 
Forced migration has increased enormously worldwide, and a 
pressing political debate has emerged on how to deal effectively with 
underlying crises. Until a few years ago, climate change was 
considered the future main driver of forced migration. Today, 
violent conflict has taken its place in the public limelight, mainly due 
to the crisis in Syria. This crisis entered the European public arena 
only when a significant number of refugees started to reach Europe. 
It suddenly became tangible that the number of refugees is at its all-
time high in the history of mankind, and not a mere figure anymore.1 
Which international actors are competent, and which approach 
is most appropriate to manage forced migration crises? This is a 
long-standing bone of contention. But since crises are becoming 
increasingly protracted today, frequently giving stakeholders of the 
humanitarian and the development sector a good reason to work 
simultaneously, it seems even more imperative to establish linkages 
between sectors. 
The call for changes – mostly as a consequence of the Syria crisis 
– became louder with the first World Humanitarian Summit in 
Istanbul, 2016. Almost all summit documents, such as the Report of 
the United Nations Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian 
Summit, are stressing the need to (better) link humanitarian 
assistance with development cooperation: “Humanitarian and 
development actors need to work collaboratively across silos and mandates to 
implement plans with a clear and measurable collective outcome that reduces the 
vulnerability of internally displaced persons over the long term” (UN Doc. 
A/70/709, 2016: 23 f.) This applies for internally displaced persons 
and refugees alike. 
                                                 
1 According to UNHCR, more than 65 million people worldwide are forced to 
leave their homes. Roughly 13.9 million people in 2014 and 12.4 million people 
in 2015 were forced to flee because of conflict. Due to registration issues and 
other problems, these figures should be treated with caution. They nevertheless 
show a worrying general trend. For the latest figures, see: 
http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (latest access 01.08.2017). 
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There seems to be a growing consensus among key stakeholders 
that the two silos have to be linked and aligned under collective 
outcomes. This is substantiated by global initiatives after the 
Istanbul summit, making policy commitments on the nexus and 
outlining ways to transform them into action.2 However, it is still 
not clear whether they will materialize, and how exactly pledges will 
be transferred to the ground in specific environments. 
Against this background, we: 
 
• filter out recommendations/normative claims from the 
conceptual literature on the humanitarian-development nexus 
and organize them in an analytical framework, allowing for a 
structured perspective on individual forced migration crises; 
• find a systematic disconnect between conceptual claims and 
empirical findings, exemplified by the Syria case; 
• suggest what needs to be done in order to bridge the gap 
between the humanitarian and the development sector when 
dealing with forced migration crises.  
 
This literature review contributes to answer how humanitarian and 
development responses to forced migration crises can be linked 
effectively. It does so by addressing two sub-questions: 
 
1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and 
development responses to forced migration crises? 
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages 
established in practice? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the 2017 
UNHCR Standing Committee 69th meeting: Strengthening humanitarian-
development cooperation in forced displacement situations. 
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To answer the questions above, we proceed in two steps:3 
 
1. We analyse a comprehensive sample of the conceptual literature 
on the nexus between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation. From a fragmented discourse we systematically 
extract recommendations on how to bridge the gap. This 
enables us to develop an analytical framework allowing for a 
structured linkage perspective on empirical literature that deals 
with individual forced migration crises. 
2. We connect the framework to a body of evaluative literature on 
one of the most recent forced migration crises, in Syria and its 
neighbouring countries. 
 
We connect findings from the empirical case study with the 
conceptual analysis, and identify in which areas, and to what extent, 
linkages have been established in the response to the Syria crisis. 
This creates opportunities to discover challenges, and opens a way 
forward for policy makers, practitioners as well as researchers in the 
humanitarian and the development field. 
Main conceptual findings on the humanitarian-
development linkage 
In a first step, 30 selected conceptual studies on the nexus will be 
reviewed. They represent the five most relevant and distinguishable 
concepts in the discourse on linking humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
                                                 
3 The review uses transparent procedures to find and synthesize conceptual and 
empirical findings on the humanitarian-development linkage. It is based on an 
explicit search strategy and applies inclusion/exclusion criteria. The review also 
uses a systematic coding and analysis of studies. Our methodological approach 
is inspired by the DEval evaluation synthesis on budget support (Orth et al., 
2017), and follows basic features of the Campbell approach to systematic 
reviews (see Campbellcollaboration.org). However, our review applies 
qualitative methods (qualitative content analysis), in contrast to the Campbell 
approach. 
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Development (LRRD), Resilience, Whole of Government (WoG), 
Early Recovery, and Connectedness. 
From this literature, we filter out seven sub-gaps of the main gap 
and nineteen recommendations (i.e. normative claims) on how to 
bridge gaps. Findings, sub-gaps and recommendations are then 
arranged in a unified analytical framework, which brings more clarity 
to the debate. The framework also forms a basis for our second step: 
a review of empirical literature on the response to Syria. Table S1 
represents a short version of our framework. 
Table S1: Analytical framework (short version) 
Sub-Gaps Recommendation 
Vision and  
Strategy 
1. Working principles of humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation should be balanced.  
2. Humanitarian and development actors should commit 
themselves to common goals to increase the coherence of 
interventions.  
3. Humanitarian and development actors should develop 
joint country strategies.  
4. Donors should seek to align their country strategies with 
host countries’ strategies.  
5. Humanitarian and development responses should both 
be committed to longer-term engagement in protracted 
crises. 
Funding 6. Humanitarian and development responses should be 
adequately funded in protracted crises. 
7. Funding mechanisms should be more flexible, enable 
actors to react to unforeseen circumstances, and allow for 
rapid responses to emergencies. 
Planning 8. A joint planning process should be initiated, including a 
wide variety of relevant stakeholders, to develop a 
coherent and needs-based response to crises. 
9. Planning processes must be based on assessments that 
collect information on short-term and longer-term needs, 
and should identify opportunities to link humanitarian and 
development interventions. 
10. Interventions should address needs in a holistic way, 
including multiple stakeholders across the humanitarian 
and development realm. 
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Institutional 11. Donor countries should strive for a high degree of 
interdepartmental cooperation in order to reduce 
redundancies and contradictions in overseas operations. 
12. Cooperation between institutions with differing 
mandates should be a common modus operandi in order 
to link humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation. 
13. Clear leadership should be ensured for jointly 
coordinating humanitarian and development actors. 
14. An institutional structure with decision-making power 
closely linked to the area of programme implementation 
should be put in place. 
15. Staffs of stakeholders should have interdisciplinary 
(humanitarian and development) skills needed to promote 
effective linkages. 
Geographic 16. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation 
should be conducted in geographical proximity in order to 
reach the same target groups when the context permits. 
Ownership 17. International humanitarian assistance should work 
with national and local stakeholders when the context 
permits. 
18. International humanitarian assistance should seek to 
develop capacities of national and local stakeholders. 
Sequence 19. Programme designs should ensure an adequate 
sequencing (including timing) of humanitarian and 
development phases. 
Source: Authors’ own  
Main empirical findings  
Progress has been made in linking humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation compared to the early years of mainly 
humanitarian crisis response. This basic finding holds especially true 
for the strategy and planning gap. For other sub-gaps we have found 
mixed evidence.  
Improvements on bridging the strategy and the planning gap  
The Syrian example demonstrates a shift in strategies and planning 
that today reflect the need to simultaneously cater for emergency 
       
8 
responses and long-term development. In the meantime, resilience 
serves as a common denominator for actors. 
Resilience is a key to long-term development. It is epitomized by 
the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RPs) and by new 
compact agreements. The 3RPs also underline how important it is 
to include host countries in a prominent position. They pay tribute 
to a strong ownership component, which is seen as a prerequisite 
for long-term development. 
There has also been progress regarding more comprehensive 
planning that takes into account various sectors (joint sector 
working groups) and beneficiaries. 
Mixed evidence on the funding gap 
An ambivalent picture emerges of the funding gap. Progress has 
been made in applying innovative funding modalities that allow for 
joint humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding 
arrangements, thus enabling actors to react quickly to new 
circumstances. 
But this positive trend is at stake. Dramatic funding shortfalls in 
recent years, and a continued emphasis on humanitarian assistance 
rather than development-oriented programmes in Syria and other 
humanitarian crises have become severe burdens on the 
international community. A general scarcity of funds has emerged. 
This has had one distinct consequence: emergency measures have 
to be prioritized over development-oriented interventions.4 
Mixed evidence on the institutional, geographic, ownership 
and sequence gap 
The institutional, geographic, ownership and sequence gaps show 
another mixed picture. On the one hand, there is no proof that 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are linked 
effectively across space and time (geographic gap, sequence gap). 
                                                 
4 This holds true despite rising ODA figures in Europe in recent years. For 
conditions to be subsumed as ODA, compare 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcov
erage.htm#Definition (last access 14.08.2017). For an in-depth study, compare 
with Knoll and Sheriff, 2017: 17ff. 
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On the other hand, progress has been made in linking institutions. 
The empirical literature provides several positive examples in the 
Syrian context of linkages on different levels – from individual 
organizations linking their humanitarian and development branches, 
and up to humanitarian actors – that show sensitivity to long-term 
perspectives and local organizations.  
Despite challenges and hindering factors to ownership, 
international actors working with and building capacities of national 
and local stakeholders is becoming a common modus operandi. 
This generates positive effects mostly: increased assistance to 
vulnerable people in “no access” areas, higher capacity among local 
authorities, and economic benefits to local private sectors. 
However, building capacities is often a top-down process, 
directed by international organizations. National and local actors 
have little influence on what kind of capacities should be developed. 
Cooperation of this kind is still often born out of necessity rather 
than after considering needs to strengthen local structures. More 
recent concepts of capacity development – as opposed to capacity 
building – are seemingly not implemented on a larger scale.5 
Table S2 summarizes the main findings derived from our review 
of the empirical literature on the Syria crisis response. Progress in 
linking humanitarian and development responses is viewed in 
contrast to remaining problems. 
  
                                                 
5 Compare with 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capa
city-development/capacity-development-a-undp-
primer/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf (last access 14.08.2017). 
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Table S2: Achievements and challenges in linking 
humanitarian and development responses to the Syria crisis 
Sub-Gaps Achievements Remaining Challenges 
Vision and  
Strategy 
 
- shift towards resilience 
agenda  
- joint international 
strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are 
in place that align the 
humanitarian-
development response 
- donor countries are 
committed to longer-
term engagement in 
Syria’s neighbouring 
countries 
- resilience component of 
3RPs/NRPs does not focus on 
refugees to the same extent as 
on host communities 
- unified (interdepartmental) 
donor country strategies are 
exceptions rather than the rule 
- balancing of competing 
working principles is still a 
challenge 
Funding 
 
- innovative funding 
modalities allowing for 
joint humanitarian-
development financing  
- flexible funding 
modalities to react 
quickly to unforeseen 
circumstances 
- the shift towards resilience 
strengthening as a common 
goal of the humanitarian-
development response is not 
reflected in actual allocation 
patterns 
- strong emphasis on emergency 
assistance regarding costs of 
resilience programs 
- at donor country level, 
bureaucratic factors and short 
funding cycles are still hindering 
a more development-oriented 
funding 
Planning 
 
- close collaboration 
between host countries 
and international 
organizations (IOs) in 
response planning 
- joint sector working 
groups in host countries 
- evidence of joint 
planning among 
humanitarian and 
development actors at 
donor country level 
- strict bureaucratic rules in host 
countries are impeding fast and 
flexible project approval 
- local actors are only partially 
involved in planning processes 
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Institutional 
 
- evidence of 
development agencies 
(e.g. Sida) linking both 
forms of assistance 
internally 
- evidence of 
humanitarian actors 
working closely with civil 
society and the private 
sector to create longer-
term perspectives 
- evidence of IOs separating 
emergency response from 
development response (such as 
UNICEF in Turkey) 
- staffs with mixed 
(humanitarian-development) 
skill sets are still in short supply 
among bilateral and multilateral 
agencies 
- high staff turnover often 
inhibits improved humanitarian-
development linkages 
Geographic 
 
no evidence in the 
sample 
- development actors have not 
equally good access to IDPs and 
host communities within the 
Syrian territory as humanitarian 
actors 
- geographical distance between 
humanitarian and development 
offices impedes joint planning 
- spatial mobility of refugees 
makes it difficult to reach them 
with both forms of assistance 
Ownership 
 
- many international 
actors are working with 
national and local 
stakeholders and 
building their capacity 
- capacity building of national 
and local stakeholders is often a 
top-down process, with little 
influence for local actors 
Sequence - many implementers 
are aware of the need 
to adequately plan 
transition and 
sequences in 
programme designs 
- finding an appropriate timing 
of interventions remains a 
challenge for implementers (e.g. 
due to re-allocations of funds or 
lengthy approval processes) 
Source: Authors’ own  
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Connecting empirical findings with the conceptual debate 
Our findings give us a better understanding of remaining challenges 
and opportunities for humanitarian-development linkage. However, 
at times, further reflections are needed to put things into 
perspective. We will subsequently connect findings drawn from the 
empirical sample with further conceptual considerations.  
Bridging the gap or creating new divides?  
An analysis of the empirical literature reveals several cases of 
successfully bridging gaps between the humanitarian and the 
development world. But doubts do remain as to whether 
reconstructing a hardly existing link between conceptual and 
empirical debates by means of a literature review is sufficient to fully 
comprehend those bridges. 
A systematic disconnect remains between conceptual claims and 
evaluative findings – no evaluative study refers directly to any 
concept of the linkage debate. This can only be healed by 
evaluations that measure the outcomes of shifts in linkage. 
Evaluations of that kind are hardly available today. 
There is also a persistent lack of conceptual clarity. Many 
frequently used terms have a catch-all meaning. The risk of jumping 
to premature conclusions can be illustrated by two examples that at 
a first glance might appear to close the ownership gap during the 
Syria crisis. In reality they are leaving many questions unanswered: 
First, humanitarian and development actors are embedded in the 
political context of neighbouring countries equipped with 
comparatively strong capacities. A strong host government arguably 
represents the development side of the nexus; it is able to firmly 
pursue (and at least partially implement) its own perspectives on 
long-term development.6 This marks a major difference compared 
to past crises in failed states (e.g. Haiti, Sierra Leone and Somalia), 
where the UN and other relief organizations substituted state 
                                                 
6 Following the same logic of representation, multilateral UN organizations 
(UNHCR first and foremost) take the lead in representing refugees as the 
humanitarian part of a crisis. 
       
 
13 
structures to a great extent, leaving the question how to achieve 
long-term development widely open. 
The ownership gap will, probably, be bridged if relevant 
stakeholders dealing with the forced migration crisis – implementers 
of humanitarian assistance in the first place – recognize a 
neighbouring host country’s interests. But are long-term 
development perspectives mainly created for host populations, or 
do they include refugees as well? This question is not fully answered. 
In the Syria crisis, host-governments are pushing the resilience 
agenda heavily towards benefits for their own populations, while the 
status of refugees (as temporary guests or people with residence 
permits) remains unsettled.7 To avoid premature conclusions as to 
the ownership gap, one last question needs to be addressed more 
carefully: Who represents whose interests, who owns what?  
Secondly, the need for more precision on what closing the 
ownership gap means in practice can also be illustrated on a micro-
level: by implementers of humanitarian aid who attempt to involve 
civil society organizations and other local actors on the ground. We 
notice a positive trend towards a more demand-driven, people-
centred approach among humanitarian actors. This enhances the 
likelihood of long-term outcomes. 
But we cannot validate to what extent working through local 
institutions is based on the following aspects: a) equally taking into 
account the needs of local populations and refugees; and b) the 
inclusion of local solutions in national plans and strategies. On the 
contrary, a rather well known mechanism seems to be at work in the 
Syria crisis, just as in previous crises. Large international relief 
organizations overwhelm local actors with prescriptions on how to 
deal with matters.  
                                                 
7 One way to give refugees greater priority in the resilience agenda is to create 
incentives for host countries, as manifested in recent compact agreements with 
the European Union. The Jordan Compact, for example, tells us that donor 
countries will provide Jordan with incentives to generate sustainable outcomes 
for refugees by offering trade concessions and non-concessional World Bank 
loans to the national government. 
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Since the empirical literature does not provide more information 
on the nature of ownership, the Syrian example possibly 
demonstrates one thing: humanitarian aid becomes adapted to 
protracted crises, without using the ownership ‘seed’ for building up 
long-term development. 
Both examples point to a missing discussion on consequences of 
current adjustments to the overall linkage discourse. Here, we can 
only state that the initial gap between international humanitarian and 
development actors in an actual and protracted forced migration 
crisis takes different forms and calls for testing overall assumptions 
of effective linkages between humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation. The latter can only be achieved with 
evaluations focusing on outcomes. 
Suggestions on a way forward 
The next steps outlined below are directed towards policy-makers 
and practitioners alike. Both national and international actors are 
invited to pick them up and use them as a guidance for their own 
practice. We have not identified specific stakeholders to lead this 
process, since the literature review serves to provide conceptual 
clarity rather than analysing the political landscape. However, the 
identified steps are geared towards preventing stakeholders to hide 
behind allegedly telling idioms, such as ‘common goals’, without 
eventually coming to terms with practical progress in linking (or 
reasoning why linking should not take place).  
Further research and evaluative work is urgently needed in order 
to find adequate answers to an overall question of urging practical 
relevance. Our literature review makes this clear. Subsequently, we 
will explain some conceptual and empirical shortcomings, and 
provide suggestions on how to overcome them: 
 
1. There is an obvious missing link between conceptual knowledge 
and empirical findings. A consistent logic must be developed of 
the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation (Theory of Change, ToC). It should be based on 
further conceptual clarity – and our analytical framework is a 
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first step. Additionally, it needs to take empirical findings into 
account in a systematic way. What can different stakeholders’ 
experiences tell us on effective linkages? What are the positive 
or negative consequences of linking efforts? 
 
2. Our empirical case study (the Syria crisis) is the best one at hand 
currently, in our opinion. But one single case study has obvious 
limitations: it leads to a lack of external validity. We have to 
contrast Syria to other cases before more general statements can 
be put forward on the humanitarian-development linkage. 
 
3. The reviewed empirical studies provide almost no evidence at 
all on intended, and unintended, outcomes of linkages between 
the two forms of assistance in relation to the Syria crisis. Studies 
do not explain whether these bridges have generated any 
substantial effects for end beneficiaries. In order to validate a 
Theory of Change on linkage, evaluations and/or impact 
assessments focused on outcomes are necessary. New empirical 
knowledge must spell out exactly how to connect to what on 
different levels. It must clarify intended outputs, outcomes and 
impacts, and how to get there (causal paths, mechanisms, etc.). 
This can also be seen as a prerequisite for giving priority to 
individual sub-gaps and closing them. 
 
4. The general debate on linking humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation is fragmented and partially 
inconsistent. The outlined way forward – and its projected 
results – must be fed into a broader discussion among 
researchers and practitioners who are open to new information. 
Ultimately, we need a unified debate, with conceptual 
consistency based on empirical evidence.  
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1. Introduction 
Forced migration triggered by crises has increased enormously in 
the world (Figure 1), and we are facing a pressing political debate on 
how to deal with this drama. Until a few years ago, climate change 
was considered the future main driver of forced migration. Since 
then, the long-lasting crises in Syria and elsewhere have pushed 
violent conflict into the limelight. The Syrian crisis entered the 
European public arena only when a significant number of refugees 
started to reach Europe. It became tangible that the number of 
refugees is at its all-time high historically, and not a mere figure 
anymore.8  
Recent experiences from Syria, Afghanistan and other places 
show that violent conflicts are increasingly protracted and difficult 
to mitigate. Consequently, the number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) seeking protection in safe areas in 
neighbouring countries, and inside a conflict-ridden country, has 
risen drastically. Eighty per cent of today’s refugees come to lower 
and middle-income countries who themselves often face fragile 
socioeconomic and political situations – and who for this reason are 
struggling to cope with the flow of refugees.9 
One common denominator in the current political debate is that 
protracted crises in refugee- and IDP-receiving countries can be 
dealt with by creating conditions that lead to long-term 
improvements for all affected groups: refugees, IDPs and host 
                                                 
8 According to UNHCR, more than 65 million people in the world are forced to 
leave their homes. Roughly 13.9 million people in 2014 and 12.4 million in 2015 
were forced to flee because of conflict. Due to a number of problems such as 
registration issues, these figures have to be treated with caution. They 
nevertheless show a worrying general trend. For latest figures, see 
http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (latest access 01.08.2017). 
9 See http://www.unric.org/en/world-refugee-day/26978-new-report-
developing-countries-host-80-of-refugees- (latest access 02.08.2017). However, 
the largest host country, hosting 2.9 million refugees, is Turkey – arguably also 
increasingly confronted with fragility. Compare with 
http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (latest access 01.08.2017). 
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populations, which in turn is allegedly suited to prevent a mass 
exodus from troubled areas. 
 
Figure 1: Forcibly and newly displaced population due to 
conflict or persecution worldwide 
 
Note: Forcibly displaced population: Refugees, IDPs, Asylum-seekers (blue series) and Newly 
displaced due to conflict or persecution (red series). Figures in millions. Source: UNHCR, A 
Year of Crises, Global Trends 2011; UNHCR. Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2016. 
 
Which international actors are competent, and what is the most 
appropriate approach to deal with and manage forced migration 
crises? That is a long-standing bone of contention.10 The fact that 
both humanitarian and development actors are involved in 
responses to protracted forced migration crises calls for clarifying 
which actors should do what, and when, in order to achieve certain 
outcomes. 
                                                 
10 Even though UNCHCR is the leading organization mandated to protect 
refugees, there is an abundance of other implementers of humanitarian 
assistance. They work “in collaboration, complementarity or competition” 
(Davey et al., 2013: 1) with each other, and vis-à-vis implementing organizations 
responsible for development cooperation. 
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1.1 Humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation – two worlds, 
one problem 
The perception of international humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation as separate worlds has a long history. 
Western humanitarian assistance appeared for the first time in an 
organized form during the Battle of Solferino during the Second 
Italian War of Independence (1859) – where volunteers helped 
injured soldiers of both war parties. This triggered the foundation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross as a neutral and 
impartial institution. Further wars in Europe induced the Hague 
Conventions (1899 and 1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1864–
1949) to stipulate rights of victims of war, including civilians. Both 
conventions show that humanitarian assistance originally is closely 
linked to wars in Europe. Saving lives and alleviating suffering was, 
and is today, the prime purpose. But modern humanitarian 
assistance carries out a broader range of activities, including 
responding to natural and man-made disasters, supporting displaced 
people in acute and protracted crises, livelihoods support, conflict 
resolution and peace-building (Davey et al., 2013: 1). 
In contrast to humanitarian assistance, support to countries 
affected by conflict and fragility is a relatively new field for 
development cooperation. Originally, development assistance 
primarily focused on partner countries seeking economic growth 
during the postcolonial era after World War II. The journey from 
early nation-building efforts unto today has brought many changes. 
Most relevant here is the emphasis on aid effectiveness as a guiding 
principle, including a strong ownership component attributed to 
partner countries. 
Expanding violent, especially intrastate, conflicts in recent years 
(cf. Gates et al., 2016: 2) has forced traditional development 
cooperation to deal more frequently with fragility. Twenty-two of 
the world’s 34 poorest countries were either conflict-ridden or In 
tormented by post-conflict traumas in 2010 (BMZ, 2013: 7). By 
supporting them as well as countries affected by forced migration 
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crises, today’s development cooperation focuses on longer-term 
perspectives for people in need. 
 
Figure 2: Two worlds: international humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation 
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In sum, modern conflicts and crises – in terms of quantity and 
length of time – has brought two originally separated worlds closer 
together: they have to deal with one common problem. This is 
reflected in current refugee crises. Both forms of assistance often 
operate simultaneously, but they follow different – historically 
grown – logics of action (Figure 2).11 
Thus, the appropriate division of labour between humanitarian 
and development actors during forced migration crises is a relevant 
issue for two main reasons. First, protracted crises highlight the 
need to systematically link what hitherto merely overlapped. 
Secondly, a plethora of divergent answers still seem to exist, despite 
the fact that effective linkages between the two worlds has been a 
frequently discussed topic since the early 1990s – also in other 
contexts such as natural disasters. 
Unfortunately, the discourse is quite fragmented. This challenge 
has motivated the present literature review to a considerable degree. 
The changes confronting international humanitarian assistance 
have not only triggered actors to stay on for longer periods of time 
and to engage on a larger scale (see ALNAP, 2015).12 These changes 
also evoke a need for more interdisciplinary expertise to mitigate 
recent crises, involving natural and social sciences, private sectors, 
the military, social networks, and local communities (Bennett et al., 
2017: 6). This expertise reaches far beyond humanitarian action of 
the past, and leads actors to a more holistic and structural view on 
conflicts and future perspectives. The intertwined nature of today’s 
conflicts is making the picture even more complex. 
The fact that countries affected by forced migration are 
exhibiting fragility gives us a logical connection to the development 
sphere. Traditionally, development cooperation operates in non-
conflict-driven environments, but the spread of fragility and crises 
has created many points of contact with forced migration in 
                                                 
11 In some crises, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation have 
started simultaneously. In others one of the two appeared first. 
12 Protracted crises usually last for decades. For example, 80 per cent of all 
refugee crises go on for ten years or more (Crawford et al. 2015: 1). 
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emergency situations. 13  Formerly stable countries are turning 
volatile, creating additional needs for investments in systemic 
development measures. Devastating downward spirals have seized 
countries hitherto not needing measures of that kind. A new start is 
called for in a difficult working environment from the very 
beginning of international engagement.  
Finally, this globalization of conflicts demonstrates that two 
separate logics – humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation – acting one after the other, or neatly segregated next 
to each other – is not adequate anymore. The lack of clear-cut 
divisions is further exacerbated by frequently changing conflicts. 
Hence, it is necessary to adapt continuously to new situations. 
Sometimes you have to find flexible answers and act quickly for the 
sake of affected groups of people. In other situations it calls for 
longer-term approaches and perspectives addressing, for example, 
institutional structures. 
Whether the two general approaches really are capable of 
adapting to frequent changes is a contested issue. But there is an 
emerging consensus on one assessment: linking cannot happen in a 
linear continuum, leading from humanitarian emergency assistance 
to structural development cooperation. It has to take place in a 
contiguum (simultaneously).   
Against this background, it seems imperative to establish 
effective linkages. The call for changes, especially as a consequence 
of the Syria crisis, became louder during the first World 
Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016. Almost all summit 
documents (such as the Report of the United Nations Secretary-
General for the World Humanitarian Summit) stress how important 
it is to interconnect humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation: 
“Humanitarian and development actors need to work 
collaboratively across silos and mandates to implement plans with a 
                                                 
13 It is noticeable that long-term rehabilitation and development of formerly 
war-stricken countries worldwide is a relatively new factor; it did not cover 
countries of the Middle East during previous conflicts (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war in 
the 1980s). 
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clear and measurable collective outcome that reduces the 
vulnerability of internally displaced persons over the long term”(UN 
Doc. A/70/709, 2016: 23 f.). This applies for internally displaced 
and refugees alike. 
However, while there is a general consensus that the two silos 
have to be linked and aligned under collective outcomes, it is not at 
all clear how this can be done in practice in specific environments. 
1.2 Scope and research question 
The multitude of different actors with diverging perspectives on the 
‘contiguum’ is the backdrop of the question how humanitarian 
assistance and development cooperation can be effectively linked.  
The present review sheds light on current conceptual knowledge on 
linkages, and juxtaposes this with the Syrian example.14 We explore 
whether there are constructive examples of interconnecting the two 
worlds. 
So how can responses to conflict-induced migration crises be 
linked effectively?15 We start by investigating two sub-questions:  
1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and 
development responses to forced migration crises? 
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages 
established in practice? 
 
We apply a two-stage procedure of literature analysis. In a first step, 
we are reviewing 30 conceptual studies on the humanitarian-
development nexus. They represent the five most prominent (i.e. 
most often referred to) and distinguishable concepts in the 
discourse on linking humanitarian aid and development 
cooperation: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, 
Resilience, Whole of Government, Early Recovery, and 
                                                 
14 On the rationale behind choosing the Syria crisis, see Section 1.3, and Sections 
2.1 and 2.3 for further details. 
15 In this review we use “conflict-induced migration crises” and “forced 
migration crises” as synonymous terms. 
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Connectedness. This serves to systematically analyse and structure 
the humanitarian-development gap at the conceptual level. It also 
filters out recommendations on how to close the gap. 
Our aim of this cross-conceptual analysis is to find all relevant 
recommendations. From this starting point we proceed and develop 
an analytical framework allowing us to scrutinize empirical studies 
through the linkage lens.  
For reasons of clarity, the analytical framework organizes our 
findings along seven dimensions of the main gap: the vision and 
strategy gap, the funding gap, the planning gap, the institutional gap, 
the geographic gap, the ownership gap and the sequence gap. They 
help us to capture all disputed ramifications relevant to the first sub-
question above. 
In a second step, we apply the framework to 30 evaluations and 
evaluative studies on the international response to the Syria 
migration crisis. This addresses the second sub-question.  
Our overarching purpose is to provide guidance for policy 
makers and practitioners on how to link humanitarian and 
development responses to conflict-induced migration crises. In 
addition, the review provides guidance on how to evaluate various 
linkage dimensions by applying the analytical framework 
(Chapter 4). 
Future research and evaluative work, finally, can build upon our 
preparatory work and develop a proper theory of linkage (a Theory 
of Change, ToC), one which spells out (1) exactly how to link what 
at various levels, (2) what the intended effects of these linkages are, 
and (3) exactly how to reach these effects (considering causal 
mechanisms).  
1.3 Limitations 
The literature review has certain limitations. We acknowledge the 
merits of a political economy perspective on organizations and their 
vested interests, but the conceptual literature does not devote much 
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attention to their role. Accordingly, our analytical framework 
reflects only partially on political economy.  
Second, we do not deny that building bridges may be irrelevant 
sometimes. There are probably cases where bridging a gap (or 
individual sub-gaps) is simply not necessary for reaching certain 
outcomes – or cases where bridges are only needed at a certain 
stage. 16  However, irrelevant or not, a comprehensive answer 
requires more impact-oriented research.  
Third, we explore what is needed to effectively link responses to 
forced migration crises exclusively from a current discourse 
perspective, based mainly on conceptual studies. An accurate 
answer will depend on how accurate these studies are. Our review 
summarizes and synthesizes information on the humanitarian-
development gap, and how to close the gap. We also reflect on 
conceptual clarity. Here, we shall apply the main analytical steps of 
a standard literature review in social sciences (Fink 2005; Hart 1998; 
Ridley 2012).17  
However, we have not systematically assessed whether some 
recommendations are more “correct” than other ones. 18  Such 
endeavours require impact-oriented research that explores whether 
recommended linkages generate positive effects for end 
beneficiaries of flesh and blood. This is an important task for future 
                                                 
16 There are also cases where a linkage is not appropriate. For example, if 
humanitarian actors protect refugees or IDPs against state violence, it would not 
be appropriate to develop a joint crisis response strategy with a state resorting to 
violence. In other words, conflicting goals can constitute a good reason for 
reflecting on when, to link and when to avoid it. 
17 This literature review uses transparent procedures to find, summarize, and 
synthesize conceptual and empirical findings on the humanitarian-development 
linkage. In doing so, it also applies essential criteria of a systematic review, as 
defined by the Campbell Collaboration. It is based on (a) an explicit search 
strategy by (b) applying inclusion/exclusion criteria, and uses a systematic 
coding and analysis of studies (see Campbellcollaboration.org). However, unlike 
the Campbell approach, this review is based on the application of qualitative 
methods – it does not apply a meta-analysis. 
18 As a consequence, we integrated only those recommendations into the 
analytical framework, which are presented in at least two of the reviewed 
conceptual studies, and/or which intuitively appeared plausible. 
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research. Our reviewed conceptual literature and empirical studies 
on the Syria crisis response remain largely silent on outcomes related 
to shifts in linkages. 
Fourth, one discovery is that conceptual studies envisage a 
humanitarian-development gap consisting of various sub-gaps (e.g. 
a funding gap or an institutional gap). Which sub-gaps are most 
important? Based on recommendations filtered out from this 
literature, we are unable to find specific conclusions. 
Fifth, in order to find out to what extent effective linkages are 
established in practice, we will focus on one single case: Syria.19 This 
means that our findings can be generalized only to a limited extent. 
Further research and evaluative work is needed to increase external 
validity. 
We believe, though, that we have chosen the best possible case. 
If there is any evidence of successful linkages, it will most likely be 
found in a drama of utmost relevance in terms of political pressure, 
funding levels, applied aid modalities, and current transformation of 
the humanitarian system.20 After all, there is no such thing as a 
typical refugee crisis, representative of all the other ones. Contexts 
always vary.  
1.4 Structure of review 
Chapter 2 will explain our methodology. Chapter 3 presents the five 
central concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus. It also 
draws general conclusions, and prepares the field for an analysis of 
empirical literature on the Syria crisis. 
In Chapter 4, we will develop an analytical framework based on 
the conceptual findings, including recommendations on how to 
close various dimensions of the main gap. In a next step, we explore 
to what extent the recommended linkages have actually been 
                                                 
19 This in-depth, single case study approach allows us to review the empirical 
literature in greater detail, and to capture the linkage of humanitarian and 
development response to this forced migration crisis in its full complexity. 
20 For a more detailed rationale of the case selection, see Sections 2.1 and 2.3. 
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established in response to the migration crisis. Additionally, we 
identify factors that are blocking or facilitating linkages between the 
two logics of action in each sub-gap. 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions, highlights residual questions, and 
suggests a way forward to further evaluative work based on our 
conceptual and empirical findings. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 A systematic literature review in two 
steps 
This literature review explores how humanitarian and development 
responses to forced migration crises can be linked more effectively. 
We will proceed in two steps guided by the following sub-questions: 
 
1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and 
development responses to forced migration crises? 
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages 
established in practice? 
 
In order to address the first sub-question, it is necessary to 
understand what various stakeholders actually mean when they are 
calling for bridging the humanitarian-development divide more 
effectively. Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer, and no 
unified conceptual framework as to what this divide contains in 
concrete terms. Instead, there are various strands of discussion on 
the humanitarian-development nexus that each touch upon 
different aspects of bringing together humanitarian and 
development responses to crises and that make different 
suggestions on how to do this in practice.  
In a first step, we therefore identify the most prominent concepts 
on the humanitarian-development nexus. We systematically analyse 
these concepts with regard to how they characterize the 
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humanitarian-development gap from their individual perspective, 
and how they propose to bridge it. Grouping these characterizations 
and recommendations according to analytical categories, then allows 
us to describe the abstract concept of the humanitarian-
development gap in a more structured and concrete manner along 
thematic “sub-gaps” that describe different dimensions of the main 
gap. 
This analytical structure provides a basis for the second step of 
our analysis (regarding the second-sub-question), exploring to what 
extent and why the individual sub-gaps are bridged in practice, i.e. 
to what extent (and why or why not) the conceptual 
recommendations are translated into actual deeds. We do so by 
contrasting the recommendations on how to close the identified 
sub-gaps of the overall humanitarian-development gap to empirical 
evidence on the international response to the Syria crisis. 
The Syria crisis promises to be the most salient case. It forms the 
background to persistent calls by international stakeholders to 
eventually come to terms with the promise of coherence and 
coordination between humanitarian and development responses. 
Due to this political pressure and relevance, it can be assumed that 
(conceptual and empirical) lessons learned by national and 
international actors are – if at all - more likely to be implemented in 
the response to the Syria crisis. In extension, this implies that the 
findings of our case study do not necessarily extend to previous 
crisis responses. They are probably more relevant as guides into the 
future. The individual analytical steps of our two-stage (conceptual 
and empirical) approach are briefly described below. Full details of 
our methodology are provided in Annex B. 
2.2 Conceptual approach 
Our review of the conceptual literature has two purposes: to gain a 
thorough understanding of what characterizes the humanitarian-
development gap, and to find relevant recommendations on how to 
bring together the two realms. This gives us an answer to the first 
sub-question. Below, we briefly describe the procedure for selecting 
the conceptual literature, and our methodological approach to 
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analysis. Later on, we will present the empirical approach by 
focussing on the same aspects. 
2.2.1 Identification of the conceptual sample 
In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on what 
the humanitarian-development gap consists of and how to close this 
gap we applied a specific sampling procedure. In a first step, we 
identified the most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-
development nexus by assuming that they will provide us with the 
most relevant information for answering these questions. Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LLRD) is by far the most 
prominent concept in terms of available literature on the topic. 
However, studies on LRRD also refer to other concepts related to 
the nexus (e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014; Otto and Weingärtner, 
2013; Steets, 2011). Most frequently mentioned are: Early Recovery, 
Resilience, Connectedness and Whole of Government. 
Analyses of different concepts give us an opportunity to capture 
different analytical approaches to the humanitarian-development 
gap and potentially different suggestions on how to bridge this gap. 
Consequently, we decided to review studies from all of these five 
concepts.21  
In a second step, we identified studies for each of these concepts. 
A keyword search (”LRRD”, “Early Recovery”, “Whole of 
Government”, “Connectedness”, and “Resilience”) was conducted 
in publicly available databases of international, governmental, and 
non-governmental organizations, active in development 
cooperation or humanitarian assistance, and in databases of 
networks and research institutes.22 In order to identify documents 
most relevant for addressing the first sub-question, we established 
as a necessary condition that documents to be included in the final 
sample must contain detailed information on a certain concept. In 
                                                 
21 Another concept – disaster risk reduction – is also mentioned in various 
overview studies. However, we did not include it because of its narrow focus on 
natural disasters, which makes it irrelevant for the context of forced migration 
crises in the second step (empirical approach) of our analysis. 
22 See Table 7 in Annex B for a complete list of the databases. 
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doing so, they must provide a characterization of the humanitarian-
development gap and recommendations on how to bridge it. 
Empirical studies were included only if they fulfilled this condition.23  
As a result, a total of 30 studies were found that deal with the 
humanitarian-development nexus from different conceptual 
perspectives. 24  Most belong to the so-called grey literature, 
published by institutions, including governmental and non-
governmental institutions, international organizations, as well as 
research institutions (see table 9 in Annex B). We did not impose 
any restriction on publication dates since we wanted to capture the 
discourse in its full depth. Our 30 studies are ranging from 1994 to 
2016. Half of them base their conceptual considerations on their 
own empirical work, or on that of others, yet this rarely involves 
more than anecdotal evidence. 
2.2.2 Content analysis of the conceptual sample 
To extract how the conceptual studies characterise the 
humanitarian-development gap from their respective perspective 
and how they recommend building bridges, we conducted a 
qualitative content analysis of these studies. Four questions were 
posed, hopefully bringing vital information and a well-founded 
answer to the first sub-question (presented in section 2.1). 
The four questions are: 
 
1. What are the specific characteristics of the humanitarian-
development gap highlighted in a study? 
2. What are the specific recommendations on how to bridge the 
gap? 
3. What justification is given regarding the need to link 
humanitarian assistance with development cooperation? 
                                                 
23 Other selection criteria for the conceptual sample are: synthesis study (either 
overview of different strands within the concept, or empirical findings on more 
than one actor/country); focus on fragile states; focus on protracted crises; 
focus on forced migration (see Figure 3 in Annex B). 
24 For the distribution of our 30 documents across the five concepts, see Table 8 
in Annex B. 
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4. What is the empirical foundation of the concepts and the 
recommendations?  
 
The first and the second question are focused on essentials related 
to our first sub-question. Once we know what the humanitarian-
development gap consists of, and find specific recommendations on 
how to bridge the gap at different levels, we will be able to describe 
what is needed to effectively link the two realms. The third and 
fourth questions give us a more complete picture. The third one 
pays particular attention to explanations on why linkages are vital. 
The fourth question sheds light on the empirical foundation of 
conceptual claims. 
The content analysis was based on a code scheme: codes (words 
or short phrases) were assigned to corresponding text segments in 
order to extract and systematize the information of interest form the 
conceptual studies. Since we don’t have a clear-cut theory on the 
linkage between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation, we applied an inductive coding approach, in which the 
codes stem from the material to be coded itself. This required an 
iterative coding process in a couple of steps:  
1. We developed a basic framework of the coding scheme deduced 
from the four questions above. Regarding the first one, for 
example, we created the main code “description of the 
humanitarian development gap”. 
2. By identifying specific information provided in the studies 
related to one of the main codes (and, thus, to one of the four 
questions), we added new (sub-)codes – capturing the essence 
of this information – to the respective main code. For example, 
if we found a text segment, which stated that the humanitarian-
development gap is characterized by a lack of joint planning 
among actors from the two realms, we added the new sub-code 
“planning gap” (as one dimension of the humanitarian-
development gap) to the main code “description of the 
humanitarian development gap”. A specific recommendation on 
how to bridge the gap with regard to the planning dimension 
received a corresponding code: “planning gap” => 
“recommendation xy”. 
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3. Once a new code was created, it was assigned to relevant text 
segments in all sample sources.  
 
This systematic approach – simultaneously assigning existing codes 
and supplementing the code scheme with new codes to be assigned 
to relevant text segments – resulted in 3,491 codings (text segments) 
across all codes. To distil a common message for each code, we 
listed all text segment per code. Depending of the respective code, 
this could be a definition of a certain dimension of the 
humanitarian-development gap (a planning dimension for instance) 
or one or several core recommendations on how to close the gap 
with respect to this dimension. 
Overall, we identified seven different dimensions of the 
humanitarian-development gap and nineteen recommendations 
filtered out of the conceptual sample studies on how to close the 
gap with respect to these dimensions. In other words, the studies 
conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap as a multi-
dimensional problem. It appears on different levels (or certain areas 
of activities respectively), such as on a strategic level or on an 
implementation level. In this interpretation, the humanitarian-
development gap is the sum of the following sub-gaps: (1) a vision 
and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an 
institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) 
a sequence gap. Definitions of these sub-gaps and 
recommendations on how to close these gaps, are integrated into 
the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4. 
The framework represents a leap forward to conceptual clarity. 
It captures the state-of-the-art knowledge on the linkage discourse 
by synthesizing the most relevant concepts into a single analytical 
framework. In the empirical part of our review, the framework 
allows us to analyse empirical studies on the international response 
to a forced migration crisis through the linkage lens. This addresses 
the second sub-question guiding our review. 
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2.3 Empirical approach 
To answer the question to what extent and why (or why not) the 
recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been 
established in practice of a pertinent forced migration crisis, we 
applied the analytical framework to analyse empirical studies on the 
international response to the Syria crisis. The rationale for selecting 
this case is simple: If there is evidence of successful linking, it will 
most likely be found in the most relevant case in terms of political 
pressure, funding levels, and applied aid modalities. In addition, the 
global humanitarian system is under transformation, largely 
triggered by protracted recentcrises (Humanitarian Policy Group et 
al., 2016). Thus, it is plausible to investigate the international 
response to the Syria crisis in which the humanitarian-development 
nexus should be apparent. 
In the following sections, we briefly describe the procedure of 
selecting the empirical literature, and our methodological approach 
to analysis. Both are described in more detail in Annex B. 
2.3.1 Identification of the empirical sample 
In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on the 
extent to which the recommended humanitarian-development 
linkages have been established in the international response to the 
Syria crisis, we applied the following sampling procedure:  
In a first step, we selected empirical literature on the international 
response to the forced migration crisis of Syria in the Syria 
Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons 
Learning (CALL) (syrialearning.org). For this purpose, we focused 
on evaluations, evaluative studies, and other documents providing 
empirically based assessments on the response inside Syria and in 
neighbouring countries that host Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Turkey.25  
                                                 
25 To identify documents that provide an assessment based on empirical 
investigations, we restricted the sample to evaluations, reports, (case) studies, 
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In a second step, we then restricted the selected empirical 
literature to those documents that address the sub-gaps of the 
humanitarian-development gap identified in the conceptual studies. 
For this purpose, we searched in the empirical literature for 
keywords extracted from our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), 
which contains definitions of the sub-gaps and recommendations 
on how to bridge them. 
Two criteria were considered: the spread of sub-gaps (How many 
sub-gaps are addressed in an actual empirical study based on the 
keywords found?) and the intensity of investigation (How 
intensively is a certain sub-gap addressed in an empirical study based 
on the number of keywords found for this sub-gap?26 In combining 
both criteria, we selected those empirical studies that address more 
sub-gaps than other studies and/or that investigate these sub-gaps 
more intensively. 
This sampling procedure led to an empirical sample of 30 
evaluations and evaluative studies, conducted or funded by 
international organizations, bilateral donors, research institutions or 
civil society organizations, and published between 2013 and 2017. 
Almost half of them investigate more than one country. Most 
studies focus on Jordan and Lebanon, while there is only one case 
study on Turkey.  
To assess the methodological quality of the sampled studies, and, 
thus, the validity of their findings, we applied eight quality criteria 
commonly used in meta-evaluations to investigate the quality of 
evaluations (Alton-Lee, 2004; DeGEval, 2008; Glock and Karliczek, 
                                                 
collections of lessons learnt/learned, impact assessments, reviews, research 
papers, surveys, assessments, regional analysis, articles, and briefs containing 
information on the applied methodological approach. To verify that no relevant 
documents are missed when selecting on the Syria Learning Portal, we 
additionally crosschecked other international and supranational databases (see 
Annex B). This procedure supplied us with 34 new documents. We added them 
to the sample, which then contained 466 documents published between 
01/2011 (the beginning of the crisis response) and 04/2017. 
26 To “secure” this selection procedure, a necessary condition was established: 
to restrict the sample to those documents in which the words “humanitarian” 
and “development” are found together in a sentence at least five times in one 
document. This procedure reduced the sample from 466 to 61 documents. 
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2014; Stufflebeam, 1999). These criteria focus on: independence, 
transparency of evaluation questions and criteria, methodological 
approach, data collection and analysis (see Table 11 in Annex B).27  
Based on these criteria, we assessed the overall methodological 
quality of our empirical sample as “sufficient” (with a median of 5 
points out of 8, reaching a pre-defined threshold of more than half 
of the points). 28 Almost all studies in the empirical sample pose 
evaluation questions, and answer them with triangulated methods 
and data sources. They dedicate a whole section to procedures on 
data collection and analysis, and to actually used data. 
2.3.2 Content analysis of the empirical sample 
To extract evidence on the extent to which and why effective 
humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the 
international response to the Syria crisis, we conducted a content 
analysis of the 30 selected empirical studies. For this purpose, we 
applied a coding scheme that is derived from the analytical 
framework (deductive coding approach). For each sub-gap and each 
recommendation on how to close a sub-gap, the code scheme entails 
a corresponding code assigned to relevant text segments in order to 
extract and systematize the information of interest from the texts. 
To distil a main message for each recommendation, we listed all text 
segments per code and synthesized our findings (presented in 
Chapter 4). 
Since the second sub-question focuses on not only the extent to 
which the recommended linkages have been established in the 
international response to the Syria crisis, but also on reasons for 
implementation (or non-implementation), we also extracted 
                                                 
27 One limitation is that this approach is based only on explicit information in 
evaluation reports; it cannot consider conceivable unpublished background 
information. 
28 Since there is no theoretical criterion for determining such a threshold, we 
decided to grade the quality of those studies as “sufficient” that reach more than 
50% of points. 
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information on hindering and conducive factors for bridging each 
one of the seven sub-gaps. 
It is impossible to find comprehensive answers to our overall 
question (how responses to forced migration crises can be linked 
effectively) without considering the effects of linkages on people 
affected by the crisis situation. Consequently, we captured all 
available empirical information on outputs, outcomes or impacts of 
bridging specific sub-gaps. 
The content analysis of the empirical sample studies was guided 
by five questions: 
1. What is the positive evidence on bridging the respective sub-
gap?29 
2. What is the negative evidence on bridging the respective specific 
sub-gap, referring to the formulated recommendations?30 
3. What are hindering factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?  
4. What are conducive factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?  
5. What are the outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging the 
respective sub-gap? 
 
 
  
                                                 
29 In this review, we use the term “evidence” for all empirical findings provided 
by the sampled studies – irrespective of whether they have been generated on 
the basis of rigorous methods or not. We define evidence as positive when 
studies are describing measures aimed at closing a sub-gap of the humanitarian-
development gap. For example, positive evidence is registered when we find a 
clear lead for coordination between humanitarian and development actors. 
30 We define evidence as negative when the empirical studies provide evidence 
on the existence of a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. It is 
negative, for instance, when there is no clear lead in coordination between 
humanitarian and development actors, which hinders linkage. 
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3. Conceptual foundation and 
implications for the case study 
on Syria 
This chapter describes the foundation of our conceptual findings on 
'what needs to be done' – how to draw connections between 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. It also 
makes comparisons to what is being done in practice (see 
Chapter 4). 
We begin with an overview of the mentioned five concepts. We 
will focus on their origin, development and definitions, and shed 
light on main similarities and differences.31 As a first analytical step, 
we identify seven sub-gaps of the main gap (see Chapter 2). Gaps 
are assigned to different levels of action – ranging from a strategic 
to an implementation level. This helps us to understand typical, 
frequently occurring linkage problems (i.e. sub-gaps). Furthermore, 
it becomes easier to discover actors who are able to design better 
linkages (according to the conceptual sample studies). 
Finally, we provide a brief overview of the migration crisis related 
to Syria. Our aim is to illustrate contextual factors that influence 
stakeholders’ efforts to find linkages. Neighbouring countries and 
Syria are compared with the help of macro indicators.  
                                                 
31 However, the main objective of our review is not to compare the concepts, 
and to analyse how they conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap in 
different ways. Our aim is to gain as much relevant information as possible on 
the linkage issue across all concepts. To provide orientation, we introduce their 
origin, development and definitions, and main similarities and differences. We 
do not compare concepts in detail. 
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3.1 The five most prominent concepts on 
the humanitarian-development nexus 
3.1.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development (LRRD) 
The LRRD concept links short-term relief with long-term 
development cooperation. LRRD represents an attempt to increase 
coherence and complementarity, and create synergies between 
actors on both sides – resulting in better overall performance and 
improved outcomes for beneficiaries. The European Commission 
(EC) coined the term in 1996, and described the rationale: “Better 
development can reduce the need for emergency relief; better relief 
can contribute to development; and better rehabilitation can ease 
the transition between the two” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1996: iii). 
In order to make this rather simplistic model operative, the EC 
provided recommendations on how to mainstream it into certain 
areas: such as global policy frameworks, sectorial programmes and 
internal coordination. Experts claim that these efforts were not very 
successful. LRRD failed to play “a significant role in shaping the 
way assistance is planned, managed or administered” (Mosel and 
Levine, 2014: 18). 
However, three key achievements can be attributed to LRRD. 
The concept has formalized a decades-old discussion on linkage.32 
It has helped us to understand that crises are characterized by 
simultaneity rather than linearity, by contiguum rather than 
continuum.33 Finally, it has alerted international stakeholders to the 
                                                 
32 The need to link relief and development was initially mentioned – by 
practitioners – in analyses of food crises affecting African countries in the 1980s 
(Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996, p. 3). 
33 Discussions on the understanding of crisis as a continuum or contiguum are, 
however, still going on (see Section 4.7). 
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debate on linkage, as can be seen by the inclusion of essential 
elements of LRRD into good humanitarian donorship principles.34 
3.1.2 Resilience 
Resilience is interpreted differently across various fields (Béné et al., 
2012; de Weijer, 2013). A definition by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is one good 
example of what resilience signifies in the humanitarian and 
development sector: “the ability of households, communities and 
nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively 
adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in 
the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty” (OECD, 
2014). Shocks are not seen in isolation from their wider causes and 
consequences. Hence, strengthening resilience is a conceivable goal 
for actors on both sides. Humanitarian assistance deals with shocks, 
development cooperation tackles underlying causes of shocks. 
Resilience is a widely accepted concept among international 
stakeholders. For example, the Regional Refugee and Resilience 
Plan (3RP) guiding the response to the Syria crisis refers to it quite 
frequently (see Chapter 4.1). 
3.1.3 The Whole of Government approach (WoG) 
The Whole-of-Government (WoG) perspective has its origin in the 
1990s. At the time, international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) and others were reflecting on experiences from states 
                                                 
34 In 2003, the Government of Sweden convened a meeting to discuss good 
humanitarian donorship. A set of Principles-and-Good-Practice-of-
Humanitarian-Donorship was agreed. Representatives from 16 donor 
governments as well as from the European Commission, the OECD, the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, and academics 
participated. Principle 9 of the meeting states: Provide humanitarian assistance 
in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to 
ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable 
livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and 
development activities. 
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struggling with insecurity, poverty and bad governance. 
International governmental institutions involved in humanitarian 
assistance and development cooperation during conflict – including 
security services and other actors – called for new outlooks that gave 
momentum to the WoG outlook (Stepputat and Greenwood, 2013: 
15). 
OECD defines WoG as “an approach where a government 
actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different 
agencies within that government to coordinate the design and 
implementation of the range of interventions that government´s 
agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of 
those interventions in achieving the desired objectives” (2006: 14). 
WoG is based on the assumption that a more meaningful impact 
can be achieved only when all concerned parties agree on a common 
modus operandi. This includes joint contextual analyses and 
strategies as well as joint planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. The concept embraces a complete management cycle, in 
which all concerned government departments participate. WoG 
aims at making interventions more effective, at reduced fiscal costs, 
and tries to enhance the legitimacy of donor policies in recipient 
countries (OECD, 2006: 18). The concept also promotes 
cooperation between humanitarian and development departments 
within individual governments.  
3.1.4 Early Recovery 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines 
Early Recovery as “the application of development principles to 
humanitarian situations” (UNDP, 2008: 5). The concept emphasizes 
two important elements: to build on local capacities, and to act 
through partner countries and their capacities. Early Recovery 
promotes development thinking in humanitarian crisis settings. It 
advocates people-centred action, which makes humanitarian 
assistance more accountable to affected populations, and it tries to 
enhance ownership among those groups (GCER, 2016). 
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Early Recovery is used mainly within the UN system, and UNDP is 
promoting the concept among other UN agencies. It is a result of 
the humanitarian reform process in 2005 to increase the 
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and to heal shortcomings 
of the humanitarian system as deliverer of aid.35  
3.1.5 Connectedness 
Connectedness is referred to as a relevant concept in the literature 
on LRRD (Mosel and Levine, 2014; Steets, 2011). Most of all, 
though, this concept is an evaluation criterion. It is developed by the 
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in 
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), based on the OECD-DAC criteria 
of sustainability, and adapted to evaluations of humanitarian 
assistance. Connectedness can, in other words, be seen as the 
adaptation of the ‘sustainability’- evaluation criterion by 
humanitarian actors. It is valuable when reflecting on links between 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. 
Connectedness provides specific information especially for users of 
evaluations. 
“Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a 
short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes 
longer-term and interconnected problems into account,” according 
to ALNAP (Beck, 2006). It instructs actors on how to prevent 
undermining of local structures through relief operations. 
Connectedness also gives recommendations on how to administer a 
handover from international to national and local stakeholders, and 
on capacity building among national and local actors. Furthermore, 
it helps evaluators to detect linkages in humanitarian programmes. 
This makes the concept, all told, particularly useful to our review. 
                                                 
35 The humanitarian reform process was initiated in 2005 by the emergency 
relief coordinator in cooperation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC). The aim is to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response 
through greater predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership. 
Implementation of the ‘cluster approach’ in order to build capacities in gap areas 
was one major outcome of the reform. 
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3.1.6 Similarities and differences among concepts 
The aim of our content analysis is to gain relevant information on 
linkage across all concepts. It does not appraise the ability of 
individual concepts to conceptualize the humanitarian-development 
gap in different ways. To reach a better understanding, some 
similarities and differences might be helpful to readers. 
The most noticeable similarity is that all five concepts presented 
above focus on increased coherence between humanitarian and 
development stakeholders. They also seek to improve the design 
and implementation of programmes in terms of sustainability and 
outcomes (Table 1).  
Table 1: Concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus 
Concept Main driver, 
initiator of the 
concept 
Focus of the concept 
Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation 
and 
Development  
European 
Commission 
Fostering institutional changes to 
promote linkages between 
humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation 
Resilience 
 
Multiple 
stakeholders of 
humanitarian 
assistance and 
development 
cooperation 
Increasing the resilience of 
individuals and communities 
struggling to recover from shocks, 
by addressing their short-term 
and long-term needs holistically 
Whole of 
Government 
 
Donor, 
governments 
Creating coherence between 
those parts of a government that 
are active in a partner country 
Early Recovery 
 
UNDP Addressing recovery needs during 
the humanitarian phase of an 
emergency 
Connectedness 
 
ALNAP, OECD/DAC Planning and providing 
humanitarian assistance in a way 
that enables connection to 
longer-term development efforts 
Source: Authors’ own  
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As to differences, concepts adopt various views on how to achieve 
more coherence, and on who should take the lead. Connectedness 
and Early Recovery imply that actors of humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation should be aware of each other’s specific 
modus operandi, and that they should intensify their coordination 
efforts. The concepts do not suggest a full integration, though. 
Other concepts – such as Resilience and WoG – propose that 
humanitarian and development needs and interventions should be 
handled in a more integrated way, providing a route to joint 
strategies and joint planning. 
Concepts diverge on other issues as well, for instance on where 
coherence should be strengthened, and who should be or is 
involved. Early Recovery is largely concerned with linkages between 
local/national actors and international assistance actors. WoG is 
more focused on the intra-governmental coherence of donor 
countries.  
The common notion is that humanitarian assistance is not 
sufficient per se. Crisis responses are comprehended as a 
contiguum, where humanitarian and development needs, rights and 
interventions exist simultaneously. 36  Actors from both worlds 
should be involved. But there are occasions when only one form is 
the realistic alternative (i.e. when a state is one of the conflicting 
parties, or in war zones where the security situation makes large-
scale development assistance unlikely). 
This highlights two crucial factors: crises do not follow a 
common pattern, and the contiguum perspective might be 
challenged in some cases. Ultimately, contexts and specific patterns 
of forced migration must determine how to act adequately in each 
case. 
                                                 
36 Connectedness, however, rather relates to crises as a continuum, as it 
addresses the link from relief to longer-term structures and approaches. 
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3.2 Identification of sub-gaps  
A majority of the studies view the humanitarian-development gap 
as a multidimensional problem. The gap can be structured into 
different sub-gaps – each representing a specific dimension of the 
main gap.  
Many conceptual studies refer in general terms to this main gap 
when addressing shortages of cooperation, coherence and 
coordination. Other studies are more precise, and describe areas of 
humanitarian and development work where the gap appears, in 
funding modalities, when strategic goals are formulated, and so on 
(see e.g. Hinds, 2015: 5; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 7; Steets, 2011: 3). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, we have found seven sub-gaps: (1) a vision 
and strategy gap (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an 
institutional gap, (5) a geographic gap, (6) an ownership gap, and (7) 
a sequence gap. Distinctions between them are not always clear-cut, 
but our typology provides an analytical structure that defines more 
precisely these components of the main humanitarian-development 
gap.  
To gain further clarity, each sub-gap can be assigned to different 
levels of a policy sequence. We have identified one strategic and 
planning level and one implementation level. Both are characterized 
by specific activities. Groups of actors are responsible for linking 
the two forms of assistance more closely at the relevant level. Table 
2 presents these levels in relation to specific activities and groups of 
actors, and assigns the sub-gaps of the main divide to the two 
identified levels. 
The location of sub-gaps (Table 2) is derived from 
recommendations found in the conceptual sample studies (see 
Chapter 4). Each recommendation addresses certain activities and 
groups of actors in order to close a sub-gap. From there, one can 
make extrapolations. The advice to develop joint strategies of crisis 
management among international humanitarian and development 
organizations, donors and partner refers to a strategic level. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, the vision and strategy, planning 
and funding gaps are assigned to the strategic level. The ownership 
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gap, the geographic gap and the sequence gap are related to the 
implementation level. 
Most sub-gaps might be categorized into multiple levels. But to 
capture the humanitarian-development gap analytically (in an ideal-
typical manner), we assigned them according to the level they refer 
to most frequently. The institutional gap is an exception. It refers to 
institutional structures that are not conducive to linking 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation effectively, 
and appears on both levels.  
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Table 2: Different levels of the humanitarian-development 
sphere 
Le
ve
l 
Su
b-
Ga
ps
 Recommendation Group of 
actors 
addresseda 
   H D L I 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
an
d 
pl
an
ni
ng
b  
Vi
sio
n 
an
d 
St
ra
te
gy
 
1. Working principles of humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation should be 
balanced.  
 
x x  x 
2. Humanitarian and development actors should 
commit themselves to common goals to increase 
the coherence of interventions.  
 
x x  x 
3. Humanitarian and development actors should 
develop joint country strategies.  
 
x x  x 
4. Donors should seek to align their country 
strategies with host countries’ strategies.  
 
x x x x 
5. Humanitarian and development responses 
should both be committed to longer-term 
engagement in protracted crises. 
 
x x  x 
Fu
nd
in
g 
6. Humanitarian and development responses 
should be adequately funded in protracted 
crises. 
 
x x  x 
7. Funding mechanisms should be more flexible, 
enable actors to react to unforeseen 
circumstances, and allow for rapid responses to 
emergencies. 
 
x x  x 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
8. A joint planning process should be initiated, 
including a wide variety of relevant stakeholders, 
to develop a coherent and needs-based response 
to crises. 
 
x x x x 
9. Planning processes must be based on 
assessments that collect information on short-
term and longer-term needs, and should identify 
opportunities to link humanitarian and 
development interventions. 
 
x x x x 
10. Interventions should address needs in a 
holistic way, including multiple stakeholders 
across the humanitarian and development realm. 
x x x x 
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Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
nc
 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
11. Donor countries should strive for a high 
degree of interdepartmental cooperation in 
order to reduce redundancies and contradictions 
in overseas operations. 
 
x x  x 
12. Cooperation between institutions with 
differing mandates should be a common modus 
operandi in order to link humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation. 
 
x x x x 
13. Clear leadership should be ensured for jointly 
coordinating humanitarian and development 
actors. 
 
x x  x 
14. An institutional structure with decision-
making power closely linked to the area of 
programme implementation should be put in 
place. 
 
x x  x 
15. Staffs of stakeholders should have 
interdisciplinary (humanitarian and 
development) skills needed to promote effective 
linkages. 
 
x x  x 
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 16. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be conducted in geographical 
proximity in order to reach the same target 
groups when the context permits. 
x x  x 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
17. International humanitarian assistance should 
work with national and local stakeholders when 
the context permits. 
x  x x 
18. International humanitarian assistance should 
seek to develop capacities of national and local 
stakeholders. 
x  x x 
Se
qu
en
ce
 19. Programme designs should ensure an 
adequate sequencing (including timing) of 
humanitarian and development phases. 
x x x x 
Notes: a H=Humanitarian; D=Development; L=Local/national; I=International. Activities by 
humanitarian and development stakeholders include: b Development of working principles, 
strategies, strategic partnerships, policies, funding modalities, funding strategies. New plans 
to operationalize strategies, programmes and interventions. c Development of working 
relationships with national and local stakeholders, identification of opportunities for 
programme adjustments, data collection for assessments. Source: Authors’ own. 
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3.3 The Syria case 
To find an answer to the second sub-question (to what extent, and 
why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?), we 
chose the Syria crisis as our example. The humanitarian system is 
currently under transformation, which makes it appropriate to use a 
recent case for investigations of the humanitarian-development 
nexus. Furthermore, funding volumes, applied aid modalities, and 
consequences for Europe and the northern hemisphere are vital 
elements of a practical crisis response. All in all, we are able to 
observe a wide range of international efforts in response to the Syria 
crisis.  
We apply our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), based on 
analyses of the conceptual studies. The framework brings together 
recommendations on how to close the seven sub-gaps. It also allows 
us to review the empirical literature on crisis responses through the 
conceptual lens. 
Events in Syria are radically influencing Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey 
and Iraq as well. Only Turkey has signed the 1951 Convention on 
the status of refugees, and therefore has a legal basis for receiving 
refugees, but all neighbouring countries have de facto accepted 
Syrian migrants. The largest Syrian refugee population since 2011 is 
found in this multi-faceted neighbourhood. A host of internal and 
external factors are influencing the ability of Turkey and the others 
to deal with the crisis. 
Internal factors: Comparisons of state capacities – measured by 
governance indicators of political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption – show a cleavage between war-torn Iraq and Syria and 
the relatively stable Jordan and Turkey. Lebanon forms a middle 
ground. The Human Development Index indicates a “high human 
development” for Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while Iraq and 
especially Syria are lagging behind (Box 1).37  
                                                 
37 In Box 1, the shortcomings of funding are labelled as external from the 
perspective of recipient countries, as the source of funds is external to the 
recipient. The total population figure compared to the number of registered 
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External factors: The external pressure is very high in Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey, which receive most of the regional refugees. 
Iraq has fewer numbers coming from Syria, but lots of IDPs. Turkey 
hosts the highest refugee population (2.9 million) in absolute terms, 
and Lebanon has the highest in relative terms. Donors’ 
shortcomings in providing funds demonstrate a chasm between 
financial needs and actual disbursements to individual countries.  
The effects on Syria itself are far more severe of course: 13.5 
million people need assistance, and 6.3 million are internally 
displaced by June 2017. These urgent needs are reflected in 
estimates of how much money is required to manage the crisis. 
Efforts are severely underfunded, both here and in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries.38 
                                                 
Syrian refugees per country is also registered as external. Registered Syrian 
refugees constitute one of many effects of the Syrian crisis on neighbouring 
countries – so refugees are considered external from a Turkish perspective, and 
so on. 
38 The outlined criteria give us a rough overview of constitutive factors that may 
influence efforts to bridge humanitarian and development responses in Syria. 
We render this sufficient for our purposes in the present literature review. But it 
does not substitute a thorough context analysis for each country. 
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Box 1. Facts on the Syria crisis 
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4. Conceptual recommendations 
and empirical findings 
This chapter juxtaposes our conceptual findings with empirical 
evidence on linkages between humanitarian and development logics 
of action in response to Syria and forced migration. It contrasts 
'what needs to be done' (according to conceptual studies) with 'what 
is being done in practice', based on 30 analysed evaluations and 
evaluative studies.  
The analysis is organized along the seven sub-gaps. For each one, 
we present recommendations extracted from the conceptual 
literature on how to bridge the sub-gap, and then contrast the 
recommendations to empirical findings in the form of short 
narratives. The narratives explore whether a recommendation is 
heeded in practice – and thus whether linkages actually have been 
established. Narratives also try to explain why, or why not, a linkage 
has happened in a certain context. Along this road, we will be able 
to distinguish hindering and conducive factors to bridging the 
humanitarian-development gap. 
The analytical framework provides a foundation for our 
investigation of the Syria crisis. We filter out conceptual claims and 
rephrase them into recommendations on how to close sub-gaps. 
The empirical literature is viewed through conceptual lenses. Before 
we turn to the narratives, it’s time to present the analytical 
framework (Table 3). It entails the recommendations which are 
contextualized in the subsequent narratives.  
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Table 3: The analytical framework 
1. A vision and strategy gap exists, where (i) no common strategic 
framework is in place among actors responding to a particular crisis, and 
(ii) little or no progress is made towards integrating and aligning 
humanitarian and development responses. The aim is to deliver 
collective outcomes. 
1.1 Balancing of working principles of humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation: A good balance between working principles is 
necessary in order to improve linkages. Humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation adhere to different working principles. This may 
prevent linkage between the two, since collaboration with the other side 
could signify a neglect of one’s own principles. In what form balancing is 
viable, depends highly on external circumstances that, furthermore, may 
vary over time. 
1.2 Commitment to common goals: Bridging humanitarian and 
development responses by committing to collective outcomes – such as 
resilience or Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – can be a first step 
towards closing the divide. 
1.3 Joint country strategies: Donors who formulate a joint crisis response 
strategy that integrates and aligns their humanitarian and development 
efforts are more likely to bridge the divide between humanitarian and 
development silos. 
1.4 Alignment of donor and partner country strategies: Donor strategies 
should be aligned with strategies formed by partner countries. A lack of 
coherence between partners will inhibit long-term development. 
1.5 Commitment to longer-term engagement in protracted crises: 
Response strategies are bound to fail if not supported by donor’s political 
will for longer-term engagement in a crisis at hand. Since protracted crises, 
by definition, are stretched out in time, humanitarian-development 
responses also require time. Only actors willing to stay enduringly are able 
to achieve long-term effects, especially in protracted crises. 
2. A funding gap is caused by insufficient, fragmented, unbalanced and 
inflexible funding for relief and longer-term development responses. It 
impedes adequately scaled and well-coordinated responses to 
protracted crisis. 
2.1 Adequate level of funding for all forms of assistance: Unequal 
distribution of funds across different forms of assistance is blocking 
linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. 
Adequate responses to protracted crises are within reach only if both aid 
forms have sufficient financial resources. 
2.2 Funding modalities: Funding modalities have to be adequate to 
promote linkages between humanitarian assistance and development 
       
 
55 
cooperation. Adjusting to unforeseen circumstances, e.g. with flexibility 
and multi-year commitments, fosters linkage. 
3. Planning gap: A planning gap is at hand when humanitarian 
assistance and development cooperation are planned independently 
and with insufficient consideration of one another. As a consequence, 
there is no coherent integration of all forms of assistance to ensure 
sustainable collective outcomes. 
3.1 Joint planning: Joint planning provides opportunities to harmonize 
individual perspectives, values, principles, and work procedures. The aim is 
to create a holistic response approach. 
3.2 Joint assessments to inform planning: Joint assessments facilitate a 
common understanding of situations, and necessary responses, as 
prerequisites for joint planning. In the absence of joint assessments, 
chances are that humanitarian actors and development actors will retain 
different perceptions. That may prevent a coherent implementation. 
3.3 Planning for holistic and flexible programming: Fragile contexts signify 
multiple needs, and new opportunities and challenges may arise quickly. 
Holistic and flexible programmes should address short-term and long-term 
needs simultaneously. 
4. Institutional gap: An institutional gap exists when the internal 
coordination structure, the skill set of human resources, and external 
cooperation strategy of institutions – donors, national governments, 
INGOs, international organizations, civil society organizations and 
national and local stakeholders – are harming effective links between 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. 
4.1 Cooperation within institutions: A high degree of cooperation within 
ministries and institutions will reduce redundancies and contradictions, 
and enhance coherent interventions. This is also valid for different 
ministries within a national government. 
4.2 Cooperation between institutions: To achieve long-term goals there 
should be a willingness to work with actors beyond traditional mandates. 
This may include different government levels in partner countries (from 
the national to the local); informal institutions (traditional authorities, clan 
structures); local civil society (beyond national NGOs); the private sector. 
4.3 Clear leadership and coordinating role: In order to enhance 
coordination within institutions, responsibilities have to be assigned with 
clarity. A lead coordinating body equipped with sufficient decision-making 
and sanctioning power may create structures capable of interweaving 
humanitarian and development assistance. 
4.4 A decentralized institutional structure: A decentralized structure is 
more conducive to incorporating local realities, and identifying short-term 
and long-term opportunities of rehabilitation. 
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4.5 Interdisciplinary staffing and training: Staff at headquarters, on country 
and field levels, should be equipped with skill sets of humanitarian 
assistance and development cooperation. Institutions can hire 
experienced staff, they can also build expertise via secondments, joint 
evaluations, inter-departmental working groups, training opportunities... 
5. Geographic gap: A geographic gap is present if humanitarian and 
development programmes or projects are not conducted in the same 
region and are not sufficiently linked with each other. 
To create development perspectives for those most in need, the whole 
spectrum of support should target the same vulnerable groups. Thus, 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should operate in 
geographical proximity to these groups as long as the context permits. 
6. Ownership gap: An ownership gap occurs when national and local 
stakeholders are not sufficiently involved in international humanitarian 
responses. This concerns multiple levels such as planning and 
implementation of international interventions. It implies the need for 
an outcome-oriented approach that builds on and strengthens existing 
national and local capacities. 
6.1 Working with national and local stakeholders: In order to gain 
efficiency, reach and sustainability, humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation should be implemented, if possible, in close 
collaboration with local, regional or national expertise and structures. 
6.2 National and local capacity development: International assistance 
(humanitarian or development) should strengthen capacities of national 
and local stakeholders within a host country to enhance planning, 
administrative, response and preparedness. An approach of this kind can 
create long-term effects through short-term interventions.  
7. Sequence gap: A sequence gap exists when relief, rehabilitation and 
development activities are not combined in an appropriate time frame. 
Sequencing is essential in chronological planning of activities. When 
phases and transitions are adequately designed, aid intervention 
remains free from delays or negative path dependencies that puts 
target groups at a disadvantage. Sequencing facilitates handovers and 
exit actions, it promotes collaboration de facto between all actors and 
creates continuity. Adequate sequencing is necessary to create 
transitions in both directions: from relief to development and from 
development to relief. 
Well-balanced phasing of stages, including exit and takeover strategies, is 
vital to avoid unexpected negative side effects, delays and harm caused by 
phases that last indefinitely, too long or end too soon. 
Source: Authors’ own  
  
       
 
57 
4.1 Vision and strategy gap 
A gap between the humanitarian and the development logic of 
action predominantly arises from a lack of common vision and joint 
strategy, according to conceptual studies (see e.g. Hinds, 2015: 2 ff.; 
Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 36 ff.; Patrick and Brown, 2007: 79). 
Common visions and joint strategies could guide the overall 
direction of a crisis response. Based on our analysis of the 
conceptual literature, we identify a vision and strategy gap, and 
define it as follows: 
A vision and strategy gap exists where no common strategic framework is in 
place among actors responding to a particular crisis, and where little or no 
progress is made towards integrating and aligning humanitarian and 
development responses based on a common vision and strategy aimed at delivering 
collective outcomes. 
Humanitarian and development approaches to crisis 
management tend to stay in their traditional silos when joint 
strategic frameworks are in short supply. This undermines the ability 
to address underlying causes of vulnerability. Consequently, actors 
become less able to enhance resilience among affected people and 
institutions. 
Various recommendations are put forward on how to bridge the 
humanitarian-development gap referring to this vision and strategy 
dimension. Several aspects of the sub-gap are explored. We have 
found a couple of recommendations: to strike a balance between 
(partly) incompatible working principles of the two approaches; to 
define and commit to common goals; to formulate joint country 
strategies; to align donor strategies to host countries’ own strategies; 
and to commit to long-term engagement in protracted crises.  
These proposals, and our corresponding empirical findings on 
how to handle the Syria crisis, will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
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4.1.1 Balancing of working principles of two forms 
of assistance 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Several studies are discussing the “principles challenge” (Otto and 
Weingärtner, 2013: 17), the (at least partially) incompatible working 
principles of humanitarian assistance and development assistance. 
Humanitarian assistance adheres to fundamental humanitarian 
principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. 
These principles should ensure that providers of humanitarian 
assistance are accepted as neutral actors by all sides, e.g. in the case 
of armed conflict, and that humanitarian actors will gain access to 
affected groups even in complex emergencies.39  
Principles for effective cooperation have been formulated as part 
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness within the 
‘development community’. They strongly reflect a requirement to 
work with, and through, partner governments to achieve objectives 
such as ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, 
and mutual accountability.  
At first glance, there is a seemingly obvious conflict between 
these principles, disagreements regarding whether actors (external 
ones in particular) should engage with governments at all in pursuit 
of humanitarian or development objectives – and how they should 
do it. The conceptual literature displays no discernible consensus on 
how to resolve the dilemma. Studies give very different, and 
contradicting, recommendations. 
Some say that humanitarian actors should adhere to 
development principles (e.g. by working with the government of a 
crisis-affected country) in order to create development 
opportunities (e.g. GCER, 2016: 8; OECD, 2006: 36). Others argue 
that diluting a humanitarian mandate in this way – especially when 
working with state institutions – can compromise core humanitarian 
principles such as neutrality, independence and impartiality (Macrae 
                                                 
39 These humanitarian principles are derived from the core guiding principles of 
the Red Cross: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
service, unity, and universality (OCHA, 2010). 
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et al., 1997: 16 ff.). Adhering to development principles and working 
with state actors who are often parties to the conflict, can do more 
harm than good (Macrae et al., 1997: 18 f.). 
A third group of studies takes a more moderate position, and 
argues that a balance can be struck between working principles (cf. 
Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 72). Humanitarian actors should 
collaborate with state actors “in a pragmatic and context-specific 
way” (Hinds, 2015: 6) and try to support vulnerable groups.  
To back up the viewpoint that a balancing act of this kind is 
within reach, studies refer to allegedly successful programmes in 
Somalia, Darfur, Northern Uganda, Colombia and the Gaza Strip, 
which managed to adhere to humanitarian principles and, 
simultaneously, take development goals into account (Bailey et al., 
2009: 13; White and Cliffe, 2000: 23). Studies do concede, though, 
that attempts to reconcile seemingly incompatible principles can 
lead to quite different results, depending on the country and crisis 
context (White and Cliffe, 2000: 23). Opportunities to reconcile 
humanitarian and development principles are highly dependent on 
the actual context (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 11; White and Cliffe, 
2000: 24). 
So far, little attention has been directed at success factors for 
reconciling competing working principles (Taylor et al., 2015: 109). 
Some analyses claim empirical support for such balancing acts. In 
reality, no article has managed to provide clear, specific 
recommendations on how to succeed in practice.  
Findings from the empirical literature 
Competing working principles is an issue in almost a third of the 
empirical studies. The studies reveal mixed evidence on whether a 
balancing of humanitarian and development principles does take 
place in reality. Another controversial topic is whether attempts to 
keep a balance have positive or negative effects. A number of 
studies notice negative repercussions. However, discussions mostly 
focus on humanitarian actors inside Syria who are compromising on 
humanitarian principles to be able to provide at least some help. Not 
very much is said about actual balancing acts in refugee-receiving 
neighbouring countries. 
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The World Food Programme (WFP) is one example. WFP has 
decided to collaborate with the Syrian government in order to 
maximize access to the most vulnerable groups of people, even 
though this choice may compromise its impartiality (Darcy, 2016: 
42). It had to choose cooperating partners inside Syria from a list 
supplied by the regime (Drummond et al. 2015: 15). While being the 
only feasible way of reaching those most in need, this had negative 
implications for the organization´s reputation as an independent 
actor (Darcy, 2016: 42; Drummond et al. 2015: 16). 
It may be difficult for international organizations and 
International NGOs (INGOs) to strictly adhere to humanitarian 
working principles in conflict settings, but it is even more 
complicated for those who are directly affected by (and emotionally 
closer to) an actual conflict.  
One evaluation illustrates this dilemma. Syrian diaspora 
organizations engaged inside Syria “appear to strive for impartiality 
and focus their engagement on the implementation of humanitarian 
activities away from politics”, but their “engagement was motivated 
by solidarity rather than humanity or neutrality” (DEMAC, 2016: 
33). This judgement, and the fact that some refrain from providing 
aid to pro-government communities (DEMAC 2016: 36), lead to 
recommendations to “engage in constructive discussions on 
humanitarian principles and to find pragmatic ways to work together 
to provide effective assistance” (DEMAC, 2016: 33). Exactly how 
this should be done is, however, not clarified.  
Another evaluation of cooperation with Syrian civil society 
organizations finds that even though these organizations usually 
position themselves with respect to the conflict, they “generally do 
abide by the principle of neutrality in their work” (Crawford, 2015: 
13).  
Only a few studies reflect directly on the “principle challenge” 
when dealing with the international response to the crisis in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries. In Jordan, for example, the office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
taken a position similar to that of the WFP in Syria. UNHCR has a 
longstanding “near exclusive bilateral relationship” (Darcy, 2016: 
39) with the government, which is judged as “instrumental” in 
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ensuring Jordan’s continued support of refugees (Hidalgo et al., 
2015: 25).  
While this strong bilateral relationship – in accordance with 
development principles of ownership and partnership – has long 
been considered a precondition for creating longer-term 
perspectives for Syrian refugees, it has also become a bone of 
contention. Concerns are raised regarding UNHCR´s mandate and 
core principles amidst growing difficulties to protect refugees in 
Jordan, and due to risks of a Jordanian-Syrian border closure to 
minimize the influx of refugees (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7).  
This illustrates how difficult it can be to keep the delicate balance 
between humanitarian and development principles. It also highlights 
what international actors will face when they collaborate with a 
sovereign government that has declined to sign international 
accords (such as the Geneva Refugee Conventions). The work of 
international actors is based on these accords. 
Nonetheless, Bailey and Barbelet (2014) view a growing internal 
recognition that “UN agencies need to think and act beyond 
traditional mandates, to connect humanitarian and development 
responses, and ensure the strongest relevance and value of [their] 
work in addressing emergency, fragility, resilience and recovery” 
(Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 5). Some bilateral actors, however, have 
stronger reservations against attempts to reconcile conflicting 
principles. 
An evaluation of Norwegian assistance related to the Syria 
regional crisis emphasizes that “Norway strongly protects its hard-
won stance as a principled and impartial actor, as ITS Humanitarian 
Policy reflects. It therefore needs to be especially aware of (…) how 
(and arising from what choices) the International Humanitarian 
Principles are being upheld” (Betts et al., 2016: 32). Ensuring that 
Norway´s local implementing partners will adhere strictly to 
international humanitarian principles is another vital issue (Betts et 
al., 2016: 33). The Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (Sida) reaches similar conclusions: the agency “adds value 
to humanitarian response at a country level by being a neutral and 
principled donor”, and this has been appreciated by partners in the 
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“highly politicised environment of the Syria crisis” (Mowjee et al., 
2015b: 23). 
4.1.2 Commitment to common goals 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
A second set of recommendations related to the vision and strategy 
gap touches on common objectives of the humanitarian and 
development responses to protracted crises. Linking humanitarian 
and development responses by committing to resilience, Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and other collective outcomes was a 
central credo of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016. 
In his report to the summit, the UN Secretary-General urged 
humanitarian and development actors "to transcend their traditional 
silos" and work together “towards agreed collective outcomes over 
a multi-year time horizon” (UN Doc. A/70/709, 2016: 33). 
Many studies in our conceptual sample agree that commitments 
to common goals should be the point of departure of any crisis 
response. A more coherent and coordinated humanitarian-
development approach is the ambition. All strategies, including 
regional and national response plans as well as single donor 
strategies, should commit to common objectives (e.g. van Cooten et 
al., 2014: 17; GCER, 2016: 40; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 9; USAID, 
2012: 20). 
Once committed to collective outcomes, humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation can no longer act in isolation but 
serve as building blocks of a unified approach that makes the overall 
response more effective (cf. OECD, 2006: 9). 
Several studies make this causal assumption (at least implicitly). 
But they do not spell out clearly what these common objectives 
should be, and how conflicting goals should be handled. Should 
common objectives merely form a sub-set of larger humanitarian 
and development objectives? Or should they be the exclusive goal 
of all humanitarian-development activities? This remains uncertain, 
and the studies deliver different opinions. A majority advocates 
resilience as the common outcome of crises responses (e.g. Levine 
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and Mosel, 2014a; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; USAID, 2012: 16). 
Others argue in favour of SDGs (e.g. OCHA et al., 2015: 7).40 Bailey 
and Barbelet (2014: 8) find disagreements among donors. 
Findings from the empirical literature 
Strengthening resilience has emerged as the overarching goal in the 
Syria crisis. Political actors from both the humanitarian realm and 
the development realm are committed to resilience under the scope 
of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans, 3RPs (see Box 2).41 
This is confirmed almost unanimously by empirical studies that 
discuss common objectives (around one third of our sample).  
In the early years of the Syria crisis, mostly humanitarian 
assistance was provided. This proved inadequate, as the conflict in 
Syria became more and more protracted. The protracted crisis posed 
economic, social and political challenges to host countries and local 
communities as well as to Syrian refugees and IDPs. Thus, calls 
became louder for a more long-term, development-oriented 
approach, building on the capacities of affected people and 
institutions to cope with the crisis in the longer-term (cf. REACH 
Initiative, 2014: 28). 
There is today a widespread recognition among political 
decision-makers, according to empirical studies, that a resilience-
based approach is the best way forward, aligning humanitarian aid 
                                                 
40 There is, however, no fundamental contradiction between the two goals as 
long as resilience is not interpreted as a goal on the same level as the SDGs. 
Since resilience is acknowledged in most SDGs, and considered as vital to 
achievement (cf. Bahadur et al., 2015), the main difference lies in the range of 
these goals. Here, resilience is a lower-outcome goal serving as an input into 
SDG achievements. This, in turn, makes resilience attractive as a common goal 
for both the humanitarian and the development sector. 
41 The 3RPs can be considered as both: strategy documents and planning 
documents (see e.g. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/52586). 
Some view the plans predominantly as a set-up of strategic objectives, with a 
lack of prioritization, while others stress the national planning components. In 
this review, we are focusing on the 3RPs through the lens of our analytical 
framework. We do it from a strategic as well as from a planning perspective. 
The aim is to assess whether the 3RPs potentially contribute to closing the 
humanitarian-development gap with regard to its strategic and planning 
dimension. 
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with longer-term development assistance and targeting both 
refugees and host-communities (cf. Cullbertson et al., 2015: xi; 
Guay, 2015: 22). 
One evaluation talks about a current “paradigm shift” (Lee and 
Pearce, 2017: 5) towards resilience. It culminated in the adoption of 
a Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria crisis, and 
the formulation of the 3RPs (see Box 2; see also Section 4.1.3). 
Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela (2016: 8) are praising the 3RP as 
a “resilience-based approach to development”. This is a new 
phenomenon, since in other crises contexts, there was “substantial 
disagreement about whether resilience is an appropriate frame for 
planning assistance” (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 8). 
Even though the 3RPs can be considered an innovative step 
towards long-term development, they nevertheless differentiate 
between two elements: a refugee protection and humanitarian 
assistance component on the one hand, and a resilience and 
stabilization component focusing on host communities on the other 
hand (see Box 2). Refugees seem to remain in the compartment of 
short-term relief, while host communities benefit from longer-term 
measures. 
Some studies adopt a generally positive view. Resilience is seen 
as a “cross-cutting theme” (Bellamy et al., 2017: 50) in the 3RPs, and 
in national resilience plans (NRPs) of neighbouring host countries. 
Bailey and Barbelet find “many entry points for a resilience based 
development approach” at the national level: safety net 
programmes, social protection mechanisms and systems for analysis 
and tracking risks (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25).  
Moreover, these studies highlight potential positive effects, and 
argue that the resilience agenda can constitute “a more progressive 
framework for hosting refugees, and the inclusion of the 
government in planning and fundraising for the response” (Bellamy 
et al., 2017: 50). Others regard resilience as a strategic basis for 
strengthening social cohesion (REACH 2014: 26); and as a vehicle 
to coherence between humanitarian and development approaches 
(Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25). In addition, Sweden and other donor 
countries have explicitly framed their response to Syria within the 
resilience agenda at the strategic level (cf. Betts et al., 2016: 36).  
       
 
65 
Some studies are more cautious in praising the resilience agenda. 
Lee and Pearce hint that strengthening of resilience is mostly 
political-strategic lip service. Jordan´s and Lebanon´s response 
plans make “ample use of language intended to `improve´, 
´enhance´, ´build´ and ´promote´ resilience”, without presenting 
any “additional clarification” (Lee and Pearce, 2017: 28). Culbertson 
et al. are also critical. Despite efforts to integrate resilience into 
recent planning documents, “there has been no real transition yet” 
in the Jordanian education sector (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 82).42 
Almost all empirical studies treat resilience as a common goal 
guiding responses to the refugee crisis. A few are referring to other 
goals as well. The evaluation on UNESCO´s Education Response 
to the Syria Crisis points at the No Lost Generation initiative. It also 
emphasizes the Sustainable Development Goal SDG 4, ensuring 
inclusive and qualitative education for all and promoting lifelong 
learning (cf. Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6f.). However, 
there is no fundamental contradiction here. Resilience is 
acknowledged in most SDGs, and considered vital to achieving 
SDG goals (cf. Bahadur et al., 2015). 
4.1.3 Joint country strategies  
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Many studies are urging donors to formulate joint crisis response 
strategies that integrate and align humanitarian and development 
efforts. Donor countries and organizations, as well as individual 
donors, should draw up coherent country strategies covering both 
forms of assistance. Actors should be empowered to work towards 
agreed common goals (cf. Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001: 11; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 34; Patrick and 
Brown, 2007: 140; USAID, 2012: 19). Such strategies take into 
account short-term as well as long-term perspectives for people and 
institutions. Ideally, they provide guidance on how to integrate, 
sequence and complement humanitarian and development 
                                                 
42 This critical point also appears later in our study. See discussions of the 
findings on the planning gap (Section 4.3.1). 
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programmes (cf. JRPSC and UN, 2016; see also Section 4.3.1). 
Furthermore, strategies ensure that both forms of assistance 
mutually support one another in favour of common outcome 
achievement (OECD, 2006: 40; USAID, 2012: 5, 19). This 
recommendation is highly relevant to Germany and Denmark, for 
example, donor countries in which some government departments 
are responsible for humanitarian assistance while others take care of 
development cooperation; a consolidated joint strategy can be 
particularly vital in such cases (cf. Below and Belzile, 2013: 15; 
Mowjee et al., 2015a: 34; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 55; see also 
Chapter 4.4).  
The conceptual literature also points out that that humanitarian 
and development actors should base their joint strategies on joint 
assessments (see Section 4.3.2) to develop a unified contextual 
understanding of short-term and long-term needs on the ground 
(see e.g. Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 28f.; Mosel and Levine, 
2014: 21; The Grand Bargain, 2016: 8f.). 
Findings from the empirical literature 
More than half of the sampled empirical studies address the 
question whether joint international and individual donors’ country 
strategies exist that provide frameworks for a coherent 
humanitarian-development response to the Syria crisis. 
Most of them draw a positive conclusion, and refer to the 3RP 
(Box 2) as a regional strategic framework for integrating the two 
responses in order to achieve resilience as the stated common 
outcome (cf. e.g. Cullbertson et al., 2015; Guay, 2015; Sediakina-
Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016).43 
                                                 
43 While most of the empirical studies refer to the 3RP as the central 
international joint crisis response strategy for the Syrian refugee crisis, Huang et 
al. (2017) also point to recent ´compact agreements´ (see Section 4). The Jordan 
Compact, presented at the 2016 London conference, aims at improving the 
resilience of host communities and refugees by stimulating economic growth, 
inter alia, via improved access to the EU market (see e.g.: 
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12008). 
       
 
67 
Box 2. Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans 
The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RPs) epitomize international actors’ 
commitment to building bridges between humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation in the Middle East. They underline the necessity of 
profound changes when dealing with humanitarian crises, particularly in Syria. 
This box serves to shed some light on the background and genesis of the 3RPs.  
When the crisis started in 2011, the regional response with regards to refugees 
was initially a UN-led process of setting up National Response Plans for Syrian 
Refugees in all neighbouring countries plus Egypt. In 2012, these plans were for 
the first time merged under a single umbrella: a Regional Response Plan (RRP). 
The humanitarian approach to refugees was still separated from the realm of 
development politics. Two coordinators worked in each neighbouring country of 
Syria (the Humanitarian Coordinator of OCHA and the Resident Coordinator, 
usually from UNDP if present). The crisis required complex coordination. 
Disputes evolved on the mandate of some UN organizations. As a consequence, 
coordination among Syria’s neighbours was merged in 2014. A Joint Resident and 
Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq was appointed. 
Calls for the inclusion of a resilience component – catering for host 
communities and for refugees – were becoming louder inside the UN (UNDP, 
2013). Exponentially growing refugee numbers in 2013–2015, and the subsequent 
strain on host countries, made it imperative to find national and local solutions. 
The Jordanian government developed a National Resilience Plan for 2014–2016, 
complementing the original National Response Plan and focusing specifically on 
crisis management in Jordan and its host communities. Efforts to merge the two 
sides led up to National Response Plans, which included a humanitarian 
component for refugees and a resilience component for host countries. 
This was also reflected on a regional level. The first 3RP was made public in 
2015 by UNHCR, highlighting longer-term commitments and objectives in 
neighbouring countries. The formal lead of National Response Plans belongs to 
nation states, though. These National Response Plans are only later fed into a 
Regional Plan. The emphasis on host communities, rather than on refugees, in 
today’s 3RPs is based on strong individual national interests among Syria’s 
neighbours, and on reconsidered UN policies to some extent. Resilience includes 
all kinds of stakeholders (from beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance to 
institutions in host countries), but the peculiar entry point to the Syria crisis led 
to a focus on host countries.  
 
Insufficient donor funding for long-term development has, however, induced 
many host governments to call for direct budgetary support.  
 
Several authors view the 3RP as an important milestone. The 3RP 
solidifies the shift in strategic thinking. It promotes an integrated 
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humanitarian and development realm for scaling up resilience, and 
formulates clear strategic objectives and indicators accompanied by 
sector plans – all in order to put the resilience agenda into practice 
(cf. Guay, 2015: 22; Lee and Pearce, 2017: 27). Most UN-related 
reports meanwhile use these targets and objectives as benchmarks 
for assessment of effectiveness (Darcy, 2016: 30). 
However, some studies find critical aspects as well. Some argue 
that the 3RP approach has a too limited time horizon that prevents 
plans from effectively contributing to resilience on a more 
sustainable basis (cf. Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 88). An 
evaluation synthesis provided by CALL discovers a downside of 
Jordan´s strong ownership in the 3RP process: refugee concerns are 
not sufficiently integrated into Jordan´s National Resilience Plan 
(Darcy, 2016: 26; see also Hidalgo et al., 2015: 9ff.). Some donor 
countries have criticized the 3RP “as a wish list and not a strategy”; 
and the joint strategy-building efforts underlying the 3RP were not 
sufficiently inclusive since NGOs were not well integrated (Darcy, 
2016: 25f.). 
Some studies also mention donor countries with a unified – 
interdepartmental – country strategy that integrates humanitarian 
and development responses to the refugee crisis, and takes 
international strategies into account simultaneously: Sweden 
produced a five-year strategy covering its Syria crisis assistance 
(2016–2021). Denmark updated the strategic framework for 
stabilization work in Syria (2015–2016), and the UK collects 
humanitarian, development and stabilization assistance under a 
single strategic framework (Betts et al., 2016: 25; see also Mowjee et 
al., 2015b: 22). Contrary to this Betts et al. (2016: 25), in their 
evaluation of the Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional 
Crisis, find no traces of any ‘whole-of-Norway’ strategy. 
Finally, some studies criticize the absence of a unified strategy 
within international organizations. For example, the ´evaluation of 
UNESCO´s role in education in emergencies and protracted crises´ 
reaches a sharp conclusion: “UNESCO does not have an 
organization-wide strategy to clearly guide and position its education 
work in crisis contexts, such as the Syria crisis” (Sediakina-Rivière 
and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 14). 
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4.1.4 Alignment of donor and partner country 
strategies 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Donors should align their strategies with a host country´s own 
strategy (e.g. national response plan). This recommendation, related 
to aspects of the vision and strategy sub-gap, is found in the 
conceptual literature as well. 
Linking short-term and long-term crisis responses arguably 
requires a collective effort that includes national and local actors (cf. 
Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 55ff.). There is widespread conviction 
that ownership – of host countries´ governments and of sub-
national actors – is a prerequisite for effective crisis response 
strategies (see e.g. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45ff.; Otto and Weingärtner, 
2013: 69). In this line of argument, strategies endorsed by all 
stakeholders are important keys to collaborative efforts. 
Government authorities, civil society and other actors should build 
a coherent strategy that promotes resilience among individuals, 
domestic and refugee households, communities, and national 
institutions (cf. GCER, 2016: 16). This also presupposes actors 
willing to collaborate on joint assessments in preparation for a clear-
cut strategy, and actors who are ready to actively promote capacity 
development (cf. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; OCHA et al., 2015: 13; 
Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 56). 
Findings from the empirical literature 
The sampled empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the 
alignment of donor and partner country strategies in the Syrian 
context. 
The Jordanian government and international actors have 
collaborated closely during the planning process before the 
incorporation of the Jordan Response Plan into the 3RP, according 
to a synthesis of evaluations (cf. e.g. Darcy, 2016: 18). 44 Several 
                                                 
44 In Jordan, for example, UNESCO has played a critical role, supporting the 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation during preparations for an 
education strategy for refugees (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 12). 
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studies emphasize the strong ownership of refugee-hosting 
countries, which generates strong coherence between the 3RP and 
national plans. Jordan´s National Resilience Plan and Lebanon´s 
Stabilization Roadmap are two good examples (cf. e.g. Darcy, 2016: 
30; Lee and Pearce, 2017: 5f.). 
However, strategy alignment has its limits where divergence of 
interests between host countries’ governments and the international 
donor community (donor countries, UN-organizations, and NGOs) 
is significant. The case of Lebanon shows that alignment becomes 
almost impossible if a national government has policies in place that 
contravene donors’ mandates and principles. In Lebanon, the 
Minister of Interior announced that refugees returning to Syria (after 
June 2014) would be stripped of refugee status if they returned to 
Lebanon once again. Statements of that kind contradict most donor 
policies of free movement for refugees, and make alignment difficult 
(OCHA and REACH, 2014: 38).  
Even when there is (partial) alignment of donor and partner 
country strategies at the national level, this does not automatically 
mean that host communities’ needs are met. Local authorities in 
Lebanon were not sufficiently represented in the national strategy 
process, evidence suggests. Priorities articulated by the Lebanon 
Roadmap differ significantly from those of municipalities and host 
communities. As a consequence, a certain disconnect has arisen 
regarding sectorial priorities set by UN agencies and by donors, in 
line with the national roadmap, and priorities by host communities 
and municipalities (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 85; Ciacci, 2014: 
27). 
The situation looks slightly different in Jordan. Until recently, 
Syrians were not granted work permits in Jordan (REACH 
Initiative, 2014: 18)), as opposed to international provisions and in 
spite of lobbying by donor countries (a case of lacking alignment of 
donor and partner country strategies). This had obvious negative 
effects. Growing competition from Syrians, Jordanians and 
Egyptians in the informal labour market put many Jordanian 
households in a vulnerable position; it increased tensions between 
Jordanians and Syrian refugees (REACH Initiative, 2014: 18). The 
main concern of the government of Jordan with allowing Syrian to 
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work was the impact this would have on hosts (Bellamy et al., 2017: 
56). 
Recently, the Jordan Compact (see Section 4.1.5) opened 
opportunities for Syrians to find regular work (Bellamy et al., 2017: 
4; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15). The Compact 
serves as a conducive factor to further alignment since it promises 
the Jordan Government more funding, more trade concessions and 
non-concessional World Bank loans (Bellamy et al., 2017: 50ff.). 
Some empirical studies also provide positive evidence on 
subnational actors’ involvement in the strategy-building process 
underlying the Jordan Response Plan. The Government of Jordan 
has, in collaboration with the UN, established a Host Community 
Support Platform (later renamed as Jordan Response Platform for 
the Syria Crisis) to coordinate the international response. The 
platform allows national NGOs and various subnational actors to 
participate in the elaboration of the Jordan Response Plans (cf. e.g. 
REACH Initiative, 2014: 2, 6).45 
4.1.5 Commitment to longer-term engagement in 
protracted crises 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Lack of commitment to longer-term engagement in protracted 
crises, is one further aspect of the vision and strategy gap. Many 
studies emphasize that response strategies are set to fail if not 
underpinned by donors´ political will to engage in a crisis for longer 
periods of time.  
Humanitarian-development responses to protracted crises 
require an investment of time (USAID, 2012: 16). This implies 
contingency planning, especially when it comes to addressing 
chronic vulnerability; it also signals a readiness to adapt to 
unpredictable developments – and a long-term focus that integrates 
                                                 
45 See also the Website of the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis: 
http://www.jrpsc.org/new-page-4/. 
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the entire spectrum of assistance in a coherent manner (cf. van 
Cooten et al., 2014: 13; de Weijer, 2013: 12).  
Donors and partner governments must adopt long-term 
strategies that guide the different forms of assistance along the road 
towards common goals (see e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014: 18; Otto 
and Weingärtner, 2013: 58f.).  
Findings from the empirical literature 
Almost one third of the empirical studies addresses the question 
whether donor and partner countries really are committed to longer-
term engagement in the Syrian refugee crisis. The evidence is 
somewhat mixed. 
Some studies draw positive conclusions. After the early years of 
the crises response which was more or less restricted to 
humanitarian aid, there is today a growing recognition that the crisis 
cannot be managed without longer-term development responses 
(Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 81f.; cf. Darcy, 2016: 30; Sediakina-
Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 8). For some authors, this 
perspective is already reflected in actors’ adherence to resilience as 
a common outcome of the humanitarian-development response 
(see Section 4.1.2).  
Huang et al. (2017) argue that the ´Grand Bargain´ signed by 
more than 30 donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs, at the World 
Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul as well as the ´ UN’s Commitment 
to Action´ (also launched at the summit), and especially new 
´compact agreements´ (such as those in Jordan and Lebanon) are 
recent developments that clearly reflect the political commitment of 
the humanitarian and the development realm to work over multiyear 
timeframes in protracted crises: “Compact agreements have 
emerged as a new approach, bringing together donors and 
development and humanitarian actors under host-country 
leadership for multiyear agreements to achieve defined, sustainable 
outcomes for refugees and host communities” (Huang and Ash, 
2017: xi). 
This new outlook is, however, the result of a long process. 
Negotiators had to overcome reservations from host countries – 
Lebanon and Jordan in particular – which abstained from 
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developing longer-term perspectives for refugees (cf. Darcy, 2016: 
26). Until recently, the Jordanian government refused to accept that 
the crisis made it imperative to shift to long-term planning (Darcy, 
2016: 26). Jordan’s national resilience plans were primarily focused 
on host communities, and to a much smaller degree on refugees. 
Multilateral development organizations such as the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank pushed for a policy 
shift towards more enduring solutions that addressed the needs of 
Syrian refugees as well as those of their Jordanian hosts (Bellamy et 
al., 2017: 51). The Jordan Compact was a major output of this 
process.  
Some reviewed empirical studies have doubts about the 
credibility of donors´ lasting engagement in the Syria crisis. Signed 
commitments have not been translated into adequate levels of 
funding, they point out (for more details, see Section 4.2). Hidalgo 
et al. (2015: 7) note that UNHCR find it difficult to make long-term 
plans due to insufficient funding. Culbertson et al. register problems 
in the education sector in Jordan. They find a lack of explicit long-
term commitment among donors, and see many who are reluctant 
to accept shared burdens for long-term improvements (Cullbertson 
et al., 2015: 13). Donors’ short planning cycles are limiting their 
ability to invest in more enduring programmes, and this has visible 
negative effects on the efficiency and sustainability of the provided 
assistance (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 13). 
Overall, the empirical studies suggest that progress has been made on closing 
the vision and strategy gap, compared to the mainly humanitarian interventions 
at the beginning of the Syria crisis. This especially goes for the crisis response in 
Syria’s neighbouring countries. Several recommendations on how to close this 
sub-gap we have derived from our analysis of the conceptual sample studies have 
already been implemented. Joint international strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are in place, 
aiming at aligning the humanitarian with the development response. Donor 
countries are willing to make longer-term efforts in neighbouring countries of 
Syria. Strengthening resilience has become a common goal of the joint crisis 
response. 
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4.2 Funding gap 
Inadequate and inflexible funding of humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation during protracted crises is another 
problematic aspect of the humanitarian-development gap.  
Various aspects of the funding gap are covered in almost all 
conceptual studies and in many empirical studies analysed for this 
review. Based on discussions and recommendations in the 
conceptual studies, we define this gap as follows: 
A funding gap is caused by insufficient, fragmented, unbalanced and 
inflexible funding for relief and longer-term development responses. It impedes 
adequately scaled and well-coordinated responses to protracted crisis. 
4.2.1 Adequate level of funding for all forms of 
assistance 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
A number of studies view inadequate distribution of funds across 
the different forms of assistance as a stumbling block to effective 
linkages between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 142). However, 
carefully prepared responses to protracted crises require sufficient 
financial resources and long-term funding of both forms of 
assistance (OCHA et al. 2015: 4).  
The conceptual studies provide little guidance, however, 
regarding what is “adequate” when it comes to funding under 
shifting circumstances. They disagree on what actual allocation 
patterns look like in practice. Some find evidence that the 
distribution of funds is strongly biased in favour of immediate 
(humanitarian) crisis responses (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 
142; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34), and claim that donors are 
unwilling to provide more long-lasting funding.46 Beck (2006: 28), 
                                                 
46 This is particularly true of funding for capacity building/development 
activities (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 136). Capacity building, however, is 
a core issue of the linkage debate, and a key measure that enables crisis-affected 
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in contrast, notes that substantial sums are regularly allocated to 
rehabilitation/recovery, rather than to short-term relief. 
Most studies agree, though, that there is a general shortfall in 
funding rehabilitation/recovery activities (Hinds, 2015: 2; Steets, 
2011: 5).47 This goes along with a general “donor fatigue” regarding 
countries recovering from conflict (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34; 
Steets, 2011: 25), and a lack of dedicated funding for rehabilitation 
activities (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Otto and 
Weingärtner, 2013: 47; Steets, 2011: 55).48 
Many studies urge donors (at least implicitly) to ensure sufficient 
funding not only for short-term interventions but also for longer-
term assistance (rehabilitation and development activities) during 
protracted crises. 
Findings from the empirical literature  
More than half of the empirical studies address the funding gap. 
Darcy (Darcy, 2016: 57f.) points out that even though the response 
to the Syria crisis generates large amounts of funding in absolute 
terms, resources are still insufficient compared to growing needs. 
Dramatic funding shortfalls, of around 40–50 per cent, have plagued 
the 3RP and Syria appeals since 2014 (Darcy, 2016: 57). Where 
resources are scarce, Ernst et al. argue, allocation patterns are crucial 
issues due to hardening competition between different approaches 
and objectives (Ernst et al., 2014: 4).  
The donor community has acknowledged the need for longer-
term financing of resilience programmes in the crisis region (Betts 
                                                 
people and institutions to become more resilient (van Cooten et al., 2014: 10; 
Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 12). 
47 We use “recovery” and “rehabilitation” as synonyms. 
48 Two examples of dedicated funding lines for rehabilitation activities are the 
USAID’s Transition Initiatives, and Germany’s funding instrument for 
transitional development assistance “crisis management and reconstruction, 
infrastructure” (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 9; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 47). 
The German budget line was named “development-oriented emergency aid” 
until 2012, then “development-promoting transitional assistance” 
(Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende Übergangshilfe), and, from 2016, 
“crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure” (Krisenbewältigung und 
Wiederaufbau, Infrastruktur). 
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et al., 2016; Darcy, 2016). Nevertheless, many studies stress that this 
verbal commitment to resilience-oriented initiatives is not matched 
by actual financial support (Bellamy et al., 2017: 52; 2016: 52; 
Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 87, 2015: 97; Lawry-White and 
Schloffer, 2014: 19; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15). 
Instead, allocations patterns reveal that donors continue to give 
priority to emergency assistance at the expense of resilience-
oriented spending (Bellamy et al., 2017: 52; Betts et al., 2016: 52; 
Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 87).49  
Capacity development is, according to some studies, the only 
field where actual spending patterns are seemingly in line with 
recommendations to match funding of short-term relief with higher 
investments in resilience building.50 
According to some empirical studies, narrowly defined rules of 
development funding are the main obstacles to adequate funding for 
all forms of assistance. Traditional humanitarian assistance 
institutions don’t have access to development funding, which makes 
it difficult to link their short-term assistance to longer term 
development (Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 22). In addition, 
middle-income countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, are normally 
not on the priority list for development funding (Ernst et al., 2014: 
19; Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7f.). Some studies point at other available 
financial resources, such as funding from the Gulf States and 
remittances (DEMAC, 2016: 19). Both are associated with longer-
term and less formalized funding modalities. 
Cullbertson et al. (2015: 54) show that a lack of resources can 
block the alignment of emergency activities with existing 
institutional structures in a partner country. One practical example 
is illuminating. Insufficient funding for emergency educational 
                                                 
49 Only Ernst et al. (2014: 23) show that the Australian Response to the Syria 
Crisis completed the shift towards resilience-oriented funding. The first two 
years of the response focused almost exclusively on humanitarian assistance, but 
since 2013 there has been a trend towards funding resilience programmes. 
Today, resilience programmes swallow more than 40 per cent of the funding 
allocation. 
50 Crawford (2015: 16) and Mowjee et al. (2015b: 20) report that all funding 
agreements between the UN and civil society organizations in Lebanon include 
capacity building components. 
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resources (e.g. human resources and equipment) in Syrian refugee 
camps in Jordan made it impossible to align camp education 
standards to those of the Jordan Ministry of Education (MoE) 
curriculum. Consequently, students in camp schools could not 
move on to institutions operated by the MoE or to higher education. 
This constitutes a practical example how inadequate funding for 
emergency interventions prevented the transition to existing 
institutional structures. 
4.2.2 Funding modalities 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
A new financing architecture would allow for more adequate 
responses by the international community, many studies argue 
(GCER, 2016: 7; Steets, 2011: 36). Current funding modalities are 
often not flexible enough to match up to needs on the ground in 
protracted crises. Funds can sometimes be used only for narrowly 
defined purposes or for specific periods, which makes it harder to 
take a flexible and holistic approach in responding to crises 
(Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Otto and Weingärtner, 
2013: 34; Steets, 2011: 31). 
Several reviewed studies make suggestions on more flexible 
funding mechanisms, capable of handling unforeseen circumstances 
and permitting rapid reactions to emergencies (Patrick and Brown, 
2007: 143). Donors should be able to redirect funds for other 
purposes than originally planned, and to adapt to new situations 
more smoothly (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Levine and 
Mosel, 2014a: 13; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 48). Donors can 
increase flexibility by relaxing earmarking of funds that can be used 
for various purposes or by adapting of the eligibility criteria (The 
Grand Bargain, 2016: 12). 
Pooled funding modalities by the EU, are a particularly good 
example of a flexible funding. The so-called B-envelope of the 
European Development Fund (EDF) permits a flexible allocation 
of funds in specific circumstances (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 48). 
The European Instrument for Stability and Peace provides funding 
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for short-term emergency needs and longer-term challenges (Mosel 
and Levine, 2014: 9), and so does the EU-funded joint 
humanitarian-development initiative SHARE (Supporting Horn of 
Africa Resilience) (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 110). 
Steets (2011: 32) argues that flexible funding facilitates a more 
needs-based approach and hence fosters adequate budgetary 
allocation. This focus on needs can be achieved with a localized 
approach that involves government systems, the private sector, 
and/or civil society (OCHA et al., 2015: 10). It can also be handled 
through feedback mechanisms, involving affected populations 
(Steets et al., 2016: 35), that allow for more appropriate assistance. 
Apart from flexibility, pooled funding can create incentives for 
collaboration. Patrick and Brown (2007: 134) cite The United 
Kingdom’s Conflict Pool as a positive example. It funds conflict 
prevention, stabilization and peacekeeping; and brings together 
three government departments designing joint conflict prevention 
and management programmes.51 Some argue that pooled funds at 
partner country level are particularly suitable for intensified 
collaboration; they can lead to better linkages and alignment of 
different forms of assistance and policy coherence (OCHA et al., 
2015: 4; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 57). 
According to Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 15), longer-term 
funding can inject more flexibility into implementing organizations, 
and facilitate time perspectives that reach beyond standard annual 
project cycles. Better linkages between relief and development are 
substantial likely rewards. 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Applied funding modalities and their suitability to the Syria crisis are 
discussed in almost half of the empirical studies. Sida and Norad, 
two Nordic donor organizations, are often seen as positive examples 
in this regard. 
Some studies show that flexible funding is provided by un-
earmarked, or lightly earmarked, arrangements via multilateral 
                                                 
51 Three government departments are involved in the United Kingdom’s 
Conflict Pool: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department 
for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). 
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organizations. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) is one of them (Ernst et al., 2014: 2), Sida is another 
one (Betts et al., 2016: 14 Syria Case Study).  
Sida and Norad are also implementing specific instruments to 
prepare the financial system for changing environments. Betts et al. 
(2016: 25) describe the approach of Norad, Sida and Danida as a 
‘reserve’ humanitarian budget approach. Roughly 25 per cent of 
their annual humanitarian assistance resources are retained for 
flexible use, including new and unanticipated priorities. Sida 
allocates half of its annual financial budget to sudden crises. The 
other half is distributed at the beginning of a budget year to ongoing 
crises. Furthermore, Sida has established a Rapid Response 
Mechanism (RRM) for kick-starting implementation that is 
disbursed at the beginning of each year (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 18 
Syria Case Study). 
 Sida’s flexible financing modalities mainly focus on allocation 
mechanisms of humanitarian aid. Unlike Danida for example, Sida’s 
humanitarian budget is fixed. It’s not ready to transfer unspent 
funds from other budget lines to the humanitarian unit (Mowjee et 
al., 2015b: 18 Syria Case Study). 
Sida and Norad also follow a needs-based approach when 
allocating financial resources. Norad’s responsive and opportunity-
based model relies on assessments made by its partners (Betts et al., 
2016: 5), and Sida permits partnering civil society organizations to 
alter project designs to respond to fluid contexts (Mowjee et al., 
2015b: 14 Syria Case Study). 
Studies stress two positive aspects of flexibility-enhancing 
mechanisms. First, they are appropriate to timely responses to 
fluctuating needs (Betts et al., 2016: 6; Ernst et al., 2014: 2,3; Mowjee 
et al., 2015b: 11 Syria Case Study). Second, they can fill potential 
funding gaps (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 12 Syria Case Study). On the 
negative side, flexibility comes at a predictability cost (Betts et al., 
2016: 6; Ernst et al., 2014: 3). Flexibility can act as a disincentive to 
a more strategic approach that is required for current protracted 
crises (Betts et al., 2016: 6). Furthermore, pooled funding through 
multilateral organizations is slowing down the funding process, 
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some authors notice; hence local implementation organizations are 
unable to adapt projects rapidly to new circumstances (Crawford, 
2015: 17; Hidalgo et al., 2015: 148). 
Almost half of the studies find an increased awareness of the 
need for continuous funding (Betts et al., 2016: 39; Ciacci, 2014: 41; 
Drummond et al., 2015: 11; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 15 Syria Case 
Study; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 7f.) Uninterrupted 
flows of money make assistance more predictable (Mowjee et al., 
2015b: 12 Syria Case Study). Evidence on the implementation of 
continuous funding modalities, however, points in various 
directions. 
The WFP’s Forward Purchasing Facility provides one solution 
(Drummond et al., 2015: 11). Diversified financial strategies by 
Oxfam Italy is another one (Ciacci, 2014: 41). Sida guarantees its 
partners ten per cent of their budget for the subsequent year, thus 
stimulating a perception of continuous funding (Mowjee et al., 
2015b: 15 Syria Case Study).  
Some evidence tells us that funding cycles are rather short-term 
even today, mostly annual (Betts et al., 2016: 33; Cullbertson et al., 
2015: 2; Ernst et al., 2014: 13). Short-term funds lead to high 
transaction costs for partners (Betts et al., 2016: 39), and to 
unpredictability (Ernst et al., 2014: 18; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 15 Syria 
Case Study). They are also hindering strategic and sustainable 
programming (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 98). 
Overall, the empirical studies paint an ambivalent picture with regard to 
closing the funding gap, as recommended by the conceptual studies. Progress has 
indeed been made. Some actors apply innovative funding modalities that allow 
for joint humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding. This enables 
them to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances. But dramatic funding 
shortfalls in recent years, and a persistent emphasis on humanitarian assistance 
rather than development-oriented programmes, are putting this positive trend at 
risk. A more unified strategic shift towards strengthening resilience is not reflected 
in actual allocation patterns. 
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4.3 Planning gap 
The humanitarian-development gap can also be caused by a lack of 
common planning. We address this aspect as a planning gap. It is 
closely associated with the vision and strategy gap, as it refers to 
problems in translating strategic goals and considerations into 
concrete measures. Based on the conceptual studies, the planning 
gap is defined as follows: 
A planning gap is given when humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation are planned independently and with insufficient consideration of one 
another. As a consequence, there is no coherent integration of all forms of 
assistance to ensure effective and sustainable collective outcomes.  
4.3.1 Joint planning 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Many authors in the conceptual sample emphasize that joint 
planning – bringing together and harmonizing perspectives, values, 
principles and work procedures – is an important prerequisite for 
sequencing and integrating humanitarian and development crisis 
response more effectively and sustainably (OECD, 2006: 24; Otto 
and Weingärtner, 2013: 16). 
Joint planning includes joint selection and preferred objectives 
(or sub-goals) that are linked to a broader strategy. It integrates 
short-term and long-term perspectives as early as possible. The 
involvement of different perspectives (e.g. of humanitarian, 
development actors, and of local players) in the planning process is 
necessary to address potential misunderstandings and prejudices 
originating in different working cultures and beliefs (Bailey and 
Barbelet, 2014: 26; GCER, 2016: 7; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 17; 
Stepputat and Greenwood, 2013: 25). 
Many authors recommend multi-disciplinary planning teams. 
Mosel and Levine (2014: 16) apply a governance perspective, and 
claim that not only individuals from different parts of government 
should join the planning group, but also academics and people more 
directly affected by a crisis. Government departments and aid 
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agencies should act as “facilitators and mobilizers rather than as 
decision makers and resource controllers” (Buchanan-Smith and 
Maxwell, 1996: 12). 
Given that the humanitarian-development sphere is heavily 
fragmented, some authors claim that joint planning teams sitting 
inside an actual country, rather than somewhere on the outside, are 
in a better position to select and prioritise activities (Mosel and 
Levine, 2014: 10; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 47). Proximity to the level of 
implementation will yield more successful projects and 
programmes. Furthermore, within those teams the principle of “task 
cultures, not role cultures” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 
12), should be followed, since task cultures address the need for new 
modes of organization in multi-disciplinary teams.  
Two positive examples of joint planning teams are mentioned. 
Sida has implemented joint humanitarian and development teams in 
fragile states (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 36), and the USAID’s 
Joint Planning Cells are working in close coordination with partner 
countries’ governments (USAID, 2012). 
The rationale behind joint teams is that the planning of 
humanitarian aid and development cooperation runs simultaneously 
(a contiguum approach). This does not always hold true, however.52 
If joint planning is not conducted simultaneously, actors from one 
strand of assistance should at least consider perspectives held by 
actors on the other side in their own planning (van Cooten et al., 
2014: 13; Hinds, 2015: 2). The humanitarian-development linkage is 
in this case seen as a continuum that follows a sequencing approach 
(see Chapter 4.7). Humanitarian actors should, while planning, give 
thought to the objective of self-help strengthening and to adaptive 
capacity building/development with long time perspectives (van 
Cooten et al., 2014: 13). Development actors should be fully 
informed about prior and existing humanitarian projects and 
programmes, and should target the same groups, those most in need 
of humanitarian support (Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 6). Sensitivity to 
                                                 
52 This can, for instance, be the case due to a security situation that inhibits 
implementation of development cooperation activities. 
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risks among vulnerable groups, sudden shocks, and changing needs 
are also worth considering (GCER, 2016: 7).53 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Joint planning is stressed by a majority of the empirical studies. 
Progress has been made lately as to bringing together and 
harmonizing different perspectives, values, principles and work 
procedures at the planning stage. Bailey and Barbelet (2014: 1) note 
that the response to the Syria crises has been primarily humanitarian 
so far, and don’t see any early evidence of a development 
perspective. However, according to Betts et al. (2016: 24), planning 
organized at Norway’s embassies includes sub-goals related to both 
humanitarian and development perspectives when reviewing the 
humanitarian situation, democratization and human rights (see also 
Section 4.3.3). In general, there is a growing recognition that the 
crisis also requires a resilience-oriented development response, 
especially in countries bordering to Syria.  
The 3RPs and national resilience plans responding to the Syria 
crisis are referred to quite often (see Box 2). These Response plans 
are supposed to align projects and programmes and to foster 
coherence.54 Bellamy et al. (2017: 53) state that all resilience-related 
funding and programming in Jordan must be aligned with the 
Jordan Response Plan. INGOs should ensure that projects are 
approved by individual ministries, prior to review by the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), and by the Inter-
Ministerial Coordination Committee (IMCC). But these procedures 
also lead to longer approval times and – due to centralization in 
Jordan – limited space for collaboration with host communities. 
Some authors criticize that the resilience plans are too strategic, 
they don’t discuss priorities and remain too vague (Cullbertson et 
al., 2015: 29; Darcy, 2016: 26; REACH Initiative, 2014: 29), and 
suffer from inconsistencies (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 62). 
                                                 
53 In this way, joint planning also involves holistic and flexible planning 
(discussed in detail in Section 4.3.3), and joint assessments to inform planning 
(discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2). 
54 For further discussion on the regional response plans, see also remarks on the 
vision and strategy gap in Section 4.1.3. 
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An example for successful joint planning at sector level comes 
from the education sector in Jordan. The Jordan Response Plan for 
the Syria crisis (2016–2018) constitutes the Kingdom’s current 
strategy, in which UNESCO acts as the Secretariat for Education 
(Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6). The Jordan Education 
Sector Working Group (ESWG), established in 2008, coordinates 
the activities of partners implementing the national educational 
programme (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 22). The ESWG coordinates 
both the humanitarian response and the development education 
programming in Jordan (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 66). This working 
group is co-chaired by UNICEF and Save the Children, and 
supported by the Ministry of Education. 
Sector-level coordination in Jordan is seen as relatively 
successful. Management and leadership has arguably worked well 
(Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 12). The involvement of 
Jordanian actors in the planning process, and the UN’s close 
relationship to the government and implementing partners, are 
probably important keys (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 96).  
Nevertheless, Cullbertson et al. (2015: 32) also stress that 
international humanitarian organizations often make no use at all of 
national capacities: for instance that of Jordan’s functioning 
education system. This is a significant obstacle to joint efforts. Most 
international organizations are unfamiliar with working conditions 
in middle-income countries. They feel uncertain of how to adapt. 
Furthermore, the strong lead of international organizations 
questioned the sovereignty of the Jordanian government, and has, 
for instance, induced the government to block NGOs from getting 
involved in planning processes. Some authors point at negative 
experiences from Syria and Turkey. Mowjee et al. (2015b: 18 Syria 
Case Study) have not discovered any move to synchronize donor 
coordination meetings on humanitarian and development issues in 
Syria, despite apparent requirements. In Turkey, joint planning for 
the health sector by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
and the Ministry of Health has not materialized; the Ministry has 
declined to participate (Daoudi et al., 2014: 39). 
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4.3.2 Joint assessments to inform planning 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Just as in the case of the formulation of joint strategies (see 4.1.3), 
planning is often only insufficiently informed by joint analyses and 
assessments. Humanitarian and development actors fail, at least 
partly, to address the root causes of crises, their dynamics, 
consequences and challenges to joint responses that interweave 
short-term and longer-term perspectives (see e.g. Koddenbrock and 
Büttner, 2009: 28f.; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 21; The Grand Bargain, 
2016: 8f.). 
Many studies of the conceptual sample argue that joint analyses 
and assessments such as context-, scenario- and need analyses help 
to better link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation 
as they help to get a common understanding and hence provide 
guidance for joint planning decisions regarding the division of tasks, 
timing and sequencing (Mowjee et al., 2015a: 28; Otto and 
Weingärtner, 2013: 55; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 14; USAID, 2012: 
6). But “if perceptions differ, actions will hardly be brought 
together. […] Without rapprochement of analyses, policies will not 
come closer” (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 134). 
Joint analyses and assessments are still exceptions, but several 
studies recommend a better use of evidence in planning by applying 
tools of this kind (Hinds, 2015: 8; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; 
Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 6). 
Findings from the empirical literature 
Needs are not properly assessed in the Syrian context, most 
empirical studies claim (Bellamy et al., 2017: 3; Cullbertson et al., 
2015: 64; Drummond et al., 2015: 13). Betts et al. (2016: 26) adds 
that projects funded by Norwegian assistance are based on needs 
assessments that focus solely on immediate needs of targets groups. 
The only positive evidence with respect to joint assessment to 
inform planning in the empirical sample is mentioned by Mowjee et 
al. (2015b: 23 Syria Case Study): Sida’s humanitarian staff member 
work particularly close with the staff working on the human rights 
and democracy programme to develop a shared context analysis. 
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The programme could utilize humanitarian maps and information 
on access, while Sida’s staff member gained a better understanding 
of local actors in Syria. 
Absence of joint assessments leads to tensions and to crisis 
responses that are not evidence-based, some authors argue. 
(Cullbertson et al., 2015: 64; REACH Initiative, 2014: 2). 
Drummond et al. (2015: 13) believe that the lack of more 
comprehensive analyses, particularly in Syria but also in refugee-
hosting countries, has a clear-cut explanation: the enormous scale 
and rapid expansion of the crisis. 
Others are stressing the role of governments. Syrian and Turkish 
governments have prevented a joint needs assessment (Darcy, 2016: 
53; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 12), whereas Jordanian officials reason that 
comprehensive assessments are important (Bellamy et al., 2017: 46). 
This implies, once more, that (country) context matters. 
4.3.3 Planning for holistic and flexible 
programming 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Needs of beneficiaries are often interlinked and cannot be addressed 
effectively in isolation. Interventions should be planned holistically, 
and include multiple needs (sectors) and multiple beneficiaries. 
This rationale is central to the humanitarian-development nexus, 
as humanitarian needs such as the relief of human suffering and 
development needs in the form of longer-term development co-
exist in protracted crises. To plan and operationalize holistic 
programmes, a number of scenarios are conceivable: a) cooperation 
between humanitarian and development actors, b) single planning 
and implementation by a dually mandated organization, and c) 
meaningful involvement of beneficiaries. The scenarios do not 
necessarily exclude one another. 
An example for programming between actors from the 
humanitarian as well the development sector is given by OCHA et 
al. (OCHA et al. 2015: 16ff.): initiatives by UNDP (development) 
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and UNHCR (humanitarian) in a joint programme led to the 
implementation of the Transitional Solutions Initiative (2012–
2014), which combined beneficiaries’ short-term and long-term 
goals. Programmes of this type must rest on a broad understanding 
of contexts, and should address needs holistically (Levine and 
Mosel, 2014a: 11–12).  
Successful holistic programming in changing environments 
requires flexibility during design and implementation phases, many 
conceptual studies state (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25; van Cooten 
et al., 2014: 9–13; EC, 2001: 7 ff. Mosel and Levine, 2014: 17 ff. 
Mowjee et al., 2015a: 27–46; UNDP, 2008: 7). Flexibility issues are 
also addressed in recent discussions on how to reform humanitarian 
action. New opportunities and challenges to linkage may develop 
quickly in conflict environments. International actors should be 
ready to alter programmes and country strategies accordingly. 
Flexibility should be promoted rather than penalized, as has often 
been the case.  
Findings from the empirical literature 
Roughly half of the empirical studies call for holistic and flexible 
planning in order to react appropriately to the Syria crisis. 
Some authors stress the lack of programmes tackling multiple 
sectors (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 86; Guay, 2015: 20), while 
others find positive examples. UNICEF’s Emergency Education 
response is accompanied by Makani centres, which address violence 
and bullying (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 52). 55  The International 
Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Economic Recovery and Development 
Program connect cash assistance and livelihood programming to 
each other (IRC, 2016: 13).  
Constructive initiatives, additionally, deliver assistance to 
multiple beneficiaries. The most vulnerable groups are targeted, 
irrespective of nationality. They also ensure that refugees as well as 
hosts are addressed by some programmes in Jordan and Lebanon. 
                                                 
55 Makani centres represent a comprehensive approach to service provision. 
Services cover informal education, skill-building programmes, and psychosocial 
support – all accessible to Jordanian and Syrian communities on the same site 
(Cullbertson et al., 2015: 51). 
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Instances where assistance was provided only to refugees are mainly 
reported from Lebanon (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 39; SDC, 2014: 
28). Other studies show how actors fail to address local 
requirements. Poorly implemented assistance is unable to cope with 
the reality that parallel market structures are harmful to local 
communities (Bellamy et al., 2017: 43; Drummond et al., 2015: 28).  
Addressing multiple needs and beneficiaries in a changing 
environment is feasible only with a flexible programme design. The 
mentioned positive examples show actors capable of handling such 
challenges (Daoudi et al., 2014: i; IRC, 2016: 19; Mowjee et al., 
2015b: 23f.; SDC, 2014: 22), and actors willing to learn from earlier 
poorly implemented interventions (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 53).  
Holistic and flexible programming mitigates (potential) social 
tensions, studies claim. Holistic perspectives may, in other words, 
promote social cohesion (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 94f.; 
Cullbertson et al., 2015: 51; Guay, 2015: 11).  
In summary, the empirical sample suggests that progress has been made 
regarding a more comprehensive planning that embraces various sectors and 
beneficiaries – as reflected by the instalment of joint sector working groups in 
Jordan. These efforts foster a harmonization of different perspectives, values, and 
work procedures at the planning stage. Important challenges continue to exist, 
though. Local actors must be much more involved in planning processes. 
4.4 Institutional gap 
Hindering factors to meaningful linkages between humanitarian and 
development institutions, is a recurring topic in the conceptual 
literature. 56  In some cases, obstacles are caused by internal 
deficiencies (e.g. lack of coordination mechanisms or unclear 
leadership). In other cases, a gap becomes visible when external 
stakeholders are interacting. An institution with insufficient 
expertise on both humanitarian and development issues has a 
palpable handicap. Its workforce may not be fully aware of how 
                                                 
56 We are referring to institutions connected to stakeholders of humanitarian 
assistance and development cooperation: donors, governments, INGOs, 
international organizations, and so on. 
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actors from both worlds usually behave, making it difficult for 
institutions to find common ground. 
Competent institutional actors who are willing to work with 
external stakeholders equipped with different mandates are vitally 
important to linkage. We summarize these characteristics as an 
institutional gap and define it as follows: 
An institutional gap exists when the internal coordination structure, the skill 
set of human resources, and external cooperation strategy of institutions – donors, 
national governments, INGOs, international organizations, civil society 
organizations and national and local stakeholders – are harming effective links 
between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.  
4.4.1 Cooperation within institutions 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
A high degree of coordination and cooperation within an institution 
is beneficial to linkage. This is a central recommendation in the 
conceptual literature. A donor government, for instance, which has 
managed to substantially improve internal cooperation within 
ministries and institutions, is capable of reducing redundancies and 
contradictions. This has further positive repercussions. It improves 
perceptions held by a partner country. The donor seemingly acts in 
a coherent manner, his standing is raised, and interventions become 
more effective (e.g. Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 21ff.; OECD, 2014: 
18; Steets, 2011: 43ff.). Improved internal coordination makes it 
easier to create stronger platforms for cooperation with other 
institutions. Actors become more fully aware of humanitarian as 
well as development goals and working principles. 
To achieve better relations between the two silos and more 
coherence, governments or institutions could use incentives of a 
certain kind: pooled funds for development and humanitarian 
departments.57 
                                                 
57 Pooled funds are, in this case, designed for humanitarian as well as 
development programmes. They give donors a better overview on needs in both 
fields, they create opportunities to identify various forms of linkage. 
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A single department, ministry or special unit for humanitarian 
and development concerns is better positioned to generate those 
linkages, the literature suggests. It becomes easier to reach beyond 
political interests, dynamics and competition for budgets. According 
to White et al. (2000: 318 ff.), donor governments building joint 
structures could be found already in the 1990s, for example, the 
Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) introduced by USAID in 
1994, and the Office of Military Affairs within USAID (Patrick and 
Brown, 2007: 141 ff.). Lack of cooperation within institutions, and 
ministries in particular, is today still considered a major obstacle to 
bridging the two main forms of assistance (Patrick and Brown, 2007; 
Steets, 2011: 43). 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Most empirical information on internal cooperation comes from 
donor organizations such as Norad and Sida. It is complemented by 
details on how UNESCO and UNICEF are implementing 
education programmes. The Scandinavian agencies are taking 
positive steps towards effective internal cooperation, while UN 
organizations are confronting obstacles to linkage that have to be 
overcome. 
An encouraging example from Norad highlights the importance 
of sharing information on Norway’s assistance in the Syrian context. 
On the one hand, Norad has ensured a constant flow of information 
between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and 
partnering organizations through a variety of channels. 58 This is 
Norad’s platform for decision-making and advocacy; it indicates 
functioning internal cooperation on activities abroad. Entities that 
are more development-oriented, such as embassies, and crisis 
response-oriented entities are included (Betts et al., 2016: 27 ff.).59 
On the other hand, Norway’s assistance in Syria faces criticism for 
promoting an organizational approach that does not foster linkage 
between different sections dealing with assistance, which indicates 
that issues are handled separately. Norway’s assistance in Syria is 
                                                 
58 Filed visits and regular meetings with key stakeholders are channels of this 
kind. 
59 Partnering external organizations constitute a vital element of Norad´s modus 
operandi, and are seen as internal to the system. 
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not, so far, managed by a joint office devoted to the Syria crisis 
response (Betts et al., 2016: 40). In sum, Norad and the other parts 
of Norway’s assistance in Syria have definitely taken steps to ensure 
a smooth information flow between entities dealing with crisis 
assistance, but have declined to establish one single office in charge 
of the overall management. 
The evaluation of Sida´s humanitarian assistance demonstrates 
another good example (Mowjee et al., 2015b). Generally, and not 
specific to the Syria case, Sida has taken concrete measures to link 
its humanitarian assistance with longer-term resilience 
strengthening. It applies common context analyses, it sometimes 
makes use of humanitarian and development funding in one single 
programme, and some of its employees are handling both topics 
simultaneously. Mowjee et al. (2015b: 5) recommend the agency to 
institutionalize these measures internally. This is currently not 
always the case. Sida´s Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
department, which is in charge of development issues, also uses 
humanitarian assistance information as a base for long-term 
strategies in connection to the Syria crisis (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 23). 
Sida is actively stimulating cooperation, just like Norad, but has not 
yet institutionalized its efforts. 
Internal cooperation does not only concern donors. Institutions 
often have to adjust, with little time for preparation, to the Syria 
crisis and its impact on their own programmes. Constant and rapidly 
appearing needs create internal difficulties for cooperation between 
development and humanitarian programmes. When the war in Syria 
affected its area of implementation, the UNICEF Programme in 
Turkey decided to separate emergency response from the regular 
development programme – the latter was operational before the 
crisis – and to manage it from now on with a minimum of 
interaction between staffs. This caused a lack of coherence on field 
level (Darcy, 2016: 24 ff.). It also curtailed cooperation within 
UNICEF in Turkey.  
UNESCO, involved in the crisis response, encompasses long-
term education as well as education in emergencies (Sediakina-
Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 7). In Jordan, UNESCO began to 
put structures in place in 2015 in order to manage education in 
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emergencies together with resilience and development issues within 
one single unit. Despite these efforts, UNESCO still lacks relevant 
expertise on how to handle emergencies and development issues 
simultaneously. Its dedicated units are understaffed or not yet fully 
established. This is epitomised by the absence of Education in 
Emergencies expertise on Head Quarter Level (UNESCO, 2012: 
14). 
4.4.2 Cooperation between institutions 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Cooperation efforts must be holistic in cases where sustainability 
and other long-term goals of international assistance are high 
priorities, Circumstances are always complex, and needs cannot be 
tackled successfully in isolation. Consequently, cooperation must 
include actors from both worlds: short-term humanitarian and long-
term development interventions (e.g. GCER, 2016: 22 ff.). 
Ambitions to work beyond traditional mandates, is another 
requirement. Mosel and Levine (2014: 14) provide a list of 
stakeholders that should establish new links – state institutions 
(local, regional, mid-level bureaucrats) formal and informal 
institutions (traditional authorities, clan structures, etc.), local civil 
society groups (beyond national NGOs) and business entities.  
Studies suggest that donor organizations, in particular, are 
capable of promoting cooperation between institutions in suitable 
contexts (Bailey et al., 2009: 11; Hinds, 2015: 7; OCHA et al., 2015: 
16; Steets, 2011: 5). There are several ways to go. Donors may 
partner with organizations that already possess mandates and 
expertise in both fields, as suggested by Hinds (2015: 7). They could 
order funding applicants to identify opportunities of cooperation 
between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation as 
an integrated part of project and programme proposals. Other 
collaborative efforts are equally vital. Humanitarian assistance actors 
may team up with the private sector around mutually rewarding aid 
projects. Initiatives of this kind form a productive nucleus. They can 
contribute to economic development and potentially enduring 
development viewed through humanitarian lenses (UNDP: 2008). 
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Findings from the empirical literature  
Cooperation intensified between institutions with different 
mandates as the war in Syria became protracted, according to many 
empirical studies. Some mention that cooperation between the 
private and the humanitarian sector in Jordan was virtually non-
existing at the onset; today it is regular modus operandi (Zyck and 
Armstrong, 2014: 9–10; DEMAC, 2016). 
A Jordanian example is illustrative. UNHCR, a humanitarian 
actor in Jordan and Lebanon, made its first attempt to engage 
development and private sector actors roughly three years after the 
beginning of the crisis (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7–9, 48) – with slow but 
increasing success. Today, cooperation between humanitarian 
institutions and local private sectors in regions with existing market 
structures seems quite natural, many studies state. 
Collaboration can include a variety of stakeholders: a local bank 
and a humanitarian organization, for example. The Cairo–Amman 
Bank co-operates with UNHCR on cash-based assistance 
programmes, and distributes money to UNHCR-registered refugees 
via specialized ATMs. (DEMAC, 2016: 18; Huang and Ash, 2017: 
33; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 13). Dually mandated organizations 
are involved at times. Some studies argue that UNICEF, certain 
diaspora organizations, and others with dual mandates are able to 
bring together humanitarian and development work. Experience 
and expertise are anchored in both fields. This is especially valuable 
when pre-crisis knowledge of a certain area already exists internally. 
Here, actors may set existing networks in motion with relative ease, 
and design responses that are sensitive to long-term perspectives 
and opportunities of collaboration (Darcy, 2016: 27; DEMAC, 
2016: 6–7, 19). 
There are also obstacles. Cooperation between international 
institutions and national or local institutions attached to the private 
sector or to civil society often seems to be hampered – on both sides 
– by a total lack of experience from long-standing working 
relationships. Mistrust, stereotypes, preconceived assumptions and 
bureaucratic procedures are some major stumbling blocks 
(DEMAC, 2016: 8, 24–30; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 14). 
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To overcome obstacles, the Global Compact Local Network and 
other initiatives can be valuable (Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 9). This 
network is designed to familiarize the private sector in Jordan with 
the humanitarian system. 
The effects of those forms of partnership are hardly discussed. 
The literature contain a few hints, though. In some cases, 
partnerships have had a seemingly positive impact on the 
sustainability and overall coherence of programmes (Darcy, 2016: 
27). The most tangible effects come from collaboration between 
humanitarian institutions and the private sector: economic benefits 
for private businesses, new local employment opportunities, and 
increased acceptance of refugees in host countries (Darcy, 2016; 
Drummond et al., 2015: x; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 2).  
Despite the sporadic evidence on general effects of joint 
initiatives, most studies recommend actors to work more closely 
together in Syria and its neighbourhood (Bouché and Mohieddin, 
2015: 98; DEMAC, 2016: 45; Huang and Ash, 2017: 33; IRC, 2016: 
21, 27; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 22). However, some caution is 
called for. Cooperation between international institutions and 
national and local partners can sometimes weaken general 
responsibilities or mandates (IRC, 2016: 20). International 
organizations should avoid structures that run parallel to national 
and local ones. It’s probably better to support existing structures if 
you want to achieve shared goals. 
4.4.3 Clear leadership and coordinating role 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
There is a need for distinct leadership and for coordinating roles to 
promote linkages, according to the conceptual literature. The 
rationale has two aspects: to bring stakeholders from development 
and humanitarian sectors closer together; and to strengthen 
cooperation within institutions and between institutions with differing 
mandates. Enhanced internal collaboration requires clearly assigned 
responsibilities. Some studies want to design a structure where 
responsibilities and tasks for linkage are specifically aimed at 
promoting the humanitarian-development nexus (e.g. van Cooten et 
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al., 2014: 17ff.; OECD, 2006: 10–23; Patrick and Brown, 2007: 57). 
A lead coordinating body is better equipped to create such linkages 
across a diverse field of stakeholders than a fragmented effort that 
lacks distinct responsibilities.60 How this will materialize in practice, 
varies from country to country and has to be based on available 
capacity.  
A clear leading body is particularly important within donor 
governments, where interdepartmental and inter-ministerial 
coordination is an important task. A paper (2006: 23) from OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) points out that 
this requires diplomatic skills, as negotiations have to take place 
between policy communities and various policy options. A leading 
coordination centre, equipped with sufficient decision and 
sanctioning power, can build bridges that stretch beyond 
contradicting budgetary and policy stakes among humanitarian and 
development units (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 21 ff.).  
Coordination between humanitarian and development 
stakeholders is another vitally important aspect. Despite mutual 
institutional efforts to support improved coordination and 
collaboration, there is still a need for leadership that translates 
commitments into real action (Mowjee et al., 2015a: 9). This might 
entail substantial reforms focused on ways of working. 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Our empirical sample contains ample individual cases of staff 
members working simultaneously on humanitarian and 
development issues and discovering opportunities for synergies 
(Mowjee et al., 2015b: 5). Unfortunately, this can be regarded as 
phenomenological evidence. Coordination appears to take place 
only erratically, without any observable clear institutional lead and 
without a transparent structure or structural incentives. This can be 
illustrated by an example from Norad. The agency used an external 
technical working group to improve coordination between 
                                                 
60 We acknowledge that the first responsibility for coordination efforts lies with 
the government of a partner country. However, in crisis situations, where a 
government is incapable of coping with a crisis on its own, international actors 
often assume leadership and coordinate efforts. 
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humanitarian and long-term aid in the Syria crisis. The efforts did 
not pay off. Exactly how the working group has influenced Norad´s 
work structurally, is still unclear (Betts et al., 2016: 46). 
Clear leadership, capable of coordinating efforts to build bridges 
between institutions and across main divides, is not an extensively 
discussed issue. The UN-led Cluster Coordination system is active 
also in countries affected by the Syria crisis, and should (especially 
the early recovery cluster) assume a leading role. But UN showed 
no such tendencies for a long time (Darcy, 2016: 29ff.). Leadership 
was not clearly assigned between UNHCR, the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and 
the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC). After some difficult 
early years, UNHCR has eventually taken the lead in Jordan and 
Lebanon, and coordinates the work of development, humanitarian 
and government stakeholders (Darcy, 2016: 26ff.). This is an 
unusual role for a predominantly humanitarian organization, but 
UNHCR’s working experience in the area and its relationship to 
regional governments are essential assets.  
4.4.4 A decentralized institutional structure 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Decentralized institutions, whose decision-making power stays 
close to the area of programme implementation, will probably 
promote good linkages between humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation. Decentralized institutions are capable of 
finding opportunities in conflicts, disasters and other challenging 
environments. Hence, structures of that type can be distinctive 
bridge builders between short-term and long-term goals. 
Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 57–59) view a decentralized 
approach, where decision-making power, including control over 
funding, is moved to a national level, as a potential way to overcome 
the humanitarian-development divide. According to White and 
Cliffe (2000: 332 ff.), centralized institutional structures are known 
to be ineffective – citing an example where key humanitarian staff 
were so detached from the operative area that it became impossible 
to even commence meaningful steps towards more development 
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oriented measures. They were unable to find long-term or medium-
term opportunities. One study observes positive effects when 
donors locate both humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation close to an implementation area (Steets, 2011: 40ff.). 
Some organizations and governments have decentralized 
institutional structures. The UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and, in part, the Australian government, are 
two examples. They take care of humanitarian as well as 
development budgets at country level (Steets, 2011: 40ff.). 
Findings from the empirical literature  
The empirical literature has not very much to say about 
decentralization. The donor perspective is predominant among the 
bits and bobs of information. Norad and Sida provide funds for 
programmes but do not handle implementation and rely on a regular 
information flow from implementation level to headquarter level 
ensures that field perspectives will be included in decisions. Field 
level information can be used for advocacy purposes. Donors may, 
for instance, want to increase funding for resilience programmes, 
respond to opportunities for linkage, or furnish additional funds. 
Accordingly, decision-making power on headquarter level is based 
on information from the field.  
Norad has ensured that positive effects of decentralization – 
such as decision-making based on facts from the ground – will be 
taken into account without having a formal decentralized 
institutional structure of its own. In the Syria case this seems to have 
worked well. Norad’s information-sharing system connects the 
headquarter to embassies and to implementing organizations (Betts 
et al., 2016: 26). Sida also finds various ways of collecting 
information from the field before making decisions. It collaborates 
closely with embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
and promotes coordination on all levels (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 16–
18, Annex 9). 
Decentralization plays a role in existing multi-stakeholder 
coordination structures. In Jordan, there were plans to extend 
coordination efforts to affected urban areas in the context of RRP6 
2014; and in Lebanon, field sector working groups were prepared in 
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the 2014 RRP6 (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 89). This 
demonstrates that coordination structures, trying to stay close to 
implementation levels, are able to achieve some degree of 
decentralization. However, our empirical sample does not (yet) have 
any information on effects of these attempts. 
One major hindering factor to decentralization in the Syria case 
(in 2015) is that international organizations active inside Syria 
cannot come close to the level of implementation for reasons of 
insecurity (compare with Chapter 4.5, geographic gap). Cross-
border work from Turkey and cross-line work among opposing 
groups are their main options (Howe et al., 2015: 15). They have to 
act through local structures on the other side of the border, or 
frontline, with little control over the actual implementation. Remote 
management of this type is (in 2014) the predominant way of 
working for international organizations within Syria – an almost 
unique case, especially compared to her neighbouring countries 
(Howes, 2011: 6, 15). 
4.4.5 Interdisciplinary staffing and training 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Staffs with skill sets that cater for both humanitarian and 
development issues are valuable assets, as claimed by a number of 
conceptual studies (e.g. Beck, 2006: 29; Hinds, 2015: 9; Levine and 
Mosel, 2014a: 11–22; Steets, 2011: 46–48; Stepputat and 
Greenwood, 2013: 48; USAID, 2012: 6). Organizations and 
ministries involved in international assistance should ensure that 
their workforce have broad analytical skills, that they are acquainted 
with various working principles and frameworks, and are 
knowledgeable of management tools suitable to humanitarian and 
development settings. This is especially vital for dually mandated 
institutions, which also internally are confronted with other forms 
of assistance (Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 22). Hiring complementary 
staff and giving personnel relevant training opportunities, 
secondments across departments, etc., is of utmost importance. 
Not all actors agree on the exact procedure required to close 
gaps. Most commentators acknowledge, though, that both 
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humanitarian and development skills should be represented in their 
own organization. USAID intends to keep humanitarian and 
development assistance as separate entities, and improve 
relationships between experts on both sides (USAID, 2012: 6). 
Other studies suggest that interdisciplinary teams, or individuals 
with mixed skill sets, should be deployed from the very beginning 
of a crisis (Below and Belzile, 2013: 18; EC, 2001: 3 ff. Mowjee et 
al., 2015a: 11 ff. UNDP, 2008: 25–26).  
Findings from the empirical literature  
Our empirical sample contains some information on comprehensive 
skill sets in institutions. Increased focus on resilience in Sida’s 
development interventions has resulted in staff taking care of both 
humanitarian and development issues and looking out for synergies 
(Mowjee et al., 2015b: 5). An evaluation of the UNFPA programme 
in Turkey finds another positive example. UNFPA had taken on an 
additional humanitarian programme next to their regular 
development work due to the Syria crisis. They began to provide 
humanitarian assistance based on their long-term programme 
expertise on gender-based violence prevention, mother and child 
health, and sexual and reproductive health. Its regular service was 
simply extended to arriving Syrian refugees (Daoudi et al., 2014: xii). 
UNFPA had staff available for highly relevant assistance in both 
settings. 
No information is available on hindering factors to 
interdisciplinary staffing, but authors offer insights into more 
general staffing issues that might affect interdisciplinary options. 
High staff turnover is one tangible problem. It prevents meaningful 
connection between international staff and local and national 
organizations/authorities from taking root, and affects long-term 
relationships (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 94; Sediakina-Rivière and 
Diaz-Varela, 2016: 14). Staffs being overstretched when the 
magnitude of a crisis turns out to be greater than expected is another 
risk. This is documented among Norway´s embassy staff in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries. The crisis was handled by employees with 
primarily diplomatic and political skill sets, rather than technical 
humanitarian skills, which contributed to overstretching due to a 
lack of expertise (Betts et al., 2016: 6). 
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The literature remains silent regarding staff training provided by 
organizations, and says nothing about incentives to foster 
interdisciplinary skill sets. Since private sectors are increasingly 
engaged in the crisis, it is also important to include people who 
know how to communicate smoothly with this sector and with local 
civil society organizations (Ciacci, 2014: 42; Zyck and Armstrong, 
2014: 22). The latter are potential long-time national partners. 
Overall, a mixed picture of institutional linkages in the Syrian context 
emerges from the empirical literature. Positive cases can be found on various 
levels. Sida and other individual organizations are linking their humanitarian 
and development wings, humanitarian actors with keen sensitive ears to long-
term perspectives, and local organizations. Negative cases are at hand where 
institutional linkages are impeded by institutional path dependencies (e.g. certain 
bureaucratic procedures). Different working cultures create obstacles, as does 
competition among departments and offices, stereotypes and mistrust among 
actors from different backgrounds. 
4.5 Geographic gap 
Some reviewed conceptual studies refer to one further aspect of the 
main divide, namely the geographic gap. Here is a definition: 
A geographic gap is present if humanitarian and development programmes 
or projects are not conducted in the same region and are not sufficiently linked 
with each other. 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Hinds (2015: 6) draws attention to a quite common “geographical 
spread of targeted sites” in protracted crises, which poses serious 
challenges. Humanitarian and development programmes and 
projects are frequently carried out in different geographical areas. 
They target different groups with various approaches. One reason 
for this spread is that countries facing protracted crises and fragility 
may not be regular partners for bilateral development cooperation 
(Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 37). 
It is, moreover, difficult to mobilize resources for longer-term 
programmes and projects due to the “immense number of areas 
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affected by a crisis” – what first and foremost calls for humanitarian 
assistance (Hinds, 2015: 6). Our conceptual studies suggest that 
donors and implementers should conduct all forms of assistance in 
geographical proximity. Assistance should reach the same target 
groups as long as the context permits. 
Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 57) are on the same track: 
“Geographic proximity and the possibility to meet in person” 
support “exchanges and collaboration between development and 
humanitarian aid actors.” 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Limited geographic overlaps of humanitarian and development 
interventions are a real matter of concern in the Syrian context, as 
stated by empirical studies.  
Unequal access to IDPs and host communities inside Syrian 
national territory is the most prominent case. There are hardly any 
development actors on Syrian territory, since donor countries have 
suspended their bilateral development cooperation with the regime, 
and because of security concerns. Humanitarian actors, though, are 
still working there – with limited access due to (temporarily relaxed) 
restrictions imposed by the Syrian government and by armed 
opposition groups (Benoit et al., 2015: v; Bouché and Mohieddin, 
2015: 19). 
This points at the general problem of limited geographic overlap 
of humanitarian and development responses due to security aspects. 
It more often than not entails that only one actor (either 
development or humanitarian) is present in the same area. 
Letting in humanitarian actors is indispensible when 
development assistance is ruled out for security reasons. 
Humanitarian actors may “substitute” development actors by 
paving the way for longer-term perspectives. However, the 
empirical sample studies are not pointing out which humanitarian 
actors are supposed to do this. Potentially UNHCR and double 
mandated implementing agencies which have skills in both, 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are good 
candidates (see section 4.3.3.).  
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Another geographic gap is described in an evaluative report on 
Sida´s Humanitarian Assistance. The physical distance between 
humanitarian and development offices are impeding joint planning 
in the Syria crisis. Weak coordination among actors in Turkey and 
Lebanon was caused by representatives sitting in different locations 
and having no regular meetings (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 17–18).  
One fifth of the studies discuss factors hindering geographic 
proximity, and provide recommendations on how to solve 
problems. The overall view is confirmed: geographical 
considerations must be taken seriously in discussions on how to link 
humanitarian-development responses. 
The spatial mobility of refugees – they are often on the move 
within host countries – is one pressing factor. Mechanisms that 
make it easier to track displacements of refugees are available to a 
limited extent (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 42). It is often difficult 
to reach vulnerable people continuously with humanitarian aid and 
development assistance. 
Another stumbling block is the inadequate level of funding for 
development work (see Section 4.2.1). Humanitarian aid and 
development assistance can often not be conducted in the same 
region, addressing the same vulnerable groups, simply due to lack 
of funding (cf. Hidalgo et al., 2015: 8).61 
Humanitarian actors are restricting their technical and financial 
commitments to the most crisis-stricken areas, according to 
Oxfam`s study on Partnership with Local Authorities in Lebanon 
(Ciacci, 2014: 33). Moreover, they focus on urban environments that 
provide “a greater depth and breadth of local actors with whom 
humanitarians might develop partnerships” (IRC, 2016: 21). This 
can lead to unfortunate situations, where development actors in 
rural and less stricken areas are unable to build upon humanitarian 
support to vulnerable groups in the vicinity. 
Oxfam draws attention to another problem: “Huge amounts of 
emergency funds arrive and many international NGOs start working 
                                                 
61 This is an issue mainly in middle-income countries receiving lower 
proportions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) than developing 
countries, or none at all. 
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in the country. Sometimes local partners ´get carried away´ by 
drivers of action established by donors, in spite of local 
development needs” (Ciacci, 2014: 33). In such cases, there are no 
local actors around anymore, through which development 
programmes can be implemented and vulnerable groups can be 
targeted.  
An evaluation of UNICEF’s Emergency Education Response 
for Syrian Refugee Children and Host Communities in Jordan is 
critical to disproportionate targeting of refugees in camps and host 
communities. There is evidence of lower attendance at non-formal 
education in host communities than in camps – donors and 
implementing partners are actually paying more attention to camps 
(Cullbertson et al., 2015). There is a risk that development assistance 
continues to support better-educated refugees in camps, while out-
of-camp refugees receive neither humanitarian aid nor development 
assistance. 
Bearing these obstacles in mind, some studies come up with 
concrete recommendations on how to avoid a geographic gap. 
Stakeholders “should recognise that criteria can inform decision-
making on where to provide support”, as emphasized by Bailey and 
Barbelet (2014: 26). Furthermore, they should list all criteria (such 
as poverty indicators and concentration of refugees), and build a 
platform for broad geographical targeting. One report describes the 
“conduct of local participatory and multi-sectorial needs 
assessments countrywide, as critical for a better prioritization of 
resilience programming efforts both geographically and sectorially” 
(Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 13). 
Overall, the empirical studies are unable to find positive examples of 
successful geographic linkages between humanitarian and development response 
to the Syria crisis. Conceptual studies, though, are advising actors to conduct all 
forms of assistance in geographical proximity. Limited geographical overlap is a 
real matter of concern in the Syrian context. 
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4.6 Ownership gap 
One suggestion in the conceptual literature is to involve 
stakeholders from micro, intermediate and macro levels of a crisis-
affected country in order to generate constructive long-term effects 
of international humanitarian assistance (Anderson et al., 2012: 67; 
CHS Alliance, 2015: 12; van Cooten et al., 2014: 15 f.; Stoddard et 
al., 2015: 109). We define this as an ownership issue. It moves the 
focus away from a supply-driven perspective (linkage between 
international humanitarian and development aid providers) and 
towards a more outcome-oriented approach (how to reach longer-
term targets through short-term interventions). Ownership 
contributes to bridging the humanitarian-development divide by 
linking international humanitarian stakeholders with national and 
local counterparts in an affected country. Hence our definition: 
An ownership gap occurs when national and local stakeholders are not 
sufficiently involved in international humanitarian responses. This concerns 
multiple levels such as planning and implementation of international 
interventions. It implies the need for an outcome-oriented approach that builds 
on and strengthens existing national and local capacities. 
We summarise what the conceptual and empirical literature has 
to say in two recommendations: ‘Working with national and local 
stakeholders’ and ‘Building the capacity of national and local 
stakeholders’.  
4.6.1 Working with national and local 
stakeholders 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
New options for international humanitarian and development 
interventions are frequently mentioned in the conceptual literature 
(Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 8 ff. van Cooten et al., 2014: 
15–16; Stoddard et al., 2015: 109; e.g. UNDP, 2008: 5 ff.). Activities 
can expand significantly in reach and sustainability where 
collaboration is already ongoing with national and local actors: civil 
society organizations, the private sector, and government structures. 
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Increased sustainability of humanitarian assistance is signalling 
longer-term effects, which also happens to be the aim of 
development cooperation 
In addition to increasing the sustainability of humanitarian 
interventions, working with national and local stakeholders can 
enhance the capacity of local actors. Working with local and national 
stakeholders, rather than around them, allows them to increase their 
response capacity through experiential knowledge and thus creates 
a precondition to adequately respond to future emergencies. The 
conceptual sample states that even in the absence of functioning 
governments, international non-governmental organisations have in 
the past often worked with local actors, which propelled these 
stakeholders to levels exceeding their pre-emergency capacity 
(Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 6). Furthermore, cooperation 
with national and local stakeholders is sometimes possible despite 
conflict or other challenges (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 12–15). 
International representatives of the development sector acting 
through, for instance, local government officials or civil society 
organizations, is a common phenomenon. Humanitarian sector 
cooperation of this kind is often limited, though. Differing 
principles among humanitarian and development actors is one 
explanation. Some states are, furthermore, unable or unwilling to 
provide services and protection to its citizens, sometimes due to 
structural weaknesses, sometimes due to partiality. This often has 
severe negative consequences for programmes in terms of 
ownership, sustainability of interventions and accountability to 
beneficiaries. 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Many empirical documents provide examples of international actors 
collaborating with national or local stakeholders. On the 
international side, we find donor organizations, UN organizations, 
international non-governmental organizations and diaspora 
organizations. On the national and local side, there are community-
based organizations, local non-governmental organizations, national 
and local private sectors, and national and local authorities. During 
the Syria crisis, partnerships are ranging from temporary 
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cooperation such as short-term contracting for specific tasks, to full 
collaboration. International stakeholders have a more limited role in 
cases of full collaboration. They function as funding agencies, while 
programme design and implementation is primarily in the hands of 
national and local stakeholders (Howe et al., 2015: 25).  
The empirical literature provides positive examples mostly. 
Collaboration with national and local partners, without building 
parallel structures, is strongly recommended by UNDP and other 
actors (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 7). UNHCR in Jordan has stated 
that its main objective is “to support the government” (Hidalgo et 
al., 2015: 26), not to work without it. Furthermore, organizations 
such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) in Syria have chosen to effectively build on national 
and local ownership supplied by the local Red Crescent organization 
(Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 5). An overall consensus seems 
to be in place: cooperation with local and national NGOs does 
create positive effects for both parties. 
However, it raises a general question concerning the efficiency of 
the conventionally used cumbersome delivery model as a whole, 
where funds go from a donor organisation to a UN organisation to 
an INGO to national and local organisations and only eventually 
reach the end-beneficiaries (Darcy, 2016: 45).  
Working with national and local stakeholders is not always the 
common modus operandi, though. Norad´s funding decisions rely 
on a trust-based model, where funds are disbursed relatively rapidly 
and pragmatically to trusted organizations. Local or national 
structures clearly do not fulfil the criteria for receiving funds 
directly. Hence implementation through local and national 
stakeholders (funding directly to local and national stakeholders) is 
not promoted particularly by Norad (Betts et al., 2016: 32). 
Some factors are keeping international stakeholders away from 
national and local actors, for instance when governments prevent or 
restrict their access to local partners (Darcy, 2016: 17). Bureaucratic, 
time-consuming administrative procedures and domestic policies 
often result in international actors trying to work their way around 
locals, rather than with them. That was the case in 2013 in parts of 
Lebanon (OCHA and REACH, 2014: p. 19, 24). Other barriers are 
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easier to cope with; such as local organizations being neglected in 
local coordination meetings (Boustani et al., 2016: 23); local 
organizations lacking capacity to fulfil international administrative 
requirements (Darcy, 2016: 29; Mercy Corps et al., 2016: 22–28; 
OCHA and REACH, 2014: 12); and UN agencies that are unable 
formally to work with local unregistered community-based 
organizations (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 43). 
National and local authorities and international stakeholders with 
differing objectives can also complicate things. In many cases local 
authorities have a long-term vision for development in their 
constituencies, while donor agendas sometimes prioritize short-
term relief measures and address immediate needs, rather than 
longer-term visions, in critical situations (OCHA and REACH, 
2014: 29). 
Lack of access to affected people is, in the eyes of many 
international actors, a good reason to start cooperation with local 
partners who possess vital social contacts. When access becomes 
more difficult, it is normally better to include current local structures 
than to implement new alternatives. Capacity-building aspects of 
working relationships are often neglected (Crawford, 2015: 15; 
DEMAC, 2016: 39). 
Our empirical sample emphasizes positive effects of close 
relationships on the whole. Local private sectors working with UN 
organizations gain significant economic benefits and create new 
local jobs, which helps to mitigate community tensions, as stated by 
a report on WFP´s regional response to the Syrian crisis 
(Drummond et al., 2015: 19). International stakeholders collect 
contextual knowledge about local realities, and gain access to useful 
local networks for providing services to affected groups (Howe et 
al., 2015: 22). The Turkish example, finally, shows that including 
local organizations in the work of international stakeholders is, at 
times, a precondition for even starting operations on the ground 
(Darcy, 2016: 50). 
Negative effects for local organizations teaming up with 
international stakeholders were reported in cases where local 
capacity was overstretched because of too many international 
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partners being around. This resulted in extensive and time 
consuming organizational rightsizing, staff burnout and other 
problems related to immense workloads (Howe et al., 2015: 30).  
4.6.2 National and local capacity development 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
International humanitarian stakeholders should build and develop 
the capacity of national and local stakeholders within host countries, 
and strengthen abilities regarding planning, administration, response 
and preparedness. When a country is faced with situations requiring 
humanitarian assistance, national and local stakeholders are most 
often the first ones to react. But locals are also frequently incapable 
of matching the scale of the crisis. The conclusion is drawn in the 
conceptual literature (e.g. Beck, 2006: 28–30; van Cooten et al., 
2014: 10; Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 29). International 
humanitarian stakeholders should design programmes that enable 
national and local actors to deal with current and future crises. 
Building capacity can be seen as an investment, a means to achieve 
long-term impact within a host country (Otto and Weingärtner, 
2013: 62ff.).  
Examples of successful capacity building/development 
interventions come from the humanitarian as well as the 
development sector. When humanitarian interventions have a 
strong capacity-building component, such as the training of local 
nurses in emergency response, they are likely to enhance human 
capital as the increased knowledge of the nurses renders them more 
capable to respond to future crises (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 
2009: 118). However, in a humanitarian context these activities 
often stop at the level of individual capacity building in the sense of 
enabling individuals to perform certain tasks needed. On the other 
hand, modern development projects and programmes on the other 
hand, try regularly to embed their capacity-development in systems 
guaranteeing a longer-term transformation of individuals and 
tapping on locally existing knowledge. Development cooperation is 
– due to its guiding principles – generally more focused on 
sustainability and participation, and is also better at facing impacts 
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of future crises. 62  Investments in civil protection and social 
cohesion measures of local organizations in non-crisis settings, for 
example, will probably reduce vulnerability among locals 
(Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 5 ff.). Koddenbruck and 
Büttner (2009: 143) conclude that capacity development will yield 
the most valuable results in terms of linking and long-term 
development. Utilizing local capacity is also considered a sustainable 
investment into a country’s future. 
India and Botswana have dealt with large-scale emergencies 
without calling for external assistance, an indication of sufficient 
state capacities. They might serve as role models. Reaching India’s 
and Botswana’s level of self-reliance could be a concrete aim of 
international assistance (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 11–
14). 
Findings from the empirical literature 
Capacity building/development among national and local 
stakeholders, mainly conducted by international actors, is common 
practice in the Syria crisis. The former are recipients and the 
international actors are providers. In this linear conception, a variety 
of stakeholders from different backgrounds are assigned specific 
roles. Among the recipients we find quite a few national and local 
actors: governments and their entities, from local to national level, 
civil society organizations and local non-governmental 
organizations. On the providers’ side are international stakeholders: 
donor organizations, UN entities, diaspora organizations and 
international non-governmental actors. 
The sectorial diversity matches the variety of stakeholders. In 
Jordan, for example, UNESCO is engaged in capacity development 
mainly due to its mandate in the education sector. UNESCO is 
partnering with the Queen Rania Teacher Academy (QRTA), and 
tries to develop the capacity of the Jordanian Ministry of Education 
to deal with educational needs among Syrian refugees (Sediakina-
                                                 
62 Compare with 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capa
city-development/capacity-development-a-undp-
primer/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf (latest access 14.08.2017). 
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Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 9–10). The Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene sector in Jordan is another case. UNICEF wants to develop 
the government’s capacity regarding sanitation and hygiene in 
schools and gender-appropriate facilities, and in infrastructure 
(Cullbertson et al., 2015: 14, 70–77). International stakeholders tend 
to invest in national and local capacities in sectors where they have 
direct mandates. Usually, they abstain from investing in new 
perspectives and fields of work for local organizations. 
The overall abilities of nation states to deal with forced migration 
are stretched beyond reasonable limits right now, beyond mandates 
of involved organizations and beyond what can be done in a short 
time span. In Lebanon (2014) the immense scale of needs became 
visible in some northern municipalities, which were mostly 
inexperienced, underfinanced and often lacked the organisational or 
human capacity to deal with the effects of the crisis (SDC, 2014: 19). 
The 2016 report on UNESCO’s education response to the Syrian 
crisis emphasizes that national governments in Jordan, Lebanon and 
Iraq are concerned about the capacity of their basic social services 
to handle an enduring crisis of this magnitude; they ask for longer-
term assistance from international actors (Sediakina-Rivière and 
Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6).  
Other than this overall barrier (high magnitude and protracted 
nature of crisis) to long term capacity development, the empirical 
sample also provides some examples on specific hindering factors 
that prevent capacity development measures from being 
implemented or successful. First, they mention the high work load 
and the high stress environment in which local organisations had to 
develop organisational capacity trying to adjust their capacity to the 
growing needs (Howe et al., 2015: 32). The second hindering factor 
for capacity development initiatives are domestic politics, as the 
example of decentralisation in Jordan demonstrates. Efforts by 
USAID, the EU and the World Bank Group to strengthen local 
government structures in Jordan were impeded by old-fashioned 
centralized structures of government and political culture (Bellamy 
et al., 2017: 59). Finally, national and local stakeholders often have 
no say when decisions are taken. Since international stakeholders 
predominantly act as providers, they tend to build those capacities 
of national and local stakeholders that seem immediately useful to 
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foreign eyes. They try to make partners ready for an organizational 
and administrative level that allows for fruitful cooperation (Bouché 
and Mohieddin, 2015: 13, 94–97; DEMAC, 2016: 19; Howe et al., 
2015: 33). They build capacity merely – they don’t develop capacity.  
Some factors are actually facilitating capacity building. A 
document on education in Jordan emphasizes the need for 
consistent funding. Donors who have realized that investments in 
capacity development can reduce reoccurring costs – thanks to 
increased national and local capacity – are generally more open to 
consistent funding (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 64). In addition, 
capacity developers should not only address humanitarian issues and 
immediate needs; they should also focus on topics that could be 
relevant to long-term development (Ciacci, 2014: 43; Mercy Corps 
et al., 2016: 29). 
Another important factor is human resources. A competent 
member of an organization in charge of capacity development 
among local authorities is also seen as a conducive factor (Howe et 
al., 2015: 33), while fluctuating staff can undermine efforts. An 
advantage lasts only if this valuable co-worker is staying long enough 
to build the needed working relationship and trust in relation to local 
authorities, as demonstrated in a report on the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ response to 
the Syria crisis (Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 9–10). 
A study on responses in Lebanon to the crisis, conducted by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC, 2014),  
pushes host governments into the limelight. Host governments 
should be the first providers of capacity development to a country’s 
population, and they have to disburse earmarked funds accordingly. 
A report on social cohesion and resilience among Jordanian host 
communities points in the same direction. Confidence and trust will 
grow among locals when a municipality demonstrates its ability to 
develop citizens’ capacities (REACH Initiative, 2014: 28). 
Only a few documents pay attention to effects on national and 
local stakeholders. The sustainability of diaspora organizations’ 
interventions was improved when new skills and know-how were 
transferred to locals (DEMAC, 2016: 19). A 2016 report on 
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UNESCO´s investments in education during the Syria crisis views 
UNESCO as an effective builder of bridges across the 
humanitarian-development divide. UNESCO knows how to 
manage both development objectives and short-term humanitarian 
needs (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6). 
Overall, the empirical sample presents a mixed picture with regard to closing 
the ownership gap. On the one hand, challenges to ownership continue to exist, 
especially in building and developing capacities of national and local 
stakeholders. This is often a top-down process, where national and local actors 
have little influence on what capacity to build. On the other hand, international 
actors who collaborate with national and local stakeholders, and build their 
capacity, are becoming the common modus operandi in Syria’s neighbourhood. 
The effects are mostly positive: improved assistance to vulnerable people in “no 
access” areas, augmented capacity of local authorities, and economic benefits to 
local private sectors. 
4.7 Sequence gap 
The sequence gap is another sub-gap of the humanitarian-
development gap. Based on arguments and findings presented in the 
studies, we define this gap as follows: 
A sequence gap exists when relief, rehabilitation and development activities 
are not combined in an appropriate time frame. Sequencing is essential in 
chronological planning of activities. When phases and transitions are adequately 
designed, aid intervention remains free from delays or negative path dependencies 
that puts target groups at a disadvantage. Sequencing facilitates handovers and 
exit actions, it promotes collaboration de facto between all actors and creates 
continuity. Adequate sequencing is necessary to create transitions in both 
directions: from relief to development and from development to relief. 
Recommendations from the conceptual literature 
Many studies consider inadequate sequencing (including timing) a 
significant obstacle to linking humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation (see e.g. Beck, 2006: 31; Schweizerisches 
Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 8 f. White and Cliffe, 2000: 336 f.). A “timing 
challenge” arises if “transition from relief to rehabilitation comes 
too early or too late (…)” – a consequence of a poorly designed 
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approach to coordinated and integrated responses (Otto and 
Weingärtner, 2013: 34). Poor sequencing might create twisted 
incentives. Relief measures that are kept going for too long might 
generate dependencies among vulnerable groups. 63  Adequate 
sequencing helps actors to avoid delays and harm caused by phases 
lasting indefinitely, for too long, or ending too soon. Thus, one of 
the main credos in the linkage-debate is to make relief phases as 
short-lived as possible (cf. Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 8 f.). 
USAID is deploying integrated teams of humanitarian and 
development experts to avoid a sequencing gap. The teams are 
responsible for mutually informed project designs and 
procurements that enable sequencing of humanitarian and 
development assistance (USAID, 2012: 6). 
Improved (ideally joint) planning is recommended by almost all 
studies focusing on this sub-gap. Long-term planning should ensure 
adequate phasing during all forms of intervention and programmes. 
Arrangements for exit and takeover strategies make it easier to 
collaborate, and create space for interconnectivity and long-term 
effects (cf. Beck, 2006: 31; Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001: 16; Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 9). 
Findings from the empirical literature  
Findings in the empirical sample can be summarized in three 
statements. First, a decline in programme funding makes it 
imperative to achieve transition into handovers. Second, the need to 
plan transition and sequences in programme design is still a 
challenge. International stakeholders generally agree, though, that 
planning is very important. Third, finding the appropriate timing is 
a demanding task for actors all the way from local to international 
levels. 
A few studies note that declining programme funding can 
accelerate the need to plan sequences and transitions. An evaluation 
of UNICEF´s Education Emergency Response in Jordan is making 
this point explicitly. UNICEF’s current service delivery in the 
                                                 
63 An unconditional cash transfer programme that lasts for too long might, for 
example, contribute to a growing dependency-syndrome among people affected 
by a crisis. 
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Jordanian education sector must be reduced due to less generous 
funding, the report states, and handed over to the national 
government and to Jordanian civil society (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 
14). Dwindling funds will, no doubt, influence how programmes are 
carried out. Sometimes, reductions will have drastic consequences 
for beneficiaries if not planned for, as emphasized in an evaluation 
of the WFP´s Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (Drummond 
et al., 2015: 20). The WFP had to cut down its food assistance, a fact 
that the organization had failed to communicate clearly beforehand 
despite warnings coming from donors.64 
Most studies in our sample hint that the need to plan for 
transition is considered necessary by international actors involved in 
the Syria crisis response. The education sector in Jordan (2015) is 
working on a new delivery model for the education of Syrian 
refugees, which will eventually assign more responsibility to the 
Jordanian Ministry of Education (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 15). The 
mentioned evaluation of WFP´s regional response (2011–2014) 
recommends the WFP to develop scenario-based, long-term 
transition plans that cover country-by-country exit strategies 
(Drummond et al., 2015: xiv). 
Another challenge is the transition from existing development 
programmes to humanitarian assistance, due to acute, escalating 
needs during the Syria crisis. In Lebanon, certain funds for 
development projects were relocated to emergency response, which 
caused discontent among the original beneficiaries, Lebanese host 
communities and local authorities (Boustani et al., 2016: 37). This 
shifting attention away from local development needs towards 
humanitarian needs, is also highlighted by Ciacci (2014: 33) in a 
report on partnerships with local authorities. Local actors received 
funds earmarked for humanitarian assistance, and often got so 
“carried away” by this funds that they neglected their initial 
development-oriented mandate. 
Switching from development programming to humanitarian 
assistance programming is not altogether easy. It is important, for 
                                                 
64 Declining funds and their impact on programme duration, and the need to 
plan in advance in protracted refugee situations, is also highlighted in the report 
on UNHCR’s mental health and psychosocial support (Meyer, 2013: 67). 
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instance, to plan for a continuation of current development 
programmes in order to avoid conflicts between hosts and refugees, 
and to avoid losing track of an initial mandate.  
Some evaluations give hints on why a sequence gap seems to 
prevail in the Syria crisis response. Insufficient planning 
(contingency, exit and handover) and shortages of programme 
funding are two apparent obstacles. The timeliness of Jordanian 
education and health interventions was blocked by external, lengthy 
approval processes, as noticed in one evaluation (Darcy 2016: 32). 
So organizations are often unable to implement a required switch 
on time, and unable to decide on timing issues. They have to rely on 
governmental approval. 
Timing was an issue also for UNESCO, which had implemented 
development-orientated programmes in Jordan already before the 
crisis, and then added humanitarian assistance as the crisis 
accelerated. A report describes how awkward it was to determine 
until what moment UNESCO should remain engaged in 
humanitarian work, before refocusing on education and other parts 
of its core, more development-orientated mandates (Sediakina-
Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15). 
Overall, the empirical studies on the Syria crisis response do not provide any 
evidence of progress in closing the sequence gap, as recommended by the conceptual 
studies. Many implementers are well aware of the need to adequately plan 
transition and sequences in programme designs. But appropriate timing continues 
to be a real challenge (e.g. due to re-allocations of funds or lengthy approval 
processes). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Syrian crisis and other protracted forced migration crises have 
pushed the debate on linking humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation into the political limelight. There is a 
widespread conviction among policy makers that such crises can 
only be tackled if both forms of assistance are more closely 
interconnected. But exactly how should this be done in practice? So 
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far, we have only met vague answers. The debate started in the 
1990s, at the latest, so today’s missing conceptual clarity is a bit 
striking. 
The call for intensified bridge building is directed towards 
humanitarian assistance first of all. Development cooperation has 
engaged in several protracted crises, and is less exposed to demands 
of this kind.   
An analytical framework has been developed based on 
conceptual literature on the humanitarian-development nexus. Most 
reviewed studies view this main gap as a multi-dimensional problem 
and a challenge at different levels (a strategic one or an 
implementation level). The divide can be structured around seven 
sub-gaps: (1) a vision and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a 
funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a 
geographic gap, and (7) a sequence gap. 
Moreover, we have filtered out corresponding conceptual claims 
from the literature and rephrased them into nineteen 
recommendations on how to close sub-gaps. 
Our analytical approach makes room for a structured perspective 
on individual forced migration crises. To begin with, we mapped the 
Syria crisis against our framework. This mapping reveals a number 
of findings: 
• Demands to link humanitarian assistance with development 
cooperation effectively have gained traction recently. High-level 
conferences such as the first World Humanitarian 2016 and 
periodic donor conferences on Syria have placed the nexus in a 
prominent position on the policy agenda. At the same time, the 
3RP and other regional strategies are trying to translate the 
postulated linkage into practical reality in the region. 
• The Syria crisis has witnessed some progress in strategy building 
and planning, but challenges remain regarding the 
implementation of strategies (Chapter 5.1). Justice must be 
accorded to both emergency responses and long-term 
development. Innovative stakeholders are trying to close the 
funding gap. But resource allocation is still devoted largely to 
short-term relief, and is insufficient to match up to the 
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magnitude of crisis. The institutional gap is bridged in a number 
of organizations, which have managed to bring together their 
humanitarian and development wings. Different working 
cultures and mistrust among actors from various backgrounds 
are making it harder, though, to succeed. As to the ownership 
gap, international actors are cooperating more frequently with 
national and local stakeholders. But this is often a top-down 
process where locals have very little influence. Finally, neither 
the sequence nor the geography gap displays any positive results 
from linkage efforts, and the literature pinpoints significant 
challenges at the implementation level above all. 
• There is a disconnect between conceptual and empirical 
literature (Chapter 5.2). Tacit reference is made to individual 
sub-gaps, but a deeper engagement is missing regarding 
questions set free by the analytical framework. We are mainly 
informed about activities and outputs related to efforts to bring 
together the humanitarian and the development sector, but we 
don’t learn much about practical solutions – about experiential 
knowledge of stakeholders or outcomes for end beneficiaries. 
• We identify a way forward that makes it easier for practitioners 
and researchers to link the two forms of assistance more 
effectively (Chapter 5.3). A consistent logic – a Theory of 
Change – of the linkage must be formulated, based on our 
analytical framework. The theory should reflect empirical 
findings systematically, feed them into the theoretical discourse 
and refine conceptual knowledge a step further. Ultimately, 
discussions among researchers and practitioners will be merged, 
and an urgently needed conceptual consistency will be reached. 
5.1 Conceptual conclusions on the 
humanitarian-development linkage in 
the Syria crisis context 
Our conceptual analysis has made it easier to put some systematic 
structure on the linkage debate regarding what needs to be done. 
However, most studies have a vague character, at least partially, and 
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they fail to clarify the exact implications of key concepts related to 
the humanitarian-development gap. 
They fail for two main reasons. First, the literature-based 
recommendations have a broad, rather sweeping character. They 
don’t contain much practical information on what should be done 
to bridge a certain sub-gap. This reflects a shortage of conceptual 
depth. Secondly, the literature often uses jargon that lacks precision. 
The term “common goals” is one telling example. Should “common 
goals” merely form a common sub-set of two larger humanitarian 
and development goals? Or are they the exclusive goals of all 
humanitarian-development activities? 
Nevertheless, the analytical framework is a necessary first step 
towards more clarity for future research. The only way to achieve 
coherence goes through a mapping of individual forced migration 
crises against the conceptual debate. 
Progress has been made lately in linking humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation in countries bordering to Syria. This 
is one distinct finding from the literature, and it should be compared 
to the mainly humanitarian-driven response at the beginning of the 
forced migration crisis. 
This mostly positive discovery can be portrayed along sub-gaps: 
Shifts in strategies and planning have taken place in the Syria crisis 
in an attempt to do justice to both worlds, to emergency responses 
and long-term development. Resilience, epitomized by the 3RPs and 
the new compact agreements, serves as a common denominator 
today. The necessity of giving host countries a prominent role when 
dealing with the refugee crisis pays tribute to a strong national 
ownership component, which in turn is seen as a prerequisite for 
long-term development. The literature also discovers progress with 
respect to a more comprehensive planning that takes into account 
various sectors and beneficiaries – all in order to bring together and 
harmonize a host of perspectives, values, and work procedures.65 
                                                 
65 Our content analysis revealed that the total number of codings (text passages) 
indicating positive evidence on linkages is at its highest with regard to the vision 
and strategy gap (1), followed by the planning gap (2), the ownership gap (3), the 
institutional gap (4), and the funding gap (5). In contrast, we have found hardly 
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The instalment of joint sector working groups in Jordan is part of 
the picture. 
 
An ambivalent picture emerges of the funding gap. Innovative 
funding modalities are becoming more frequent, allowing for joint 
humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding. They 
also enable actors to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances. 
However, this positive trend is at stake. Dramatic funding shortfalls 
in recent years, and a continuous emphasis on funding humanitarian 
assistance rather than development-oriented programmes, are 
causing many problems.66 
Syria and other humanitarian crises put severe burdens on the 
financial capacities of all actors. The overall scarcity of funds forces 
the international community to make tough priorities every now and 
then, and it usually ends up in favour of emergency measures. 
Resilience is focused on closing gaps by taking into account 
short-term and long-term objectives. But what happens when 
sufficient funds for long-term development are not available? Some 
may question the worth of it all.  
Empirical studies offer several constructive examples of 
institutional linkages in the Syrian context. Progress appears on 
different levels: starting with Sida and other individual organizations 
linking their humanitarian and development wings, and on to 
humanitarian actors with sensitive ears to long-term perspectives, 
and local organizations.  
There are also obstacles: institutional path dependencies (e.g. 
certain bureaucratic procedures), different working cultures, 
competition among departments and offices, stereotypes and 
mistrust among actors from different backgrounds.  
                                                 
any positive evidence on linkages related to the sequence gap, and no positive 
evidence at all related to the geographic gap. A high figure does not necessarily 
reflect a diversity of empirical findings. It is equally possible that different 
studies refer to the same aspect more often. However, the fact that different 
studies pay attention to this aspect indicates, at least potentially, its importance. 
66 This comes with a peculiarity – donors are reluctant to finance anything 
beyond immediate help inside government-controlled areas in Syria. 
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Despite challenges to ownership, the empirical findings show 
that international actors collaborating with, and building the 
capacity of, national and local stakeholders is the customary modus 
operandi today in Syria’s neighbouring countries. This has mostly 
positive effects such as an increase of assistance to vulnerable 
people in “no access” areas, augmented capacity of local authorities, 
and economic benefits for the local private sector. 
However, building capacity among national and local 
stakeholders is often a top-down process, where national and local 
actors have little influence on what should be done. In addition, 
cooperation with national and local actors is still born of necessity 
(access to beneficiaries) rather than from a desire to strengthen 
implementing local structures long-term. 
We have found hardly any positive evidence on linkages related 
to the sequence gap, and no positive evidence related to the 
geographic gap. This is a telling absence in our empirical sample; it 
indicates that implementers are facing serious challenges. 
Table 4 summarizes our main empirical findings on the Syria 
crisis response. It contrasts achievements in linking humanitarian 
and development responses to challenges that continue to exist. 
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Table 4: Achievements and challenges in linking humanitarian-
development responses to the Syria crisis 
Sub-Gaps Achievements Remaining Challenges 
Vision and  
Strategy 
 
- shift towards resilience 
agenda  
- joint international 
strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are 
in place that align the 
humanitarian-
development response 
- donor countries are 
committed to longer-term 
engagement in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries 
- resilience component of 
3RPs/NRPs does not focus on 
refugees to the same extent 
as on host communities 
- unified (interdepartmental) 
donor country strategies are 
exceptions rather than the 
rule 
- balancing of competing 
working principles is still a 
challenge 
Funding 
 
- innovative funding 
modalities allowing for 
joint humanitarian-
development financing  
- flexible funding 
modalities to react quickly 
to unforeseen 
circumstances 
- the shift towards resilience 
strengthening as a common 
goal of the humanitarian-
development response is not 
reflected in actual allocation 
patterns 
- strong emphasis on 
emergency assistance 
regarding costs of resilience 
programs 
- at donor country level, 
bureaucratic factors and short 
funding cycles are still 
hindering a more 
development-oriented funding 
Planning 
 
- close collaboration 
between host countries 
and international 
organizations (IOs) in 
response planning 
- joint sector working 
groups in host countries 
- evidence of joint 
planning among 
humanitarian and 
development actors at 
donor country level 
 
- strict bureaucratic rules in 
host countries are impeding 
fast and flexible project 
approval 
- local actors are only partially 
involved in planning processes 
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Sub-Gaps Achievements Remaining Challenges 
Institutional 
 
- evidence of 
development agencies 
(e.g. Sida) linking both 
forms of assistance 
internally 
- evidence of 
humanitarian actors 
working closely with civil 
society and the private 
sector to create longer-
term perspectives 
- evidence of IOs separating 
emergency response from 
development response (such 
as UNICEF in Turkey) 
- staffs with mixed 
(humanitarian-development) 
skill sets are still in short 
supply among bilateral and 
multilateral agencies 
- high staff turnover often 
inhibits improved 
humanitarian-development 
linkages 
Geographic 
 
no evidence in the sample - development actors have not 
equally good access to IDPs 
and host communities within 
the Syrian territory as 
humanitarian actors 
- geographical distance 
between humanitarian and 
development offices impedes 
joint planning 
- spatial mobility of refugees 
makes it difficult to reach 
them with both forms of 
assistance 
Ownership 
 
- many international 
actors are working with 
national and local 
stakeholders and building 
their capacity 
- capacity building of national 
and local stakeholders is often 
a top-down process, with little 
influence for local actors 
Sequence - many implementers are 
aware of the need to 
adequately plan transition 
and sequences in 
programme designs 
- finding an appropriate timing 
of interventions remains a 
challenge for implementers 
(e.g. due to re-allocations of 
funds or lengthy approval 
processes) 
Source: Authors’ own  
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5.2 On connecting empirical findings with 
the conceptual debate  
Our mapping of the Syria crisis reveals a gulf between conceptual 
and empirical literature (no evaluative study refers directly to any 
concept in the linkage debate). Tacit references are made to 
individual sub-gaps, but studies show no attempts to explore in-
depth questions found in the analytical framework. We mainly learn 
about certain linking activities regarding the humanitarian and the 
development sector, and their outputs. Experiences of stakeholders 
and outcomes bringing advantages to end beneficiaries are seldom 
discussed. 
This is also one reason why the conceptual intricacies of linkage 
are largely absent in the empirical sample. A majority of the studies 
mention that, for instance, “joint” planning has taken place, but they 
don’t explain what this planning has changed or what the 
alternatives could be. Is it always necessary to base “joint planning” 
on an identified “joint strategy”? And what if not? 
Another telling example is, that we do know that working 
principles of humanitarian actors (such as independence) happened 
to be at least weakened, but the literature does not tell us what the 
consequences and lessons learned of this were. Hence, our 
conceptual distinctions (regarding, for example, the balance 
between logics of action) are not mirrored in the empirical sample. 
There is room for further empirical studies. 
Some caution is warranted in order to avoid premature 
conclusions. This can be illustrated by two efforts, which at a first 
glance appear to close the ownership gap during the Syria crisis. De 
facto, though, many questions are left unanswered.  
Humanitarian and development actors are embedded in the 
political contexts of neighbouring countries of Syria. A strong, 
capable host country government may arguably represent the 
development world in a certain sense. It’s able to advocate firmly 
(and at least partially implement) its own interests of long-term 
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development.67 Jordan and Turkey should be viewed as relatively 
strong governments in the Syria case. This constitutes a major 
difference compared to previous crises in Haiti, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia, failed states where the UN and other relief organizations 
substituted state structures to a great extent and left wide open how 
to achieve long-term development. 
On the surface one could argue that the ownership gap is bridged 
when all stakeholders (especially implementers of humanitarian 
assistance) pay attention to a host country’s interests in a migration 
crisis. 
But even if the general question – how to transform short-term 
crisis management into long-term development – may be answered 
as far as host populations are concerned, long-term perspectives for 
refugees are not automatically included. This is clearly underlined in 
the Syria crisis. Host governments are pushing the resilience agenda 
heavily towards benefits for their own citizens, while the status of 
refugees (temporary guests or immigrants with residence permits) 
remains unsettled.68 
Ultimately, to avoid premature conclusions with regard to the 
ownership gap, the question that needs to be addressed more 
precisely in the “linkage-discourse” is: who represents whose 
interests, or who owns what?  
We need more precision on what closing the ownership gap 
means in practice. This can also be illustrated on a micro level where 
implementers of humanitarian aid try to involve, for instance, local 
civil society organizations. 
We do recognize a positive trend towards a more demand-driven, 
people-centred approach among humanitarian actors in the Syria 
                                                 
67 In accordance with the same logic, multilateral UN organizations (UNHCR 
first and foremost) take the lead and represent refugees as the humanitarian part 
of the crisis. 
68 One way to assign greater priority to refugees in the resilience agenda is to 
create incentives for host countries, as manifested in the recent compact 
agreements with the European Union. For example, the Jordan Compact 
stipulates that donor countries shall provide incentives to generate sustainable 
outcomes for refugees and, at the same time, offer trade concessions and non-
concessional World Bank loans to the Jordanian government. 
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crisis, enhancing the likelihood of long-term outcomes. But we 
cannot validate to what extent working through local institutions is 
based on certain aspects: a) equal care for the needs of local 
populations and refugees, and b) local solutions included in national 
plans and strategies. 
On the contrary, it seems that the well-known mechanism of 
large international relief organisations overwhelming local 
organisations with their own prescriptions on how to deal with the 
crisis takes place in the Syria-crisis just as it did in past humanitarian 
crises. The reviewed empirical literature does not provide any in-
depth information on the nature of ownership, so it’s quite possible 
that the example shows how humanitarian aid becomes adapted to 
protracted crisis, without using the ownership ‘seed’ for building 
long-term solutions.   
Both examples point to a missing discussion on consequences of 
adjustments in the field and in what way they are relevant to the 
overall linkage discourse. Here, we can only state that the initial gap 
between international humanitarian and development actors in an 
actual protracted forced migration crisis takes different forms. 
Assumptions on effective linkages between humanitarian assistance 
and development cooperation should be tested, and evaluations 
focusing on outcomes is the only way to achieve results. 
The discourse on building bridges is seemingly, all in all, directed 
towards humanitarian actors in the first place, asking them to take 
long-term developments into account. However, the Syria crisis 
shows that bilateral development cooperation is also under pressure. 
If development cooperation has to tackle the root causes of forced 
migration, as some authors claim, then cooperation is potentially 
caught in the middle of two competing tasks: how to support host 
countries and how to care for refugees. Host countries may 
sometimes set priorities that are opposed to those of refugees. This 
dilemma can cause severe stress among international development 
cooperation decision-makers. 
       
126 
5.3 Suggestions on a way forward 
The steps outlined below are directed towards policy-makers and 
practitioners alike. National and international actors are invited to 
use them as guidance. We have not identified specific stakeholders 
capable of leading this process. Our literature review attempts to 
provide conceptual clarity. Others may analyse the political 
landscape. 
These four steps have a preventive purpose. Stakeholders should 
not dwell on ‘common goals’ or other allegedly telling idioms, 
without coming to terms with practical progress in linking (or why 
linking should be avoided). 
We identify certain conceptual and empirical shortcomings, and 
make suggestions on how to overcome them: 
1. There is an obvious missing link between conceptual knowledge 
and empirical findings. A consistent logic of the linkage of 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation must be 
developed. This Theory of Change should be based on further 
conceptual clarity – our analytical framework is only a 
beginning. It should also take empirical findings into account in 
a systematic manner. What do experiences of different 
stakeholders tell us on effective linkages? What are the positive 
or negative consequences of efforts to build bridges?  
 
2.  This case study on the Syria crisis is the best one at hand, in our 
opinion. But one single study on a complicated topic has some 
limitations. There might, for example, be a lack of external 
validity. In order to reach the destination – generalizable 
findings on the humanitarian-development linkage – the Syria 
crisis must be contrasted to other case studies. The fundamental 
character of our analytical framework makes this all the more 
important. 
 
3. The reviewed empirical studies provide almost no evidence on 
intended (and unintended) outcomes of humanitarian-
development linkage in response to the Syria crisis. Studies do 
not explain whether established linkages have generated positive 
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effects for end beneficiaries. A valid Theory of Change can only 
be reached through evaluations and impact assessments focused 
on outcomes. Empirical, forward-looking knowledge may 
eventually enable researchers to spell out exactly how to link 
with whom at various levels. It could cast new light on how to 
achieve effects (causal paths, mechanisms, etc.). It highlights 
individual sub-gaps and the art of closing them.   
 
4. The overall debate on linking humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation is fragmented and partially 
inconsistent. The outlined way forward must be fed into a 
broader discussion among researchers and practitioners who are 
open to new information. Ultimately, we need a more unified 
debate, with conceptual consistency based on empirical 
evidence. 
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Annexes 
Annex A: Sampled literature 
Table 5: Selected studies on the humanitarian-development 
nexus: conceptual sample 
 Study E S F P R 
LRRD      
1 Buchanan/Fabbri 2005: Links between relief, 
rehabilitation and development in the tsunami 
response – a review of the debate. 
 x    
2 Buchanan/Maxwell 1996: Linking Relief and 
Development. An Introduction and Overview. 
 x    
3 European Commission, 2001: Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment. 
x x x x x 
4 Hinds 2015: Relationship between humanitarian and 
development aid. 
 x x x x 
5 Koddenbrock/Büttner 2009: The Will to Bridge? 
European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. 
 x x   
6 Longhurst 1994: Conceptual Frameworks for Linking 
Relief and Development. 
     
7 Macrae et al.1997: Conflict, the continuum and 
chronic emergencies: a critical analysis of the scope 
for linking relief, rehabilitation and development 
planning in Sudan. 
x x x x  
8 Mosel/Levine 2014: Remaking the Case for Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. How LRRD 
can Become a Practically Useful Concept for 
Assistance in Difficult Places. 
 x x x  
9 Mowjee et al. 2015a: Coherence in Conflict: Bringing 
Humanitarian and Development Aid Streams 
Together. 
 x x   
10 OCHA et al. 2015: Addressing Protracted 
Displacement: A Framework for Development-
Humanitarian Cooperation. 
x    x 
 
Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an overview 
of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor or 
country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees. 
(Table ctd. on next page) 
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 Study E S F P R 
11 Otto/Weingärtner 2013: Linking Relief and 
Development: More than Old Solutions for Old 
Problems? 
 x x x x 
12 Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz 2010: Konzept LRRD. 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. 
     
13 Steets 2011: Donor Strategies for Addressing the 
Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and 
Development Assistance. A Contribution to the 
International Debate. 
x  x x  
14 White/Cliffe 2000: Matching Response to Context in 
Complex Political Emergencies: “Relief”, 
“Development”, “Peace-building” or Something In-
Between? 
x x x x x 
Whole of Government      
15 Below/Belzile 2013: Comparing Whole of Government 
Approaches to Fragile States. 
x x x   
16 OECD-DAC 2006: Whole of Government Approaches 
to Fragile States. 
 x x   
17 Patrick/Brown 2007: Greater than the sum of its 
parts? Assessing “whole of government” approaches 
to fragile states. 
x x x x  
18 Stepputat/Greenwood 2013: Whole-of-Government 
Approaches to Fragile States and Situations. 
x x x   
Connectedness      
19 Beck 2006: Evaluating humanitarian action using the 
OECD-DAC criteria: an ALNAP guide for humanitarian 
agencies. 
x  x x  
Early Recovery      
20 UNDP 2008: UNDP Policy on Early Recovery.     x 
21 Bailey et al. 2009: Early recovery: an overview of 
policy debates and operational challenges. 
x     
22 Global Cluster for Early Recovery 2016: Guidance on 
Early Recovery Coordination. 
x  x x  
 
Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an overview 
of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor or 
country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees.  
(Table ctd. on next page) 
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 Study E S F P R 
Resilience      
23 Bahadur et al. 2016: Resilience scan.  x x   
24 Bailey/ Barbelet 2014: Towards a Resilience-Based 
Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. A Critical 
Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Frameworks. 
x  x x x 
25 Béné et al. 2012: Resilience: new utopia or new 
tyranny? Reflection about the potentials and limits of 
the concept of resilience in relation to vulnerability 
reduction programmes 
x    x 
26 de Weijer 2013: Resilience: a Trojan horse for a new 
way of thinking? 
  x   
27 Levine/Mosel 2014: Supporting resilience in difficult 
places. A critical look at applying the “resilience” 
concept in countries where crises are the norm. 
  x x  
28 Taylor et al. 2015: The state of the humanitarian 
system. 
x x x x x 
29 USAID 2012: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis. 
USAID Policy and Program Guidance. 
x  x x  
30 van Cooten et al. 2014: How to Avoid Lost 
Generations? Resilience as a Way to Improve the 
Adaptive Capacity of Affected Populations. 
   x x 
Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an 
overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor 
or country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees. 
All studies contain a detailed review of respective concept except for study 28 (Taylor et al., 
2015). 
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Table 6: Selected studies on the response to the Syria crisis: 
empirical sample 
 Study Sp St F P I O Se 
1 Betts. J. et al. 2016: ‘Striking the Balance’. 
Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and 
Management of Norwegian Assistance 
related to the Syria Regional Crisis. 
x x   x   
2 Cullbertson. S. et al. 2015: Evaluation of 
Emergency Education Response for Syrian 
Refugee Children and Host Communities in 
Jordan. 
x x  x x   
3 Tillinac. A. et al. 2015: Addressing Human 
Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of 
Crisis. Evidence and Recommendations for 
Further Action to Protect Vulnerable and 
Mobile Populations. 
x x      
4 Drummond. J. et al. 2015: An Evaluation of 
WFP’s Regional Response to the Syrian 
Crisis, 2011–2014.  
x x  x x x x 
5 Ernst. S. et al. 2014: Australia’s 
Humanitarian Response to the Syria Crisis.  
x  x     
6 Howe. K. et al. 2015: Breaking the 
Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote 
Management Settings – The Cases of Syria 
and Iraqi Kurdistan. 
x    x x  
7 DEMAC 2016: Diaspora Humanitarianism: 
Transnational Ways of Working. 
x    x x x 
8 Crawford. N. 2015: Engaging with Syrian 
CSOs. How Can the International 
Community Engage Better with Syrian Civil 
Society Organizations during the Civil War? 
x x x   x  
9 Mowjee. T. et al. 2015b: Evaluation of Sida’s 
Humanitarian Assistance. 
x x x  x x  
10 Ababsa et al. 2014: Gulf Donors and NGOs 
Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Jordan. 
 x      
11 Zyck. S.A. and J. Armstrong 2014: 
Humanitarian Crises, Emergency 
Preparedness and Response: The Role of 
Business and the Private Sector. Jordan Case 
Study. 
x    x   
Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap; 
O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap.                                                         (Table ctd. on next page) 
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 Study Sp St F P I O Se 
12 Daoudi et al. 2014: Independent Country 
Programme Evaluation – Turkey 2011–2015. 
x x  x x x  
13 Hidalgo. S. et al. 2015: Independent 
Programme Evaluation (IPE) of UNHCR's 
Response to the Refugee Influx in Lebanon 
and Jordan. 
x x  x x   
14 OCHA and REACH 2014: Informing Targeted 
Host Community Programming in Lebanon. 
Secondary Data Review. 
   x    
15 Huang et al. 2017: Refugee Compacts. 
Addressing the Crisis of Protracted 
Displacement. 
x x   x   
16 SDC 2014: Refugee Compacts. Addressing 
the Crisis of Protracted Displacement. 
x x      
17 Boustani. M. et al. 2016: Responding to the 
Syrian crisis in Lebanon. Collaboration 
between Aid Agencies and Local 
Governance Structures. 
x x   x   
18 Guay. J. 2015: Social Cohesion between 
Syrian Refugees and Urban Host 
Communities in Lebanon and Jordan. 
x x   x   
19 Darcy. J. 2016: Syria Coordinated 
Accountability and Lesson Learning (CALL). 
Evaluation Synthesis and Gap Analysis. A 
Synthesis and Analysis of 24 Publicly 
Available Evaluative Studies Concerning the 
International Response to the Syria Crisis 
Commissioned by the Steering Group for 
Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluations. 
x x x x x   
20 Mercy Corps et al. 2016: Technology-Based 
Learning Assessment. Findings Report. 
    x x  
21 Ciacci. S. 2014: The Partnership with Local 
Authorities in Responding to Humanitarian 
Crisis. The Case of Lebanon. Lessons 
Learned and Recommendations 
x  x  x x  
22 Bailey. S. and V. Barbelet 2014: Towards a 
Resilience-Based Response to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis. A Critical Review of 
Vulnerability Criteria and Framework. 
 x      
 
Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap; 
O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap.                                                         (Table ctd. on next page) 
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 Study Sp St F P I O Se 
23 Bouché. N. and M. Mohieddin 2014: The 
Syrian Crisis. Tracking and Tackling Impacts 
on Sustainable Human Development in 
Neighboring Countries. Insights from 
Lebanon and Jordan. 
x x x  x x x 
24 REACH 2014: Understanding Social Cohesion 
and Resilience in Jordanian Host 
Communities. 
 x    x  
25 Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela 2016: 
UNESCO's Education Response to the Syria 
Crisis: Towards Bridging the Humanitarian-
Development Divide. 
     x  
26 Meyer. S. 2013: UNHCR's Mental Health and 
Psychosocial Support for Persons of 
Concern. 
x x   x  x 
27 Lee. B. and E. Pearce 2017: Vulnerability- 
and Resilience-Based Approaches in 
Response to the Syrian Crisis: Implications 
for Women, Children and Youth with 
Disabilities. 
x x     x 
28 Bellamy. C. et al. 2017: The Lives and 
Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees. A Study of 
Refugee Perspectives and their Institutional 
Environment in Turkey and Jordan. 
x x  x    
29 International Rescue Committee 2016: 
Finding Economic Opportunity in the City. 
Lessons from IRC’s Cash and Livelihoods 
Programmes in Cities within Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
x  x   x  
30 Lawry-White. S. and M. Schloffer 2014: Real 
Time Evaluation. IFRC Response to the Syria 
Crisis 2012–2014. 
     x x 
Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap; 
O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap. 
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Annex B: Methodology 
To answer the question how humanitarian and development 
responses to forced migration crises can be linked more effectively, 
a two-stage approach was applied. In a first step, we identified the 
most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus. 
We systematically analysed these concepts with regard to how they 
characterize the humanitarian-development gap from their 
individual perspectives, and how they recommend to bridge the gap. 
This part of our analysis explored the first sub-question of the 
review: What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and 
development responses to forced migration crises? Our findings 
were then integrated into an analytical framework (as presented in 
Chapter 4). 
In a second step, we used this framework to analyse empirical 
studies on the international response to the Syria crisis through the 
lens of relevant concepts. This part of our analysis explored the 
second sub-question of the review: To what extent, and why (or why 
not), are effective linkages established in practice?  
Subsequently, and in line with our two-stage process, we describe 
the conceptual approach and (later) the empirical one. We always 
present information on a) the sampling procedure by which we 
identified and selected literature, b) the characteristics of the 
resulting sample, and c) methodological aspects of analysis. 
Conceptual analysis 
Sampling procedure 
In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on what 
the humanitarian-development gap consists of and how to close this 
gap we applied a specific sampling procedure (see also Figure 3):  
In a first step, we identified the most prominent concepts on the 
humanitarian-development nexus by assuming that they will provide 
us with the most relevant information for answering these 
questions. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LLRD) 
is by far the most prominent concept in terms of available literature 
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on the topic. However, studies on LRRD also refer to other 
concepts related to the nexus (e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014; Otto 
and Weingärtner, 2013; Steets, 2011). Most frequently mentioned 
are: Early Recovery, Resilience, Connectedness and Whole of 
Government. Analyses of different concepts give us an opportunity 
to capture different analytical approaches to the humanitarian-
development gap and potentially different suggestions on how to 
bridge this gap. Consequently, we decided to review studies from all 
of these five concepts.69 
In a second step, we identified studies for each of these concepts. 
A keyword search (”LRRD”, “Early Recovery”, “Whole of 
Government”, “Connectedness”, and “Resilience”) was conducted 
in publicly available databases of international, governmental, and 
non-governmental organizations, active in development 
cooperation or humanitarian assistance, and in databases of 
networks and research institutes. We carried out title searches, and 
otherwise full-text searches. Table 7 displays these databases. Due 
to search limitations of some databases, keywords yielded no less 
than 15,726 hits. 
To identify those documents that cover most discussion on the 
linkage, and hence narrow down the sample, a set of pre-screening 
criteria was applied – referring to the type of document, document 
language, and contents related to one of the five concepts (see step 
2b in Figure 3). This filtration procedure left us, temporarily, with 
226 documents. 
The aim of the third step was to identify documents most 
relevant for addressing the first sub-question of this review (What is 
needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses 
to forced migration crises?). For this purpose, we established as a 
necessary condition that documents to be included in the final 
sample must contain detailed information on a certain concept. In 
doing so, they must provide a characterization of the humanitarian-
                                                 
69 Another concept – disaster risk reduction – is also mentioned in various 
overview studies. However, we did not include it because of its narrow focus on 
natural disasters, which makes it irrelevant for the context of forced migration 
crises in the second step (empirical approach) of our analysis. 
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development gap and recommendations on how to bridge it. 
Empirical studies were included only if they fulfilled this condition. 
We also used other selection criteria: synthesis study (either 
overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings 
on more than one actor/country); focus on fragile states; focus on 
protracted crises; focus on forced migration (see step 3 in Figure 3).  
As a result, a total of 30 studies were found that deal with the 
humanitarian-development nexus from different conceptual 
perspectives. 70  Hardly any study investigates the nexus in 
connection to forced migration (Table 5). In the end, studies that 
focus on fragile states and/or protracted crises turned out closest to 
our object of investigation. 
                                                 
70 Irrespective of the sampling procedure, we added seven studies suggested by 
consulted experts. Among them are documents, which were prepared for the 
World Humanitarian Summit 2016 in Istanbul. The seven additional documents 
were analysed without using the code system applied to the core sample studies 
(see below), as they do not constitute a new concept. We used them to enrich 
findings derived from the review, and to identify possible emerging aspects not 
covered in the sample studies. 
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Figure 3: Sampling procedure to identify the conceptual 
sample 
 
Source: Authors’ own  
 
       
146 
Table 7: Database by type for the conceptual sample 
Database by 
Type 
Website 
United Nations 
(humanitarian, 
development 
and dual 
mandate) 
UNDP 
(www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/library.html) 
UNICEF (www.unicef.org/) 
UNHCR (www.unhcr.de/service/publikationen.html) 
WFP (www.wfp.org/) 
UNEG (www.unevaluation.org/evaluation/reports) 
Network/ 
Coalition 
PreventionWeb 
(www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/) 
ReliefWeb (www.reliefweb.int/topics) 
Provention Consortium 
(www.proventionconsortium.net/) 
ALNAP (www.alnap.org/resources/) 
IASC 
(www.interagencystandingcommittee.org/resources/ias
c-products) 
Think 
Tank/Research 
Institution 
DIE (www.die-gdi.de/publikationen/) 
ODI/HPG (www.odi.org/publications) 
GPPi (www.gppi.net/publications/categories/innovation-
in-development/#) 
URD (www.urd.org/Publications) 
3IE (www.3ieimpact.org/) 
International 
Organization 
ICRC (www.icrc.org/en/resource-centre) 
IFRC (www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-
reports/general-publications/) 
OECD (www.oecd-ilibrary.org/) 
Non-
Governmental 
Organization 
Oxfam (www.policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications) 
Welthungerhilfe (www.welthungerhilfe.de/ueber-
uns/mediathek.html) 
Development 
Bank 
World Bank 
(www.worldbank.org/en/publication/reference) 
KFW (www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Internationale-
Finanzierung/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/Publikationen-
Videos/Publikationen-thematisch/) 
Donor/Part of 
Government 
AA (www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Startseite_node.html) 
BMZ 
(www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/index.html) 
IOB (www.iob-evaluatie.nl/en/topics) 
Danida (www.um.dk/en/danida-en/results/eval/) 
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Sida 
(www.sida.se/English/publications/Publication_database
/?epieditmode=true) 
USAID (www.usaid.gov/reports-and-data) 
ECHO (www.ec.europa.eu/echo/) 
European Commission 
(www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/home_en) 
Federal 
enterprise  
(provider of 
international 
cooperation 
services) 
GIZ (www.giz.de/de/mediathek/116.html) 
Academic/Eval
uation 
Resource 
Centre 
Wiley Online Library 
(www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/advanced/search) 
JSTOR (www.jstor.org/action/showAdvancedSearch) 
Emerald Insight (www.emeraldinsight.com/) 
World Bank IEG 
(www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations) 
OECD DEREC 
(www.oecd.org/derec/?hf=5&b=0&s=score) 
 
Sample characteristics 
Table 8 shows how the 30 studies from the conceptual sample are 
distributed across our five concepts. The LRRD concept is 
represented in almost half of the studies, followed by Resilience, 
Whole of Government, Early Recovery, and Connectedness. 
 
Table 8: Number of studies per concept 
Concept Number of documents 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 14 
Whole of Government 4 
Resilience 8 
Connectedness 1 
Early Recovery 3 
TOTAL 30 
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This distribution was stable throughout both sampling steps (see 
step 2 and 3 in Figure 3). As we did not aim to establish an equal 
number of documents for each concept, the unbalanced distribution 
was not a surprise. Among those deemed most relevant for 
addressing our first sub-question, many studies are dwelling on 
LRRD. 
Table 9 shows that the conceptual sample includes different 
kinds of studies. More than two-thirds, 23 selections, belong to one 
single category: agency reports and other forms of grey literature. 
Seven are classified as academic literature, including peer-reviewed 
articles in academic journals or books.  
The literature is published by a variety of institutions, including 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, international 
organizations, as well as research institutions. We wanted to capture 
the linkage discourse in full depth, so we avoided any search 
restriction on publication dates. They range from 1994 to 2016. 
Consequently, our sample provides a “historical perspective”, 
old and new studies that have influenced the discourse on the 
humanitarian-development nexus. These studies may, potentially, 
capture all relevant aspects and possible changes of the five 
concepts. 
Table 9: Description of the conceptual sample by type of 
document 
Institution  Published  Concept 
Grey literature (23)   
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) 2005 LRRD 
European Commission (EC) 2001 LRRD 
Governance and Social Dev. 
Resource Centre (GSDRC) 
2015 LRRD 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) 2014 LRRD 
Danish International Development 
Agency (Danida) 
2015 LRRD 
United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) 
2015 LRRD 
Policy and Operations Evaluation 
Department (IOB) 
2013 LRRD 
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Swiss Red Cross (SRC) 2010 LRRD 
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) 2011 LRRD 
Brandenburg Institute for Society 
and Security (BIGS) 
2013 Whole of 
Government 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 
2006 Whole of 
Government 
International Peace Academy (IPA) 2007 Whole of 
Government 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development - 
Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD-DAC) 
2006 Connectedness 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
2008 Early Recovery 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) 2009 Early Recovery 
Global Cluster for Early Recovery 
(GCER) 
2016 Early Recovery 
Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) 
2015 Resilience 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
2014 Resilience 
European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ecdpm) 
2013 Resilience 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) 2014 Resilience 
Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in 
humanitarian action (ALNAP) 
2015 Resilience 
United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) 
2012 Resilience 
HealthNet TPO, War Child, Save the 
Children 
2014 Resilience 
Academic literature (7)   
Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
The Johns Hopkins University/Global 
Public Policy Institute 
2009 LRRD 
Disasters Journal 1997 LRRD 
Disasters Journal 2000 LRRD 
Danish Institute for International 
Studies (DIIS) 
2013 Whole of 
Government 
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS) 1996 LRRD 
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS) 2012 Resilience 
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS) 1994 LRRD 
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To get a rough impression of the empirical foundation, we analysed 
whether the conceptual studies are building their considerations on 
empirical evidence. 71 Half of them, base their considerations on 
their own or others’ empirical work, our analysis demonstrates. 
However, none of them derive their conceptual considerations from 
impact assessments. They build on anecdotal evidence. 
Content analysis of the conceptual sample 
To extract how the conceptual studies characterise the 
humanitarian-development gap from their respective perspective 
and how they recommend building bridges, we conducted a 
qualitative content analysis of these studies (see Mayring, 2014; 
Schreier, 2012). Four questions helped us to a well-founded answer 
to the first sub-question: 
1. What are the specific characteristics of the humanitarian-
development gap highlighted in a study? 
2. What are the specific recommendations on how to bridge the 
gap? 
3. What justification is given regarding the need to link 
humanitarian assistance with development cooperation? 
4. What is the empirical foundation of the concepts and the 
recommendations?  
The first and the second question are focused on essentials related 
to our first sub-question. Once we know what the humanitarian-
development gap consists of, and find specific recommendations on 
how to bridge the gap at different levels, we will be able to describe 
what is needed to effectively link the two realms. The third and 
fourth questions give us a more complete picture. The third one 
pays particular attention to explanations on why linkages are vital. 
The fourth question sheds light on the empirical foundation of 
conceptual claims. 
                                                 
71 For this purpose, we assigned an additional ´evidence-code´ to all text 
segments identified in content analyses (see below). The code distinguishes 
between (1) own empirical evidence based on impact assessment, (2) own 
empirical evidence without impact assessment, (3) reference to empirical 
evidence based on impact assessment, (4) reference to empirical evidence 
without impact assessment, (5) no empirical evidence at all. 
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The content analysis was based on a code scheme: codes (words 
or short phrases) were assigned to corresponding text segments in 
order to extract and systematize the information of interest form the 
conceptual studies. Since we don’t have a clear-cut theory on the 
linkage between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation, we applied an inductive coding approach, in which the 
codes stem from the material to be coded itself (Mayring, 2014: 79). 
This required an iterative coding process in a couple of steps: 
1. We developed a basic framework of the coding scheme deduced 
from the four questions above. Regarding the first one, for 
example, we created the main code “description of the 
humanitarian development gap”. 
2. By identifying specific information provided in the studies 
related to one of the main codes (and, thus, to one of the four 
questions), we added new (sub-)codes – capturing the essence 
of this information – to the respective main code. For example, 
if we found a text segment, which stated that the humanitarian-
development gap is characterized by a lack of joint planning 
among actors from the two realms, we added the new sub-code 
“planning gap” (as one dimension of the humanitarian-
development gap) to the main code “description of the 
humanitarian development gap”. A specific recommendation on 
how to bridge the gap with regard to the planning dimension 
received a corresponding code: “planning gap” => 
“recommendation xy”. 
In this second step, each member of the coding team reviewed 
the same five documents in order to formulate new codes and 
assign them to text segments. The team had three members. 
Decisions on new codes were taken after a close reading of texts. 
Codes and their corresponding codings (text segments) were 
then discussed in a joint feedback round. 
This dialogic approach had several advantages. It helped us to 
reach a common understanding on the use of codes, and 
provided opportunities to supplement and refine our scheme. 
Moreover, it served to assess the inter-coder reliability as an 
indicator of measurement consistency. Inter-coder reliability can 
clarify whether different members of a team are working 
consistently (Neuendorf, 2002: 141). After some rounds of 
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feedback, we reached a consensus and could assign a certain 
code to a corresponding text segment. 
3. We expanded the coding to our entire sample (30 documents). 
Each team member coded ten sources. Once a new code was 
created in order to capture additional aspects agreed upon 
within the team, it was assigned to respective text segments in 
the 30 studies – including segments that previously had been 
marked with other codes. This implies that the subset of our 
sampled literature had also been recoded. 
This systematic approach – simultaneously assigning existing codes 
and supplementing the code scheme with new codes to be assigned 
to relevant text segments – resulted in 3,491 codings (text segments) 
across all codes. We used MAXQDA®, a software package for 
qualitative data analysis. To distil a common message for each code, 
we listed all text segment per code. Depending of the respective 
code, this could be a definition of a certain dimension of the 
humanitarian-development gap (a planning dimension for instance) 
or one or several core recommendations on how to close the gap 
with respect to this particular dimension. 
Overall, we identified seven different dimensions of the 
humanitarian-development gap and nineteen recommendations 
filtered out of the conceptual sample studies on how to close the 
gap with respect to these dimensions. In other words, the studies 
conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap as a multi-
dimensional problem. It appears on different levels (or certain areas 
of activities respectively), such as on a strategic level or on an 
implementation level. In this interpretation, the humanitarian-
development gap is the sum of the following sub-gaps: (1) a vision 
and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an 
institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) 
a sequence gap. Definitions of these sub-gaps and 
recommendations on how to close these gaps, are integrated into 
the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4. 
The framework represents a leap forward to conceptual clarity. 
It captures the state-of-the-art knowledge on the linkage discourse 
by synthesizing the most relevant concepts into a single analytical 
framework. In the empirical part of our review, the framework 
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allowed us to analyse empirical studies on the international response 
to a forced migration crisis through the linkage lens. This addressed 
the second sub-question guiding our review. 
Empirical analysis 
To answer the question to what extent and why (or why not) the 
recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been 
established in practice of a pertinent forced migration crisis, we 
applied the analytical framework to analyse empirical studies on the 
international response to the Syria crisis. The rationale for selecting 
this case is simple: If there is evidence of successful linking, it will 
most likely be found in the most relevant case in terms of political 
pressure, funding levels, and applied aid modalities. 
In addition, the global humanitarian system is under 
transformation, largely triggered by protracted recent crises 
(Humanitarian Policy Group et al., 2016). Thus, it is plausible to 
investigate the international response to the Syria crisis in which the 
humanitarian-development nexus should be apparent. 
Sampling procedure 
In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on the 
extent to which the recommended humanitarian-development 
linkages have been established in the international response to the 
Syria crisis, we applied a sampling procedure in two steps (see 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Sampling procedure to identify the empirical sample 
 
Source: Authors’ own  
 
In a first step, we selected empirical literature on the international 
response to the forced migration crisis of Syria in the Syria 
Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons 
Learning (CALL) (syrialearning.org).72 For this purpose, we focused 
                                                 
72 The aim of the portal is to foster collective learning regarding the Syria crisis, 
and to improve the international emergency response. The portal brings 
together a broad range of information, data, discussions, and analyses. It is 
maintained by the ALNAP secretariat, in cooperation with the CALL initiative. 
CALL is a project developed by the Inter-Agency Steering Committee for 
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on evaluations, evaluative studies, and other documents providing 
empirically based assessments on the response inside Syria and in 
neighbouring countries that host Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Turkey). 
To identify documents that provide an assessment based on 
empirical investigations, we restricted the sample to evaluations, 
reports, (case) studies, collections of lessons learnt/learned, impact 
assessments, reviews, research papers, surveys, assessments, 
regional analysis, articles, and briefs containing information on the 
applied methodological approach. To verify that no relevant 
documents are missed when selecting on the Syria Learning Portal, 
we additionally crosschecked other international and supranational 
databases. This procedure supplied us with 34 new documents. We 
added them to the sample, which then contained 466 documents 
published between 01/2011 (the beginning of the crisis response) 
and 04/2017.Only documents in English were selected.73 
In a second step, we then restricted the selected empirical 
literature to those documents that address the sub-gaps of the 
humanitarian-development gap identified in the conceptual studies. 
For this purpose, we searched in the empirical literature for 
keywords extracted from our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), 
which contains definitions of the sub-gaps and recommendations 
on how to bridge them. 
Two criteria were considered: the spread of sub-gaps (How many 
sub-gaps are addressed in an actual empirical study based on the 
keywords found?) and the intensity of investigation (How 
intensively is a certain sub-gap addressed in an empirical study based 
                                                 
Humanitarian Evaluations (IAHE). It has quite a few members: FAO, ICVA 
(International Council of Voluntary Agencies), Oxfam, UNHCR, UNICEF, 
OCHA, the WFP, WHO, and World Vision. Given the variety of members and 
partners, we assumed that this platform would house the most comprehensive 
collection of information on responses to the Syria Crisis. Furthermore, we 
assumed that information from institutions that are members of CALL or 
ALNAP are included in the Syria Learning Platform. 
73 All documents on the Syria Learning Portal are in English (some have also 
been published in other languages). The restriction to documents in English 
caused no loss of possibly relevant documents. For the other databases, we also 
restricted our search to documents in English. 
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on the number of keywords found for this sub-gap?). To ´secure´ 
this selection procedure, a necessary condition was established: to 
restrict the sample to those documents in which the words 
“humanitarian” and “development” are found together in a 
sentence at least five times in one document. This procedure 
reduced the sample massively: from 466 to 61 documents. 
In combining both criteria, we selected those empirical studies 
that address more sub-gaps than other studies and/or that 
investigate these sub-gaps more intensively. 
To challenge the resulting sample of 33 documents, we tested for 
´false positives´ by screening all of them. Three documents were 
deemed irrelevant and then removed. We also tested for ´false 
negatives´. For this purpose, we randomly picked four documents 
previously identified as irrelevant, and could verify that they provide 
no information on humanitarian-development linkages. 
In the end, we had an empirical sample of 30 evaluations and 
evaluative studies, published between 2013 and 2017 (Table 10). 
Sample characteristics 
Table 10 provides an overview on the basic characteristics of our 
empirical sample (i.e. evaluations and evaluative studies on the 
international response to the Syria crisis): publication year, 
institution, and investigated country. The studies were conducted or 
funded by international organizations, bilateral donors, research 
institutions, and civil society organizations. Publication dates range 
from 2013 to 2017. About half the sample studies apply a cross-
country approach; they investigate more than one country in the 
region. Most studies inspect Jordan and/or Lebanon closely. There 
is only one case study on Turkey. 
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Table 10: Description of the empirical sample 
Author 
 
Institution Country Publicati
on year 
Bailey and Barbelet UNDP, ODI Region 2014 
Bellamy et al. HPG, ODI Turkey, Jordan 2017 
Betts et al. Norad Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Turkey 
2016 
Bouché and Mohieddin UNDP Lebanon Jordan 2014 
Boustani. et al. iied Lebanon 2016 
Ciacci Oxfam Italia Lebanon 2014 
Crawford - Syria 2015 
Cullbertson. et al. UNICEF, RAND Jordan 2015 
Darcy  CALL Region 2016 
DEMAC DEMAC Syria 2016 
Drummond et al. WFP, ODI Region 2015 
Ernst et al. DFAT Region 2014 
Forced Displacement 
and Dev. Study Group 
CGD; IRC Region 2017 
Guay  World Vision Lebanon, Jordan 2015 
Hidalgo et al. UNHCR Jordan Lebanon 
 
Howe et al. Feinstein 
International 
Center 
Syria 2015 
Int. Rescue Committee IRC Lebanon, Jordan 2016 
Lawry-White and 
Schloffer 
IFRC Jordan, 
Lebanon, 
Turkey, Syria 
2014 
Lee and Pearce  WRC Region 2017 
Mercy Corps et al. M.C., IRC Syria 2016 
Meyer. S. UNHCR Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon 
2013 
Mowjee. T. et al. Sida Region 2015 
OCHA and REACH OCHA, REACH Lebanon 2014 
REACH REACH Jordan 2014 
SDC SDC Lebanon 2014 
Tillinac. A. et al. IOM Iraq, Syria 2015 
UNESCO UNESCO Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq 
2016 
UNFPA UNFPA Turkey 2014 
UNHCR UNHCR Jordan 2014 
Zyck and Armstrong HPG  Jordan 2014 
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To assess the methodological quality of the empirical studies, and 
thus the validity of their findings, we applied eight quality criteria 
commonly used in meta-evaluations to investigate the quality of 
evaluations (Alton-Lee, 2004; DeGEval, 2008; Glock and Karliczek, 
2014; Stufflebeam, 1999) and that focus on: independence, 
transparency of evaluation questions and criteria, methodological 
approach, data collection and analysis (Table 11).74 Based on the 
application of these criteria, we judged the overall methodological 
quality as “sufficient” (with a median of 5 points out of 8, reaching 
a pre-defined threshold of more than half of the points).75 Almost 
all studies in the empirical sample formulated evaluation questions, 
answered them by triangulated methods and data sources, and 
dedicated a whole section to procedures for data collection and 
analysis as well as data used.  
Table 11: Methodological quality of the empirical sample 
Category Quality Criterion (QC) (1/0) N 
Independence QC 1: External evaluation. 19 
Formulation 
and 
application of 
evaluation 
questions 
QC 2: Evaluation questions are formulated, and 
findings are organized along these questions (0.5 
if only one of both applied). 
28 
Formulation 
and 
application of 
evaluation 
criteria 
QC 3: Evaluation criteria are applied, and findings 
are presented in relation to these criteria (0.5 if 
only one of both applied). 
10 
Methodology/ 
plausibility of 
findings and 
conclusions 
QC 4: The evaluation spells out a theory of 
change. 
10 
QC 5: The evaluation triangulates methods and 
sources. 
25 
QC 6: The evaluation makes methodological and 
other limitations transparent. 
22 
                                                 
74 This approach is based exclusively on information spelled out explicitly in 
evaluation reports. Unpublished background information remains a non-
explored field. 
75 Since there is no theoretical criterion for determining such a threshold, we 
decided to grade the quality of those studies as “sufficient” that reach more than 
50% of points. 
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QC 7: The evaluation includes a methodological 
section or annex that describes procedures for 
data collection and analysis (0.5 if only one of 
both applied). 
17 
QC 8: The evaluation includes a section or annex 
that describes the data used. 
27 
 
Content analysis of the empirical sample 
To extract evidence on the extent to which and why effective 
humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the 
international response to the Syria crisis, we conducted a content 
analysis of the 30 selected empirical studies. For this purpose, we 
applied a coding scheme that is derived from the analytical 
framework (deductive coding approach). For each of the seven sub-
gaps and nineteen recommendations formulated in the analytical 
framework on how to close the sub-gaps, the code scheme entails a 
corresponding code, which was assigned to relevant text segments. 
Our aim was to extract relevant information and systematize it. 
To distil a main message for each recommendation, we listed all 
text segments per code and synthesized our findings. They are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
Since the second sub-question focuses on not only the extent to 
which the recommended linkages have been established in the 
international response to the Syria crisis, but also on reasons for 
implementation (or non-implementation), we also extracted 
information on hindering and conducive factors for bridging each 
one of the seven sub-gaps. 
It is impossible to find comprehensive answers to our overall 
question (how responses to forced migration crises can be linked 
effectively) without considering the effects of linkages on people 
affected by the crisis situation. Consequently, we captured all 
available empirical information on outputs, outcomes or impacts of 
bridging specific sub-gaps. 
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The content analysis of the empirical sample studies was guided 
by five questions: 
 
1. What is the positive evidence on bridging the respective sub-
gap?76 
 
2. What is the negative evidence on bridging the respective specific 
sub-gap, referring to the formulated recommendations?77 
 
3. What are hindering factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?  
 
4. What are conducive factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?  
 
5. What are the outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging the 
respective sub-gap? 
  
                                                 
76 In this review, we use the term “evidence” for all empirical findings provided 
by the sampled studies – irrespective of whether they have been generated on 
the basis of rigorous methods or not. We define evidence as positive when 
studies are describing measures aimed at closing a sub-gap of the humanitarian-
development gap. For example, positive evidence is registered when we find a 
clear lead for coordination between humanitarian and development actors. 
77 We define evidence as negative when the empirical studies provide evidence 
on the existence of a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. It is 
negative, for instance, when there is no clear lead in coordination between 
humanitarian and development actors, which hinders linkage. 
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Previous EBA-reports 
2018:01 DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund, Stephen 
Spratt, Peter O’Flynn, Justin Flynn 
2017:12 Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska 
biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet? Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys 
2017:11 Sweden’s Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the 
Past, Looking to the Future, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas 
G. Weiss 
2017:10 Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap, Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi 
2017:09 Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation, Ann-
Sofie Isaksson 
2017:08 Research capacity in the new global development agenda, Måns 
Fellesson 
2017:07 Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future 
prospects and policy options, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin  
2017:06 Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose 
of accountability and learning in aid evaluation, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian 
Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill 
2017:05 Local peacebuilding – challenges and opportunities, Joakim Öjendal, 
Hanna Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist 
2017:04 Enprocentmålet – en kritisk essä, Lars Anell 
2017:03 Animal health in development – it’s role for poverty reduction and 
human welfare, Jonathan Rushton, Arvid Uggla, Ulf Magnusson 
2017:02 Do Anti-Discrimination Measures Reduce Poverty Among 
Marginalised Social Groups? Rachel Marcus, Anna Mdee, Ella Page 
2017:01 Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee 
situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe, 
Anna Knoll, Andrew Sherriff 
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2016:11 Revitalising the policy for global development, Per Molander 
2016:10 Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania – Has It Helped 
the Poor?, Mark McGillivray, David Carpenter, Oliver Morrissey, 
Julie Thaarup 
2016:09 Exploring Donorship – Internal Factors in Swedish Aid to Uganda, 
Stein-Erik Kruse 
2016:08, Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the 
Swedish policy for global development Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román 
2016:07 Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm? 
Cathy Shutt 
2016:06 Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt, 
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys 
2016:05 Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Barbara Befani 
2016:04 Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson 
2016:03 Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education, 
Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy 
2016:02 Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect 
learning and time in school? Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne 
Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun 
2016:01 Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what 
works and why? Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin 
2015:09 In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence 
from forest conservation and household energy transitions, G. Köhlin, S.K. 
Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, D. Ternald 
2015:08 Business and human rights in development cooperation – has Sweden 
incorporated the UN guiding principles? Rasmus Klocker Larsen, Sandra 
Atler 
2015:07 Making development work: the quality of government approach, Bo 
Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg 
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2015:06 Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the 
private and public sectors in development cooperation, Sara Johansson de 
Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg 
2015:05 Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms 
in partner countries? Matt Andrews 
2015:04 Youth, entrepreneurship and development, Kjetil Bjorvatn 
2015:03 Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation, 
Rune Jansen Hagen 
2015:02 Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning, Expertgruppen 
för biståndsanalys  
2015:01 Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy, Richard 
Youngs  
2014:05 Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt, 
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys  
2014:04 The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a 
changing Africa? Christopher Humphrey  
2014:03 International party assistance – what do we know about the effects? 
Lars Svåsand  
2014:02 Sweden´s development assistance for health – policy options to support 
the global health 2035 goals, Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert 
Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison  
2014:01 Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy 
relevance, Anders Olofsgård  
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Previous DEval-reports 
Evaluation of the BMZ Action Plan for the Inclusion of Persons with 
Disabilities, Thomas Schwedersky, Lena Ahrens, Heike Steckhan, 
2017 [Report in English and German] 
Fostering learning. Creating transparency. 5 Years of DEval 2012-2017, 
2017 [Report in German] 
What we know about the effectiveness of budget support. Evaluation 
synthesis, Magdalena Orth, Johannes Schmitt, Franziska Krisch, 
Stefan Oltsch, 2017 [Report in English] 
Evaluation of the develoPPP.de Programme, Christoph Hartmann, Felix 
Gaisbauer, Kirsten Vorwerk, 2017 [Report in English and German] 
Donor-assisted land-use planning in the Philippines: insights from a multi-level 
survey, Melody Garcia Schustereder, Lena Hohfeld, Malte Lech 
Gerald Leppert, 2016 [Report in English] 
Integration of Technical Cooperation Instruments, Lutz Meyer, Stefan 
Oltsch, Simon Freund, Jan Tobias Polak, 2016  [Report in German] 
Agricultural value chains, Marcus Kaplan, Simon Bettighofer, Sabine 
Brüntrup-Seidemann, Martin Noltze, 2016 [Report in English and 
German] 
German Aid from a Partner Perspective, Jörg Faust, Stefan Leiderer, 
Takaaki Masaki, Bradley Parks, 2016 [Report in English] 
The develoPPP.de programme: a portfolio analysis, Kim Lücking, Hanne 
Roggemann, 2016 [Report in German] 
German Development Cooperation’s Contribution to Global Health, Khullat 
Munir, Markus Freund, 2016 [Report in English] 
Health Systems Strengthening in German Development Cooperation, Khullat 
Munir, Ilse Worm, 2016 [Report in English] 
Baseline Report for the German-Myanmar Programme on Sustainable 
Economic Development, Miriam Amine, Heike Steckhan, Stefan 
Silvestrini, 2016 [Report in English] 
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Small and Medium Enterprise Survey Myanmar, Miriam Amine, Reinhard 
Stockmann, 2015 [Report in English] 
Development Workers, Helge Roxin, Thomas Schwedersky, Jan Tobias 
Polak, Kirsten Vorwerk, Felix Gaisbauer, 2015 [Report in German] 
Accompanying measures to general budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Franziska Krisch, Johannes Schmitt, Ulrike Dörr, 2015 [Report in 
English and German] 
Evaluation practices of German development aid agencies, Kim Lücking, 
Simon Bettighofer, Simon Freund, 2015 [Report in German] 
Baseline study of DEval and its environment, Kim Lücking, Simon 
Bettighofer, Simon Freund, 2015 [Report in German] 
Aid for Trade, Policies and Strategies in German Development Cooperation, 
Antje Kröger, Petra Voionmaa, 2015 [Report in English] 
Thirty Years of Rwandan-German Development Cooperation in the Health 
Sector, Thomas Schwedersky, Martin Noltze, Felix Gaisbauer, 2014 
[Report in English and German] 
A Review of Evaluative Work of German Development Cooperation in 
Afghanistan, Renate Kirsch, Mary Beth Wilson, 2014 [Report in 
English and German] 
 
